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The Color of Creditworthiness: Debt, Race, and Democracy in the 21st Century 
addresses the historical and contemporary politics of debt and race. It addresses the 
practices of debt and race together by demonstrating how debt has served as a central 
rhetorical and material nexus for producing asymmetrical power relationships between 
subjects figured as creditors or debtors through techniques for evaluating 
creditworthiness in varying combinations of moral, racial, economic, and political terms. 
The project proposes to view the creditor-debtor relation as the primary power relation 
underpinning capitalist society and liberal democracy, challenging a foundational 
assumption in liberal political theory and neoclassical economics that views exchange 
between contracting citizens or free-market actors as axiomatic. By contrast, the 
dissertation argues that capitalism and liberal democracy are based on asymmetrical 
power relations between creditor subjects who enjoy the political privilege of citizenship, 
the racial privilege of whiteness, and the economic privilege of creditworthiness, and 
debtor subjects figured as non-citizens, non-whites, and without credit.  
The dissertation first puts Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber into conversation 
to illustrate how religiously derived notions of indebtedness and creditworthiness 
contributed to producing the model of the rational economic subject during the rise of 
early capitalism. Second, it engages the work of Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, W. E. B. 
Du Bois, and Saidiya Hartman to show how race and debt functioned together as crucial 
political technologies that shaped the liberal capitalist regime, serving to discipline and 
dispossess free blacks in the Reconstruction-era American South. Third, it performs a 
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close reading of recent theoretical works on debt by Maurizio Lazzarato and Annie 
McClanahan to argue that the neoliberal debt economy, and credit scoring in particular, 
constitute techno-political infrastructures of control maintaining a “colorblind” form of 
racial capitalism in the United States today. Finally, the dissertation draws on work in 
democratic theory from Wendy Brown, William Connolly, W. E. B. Du Bois and Joel 
Olson to make a case for the abolition of the contemporary regime of racialized 
indebtedness, which poses a severe threat to the unfinished project of democracy in 
America by undermining democratic citizenship, institutions and forms of popular 
struggle. 
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Introduction | Politicizing Debt in the 21st Century 
 
“Everything in this 'system' depends on the appearance of trade in which debtor is 
neither slave nor wagelaborer but a trader with an ironclad obligation to pay back the 
advance. Why this fiction of trade should exercise so much power is one of the great 
oddities of political economy . . . In this topsy-turvy semiosis, who was to say who was 
creditor and who was debtor, let alone what made a man a debtor and a debt a man?”  
— Michael Taussig1 
 
Today, the words “credit” and “debt” are perpetually on the lips of journalists, 
politicians, and economists, often followed by troubling descriptors like “crunch,” “risk,” 
“bubble,” or “crisis.” From 1980 to the 2008 financial crisis, easy access to credit became 
the preferred solution through which the economy could continue to grow unceasingly, 
and the American dream of upward mobility and property ownership could be extended 
to an ever-expanding middle class. This dream of freedom could finally be extended to 
historically excluded populations deemed unworthy in the past. However, in recent years 
we have witnessed the collapse of financial markets built on housing debt, student loan 
levels in the U.S. topping $1.3 trillion dollars,2 sovereign debt levels leading to a 
showdown between Greece and the EU, and again in the U.S., massive debt crises in the 
City of Detroit and the territory of Puerto Rico leading to governmental takeovers, 
bankruptcies, and structural adjustments. After the housing bubble burst, leading to a 
global economic recession, the problem of mounting indebtedness in both the public and 
private sectors led to calls for “austerity” and belt-tightening in the European Union and 
the United States. Now, nearly a decade after the crisis, the U.S. stock market is soaring 
                                                 
1 Taussig, Michael. Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing. Nachdr. 
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2004, 66.  
2 Student loan debt now surpasses consumer debt from credit cards, auto loans, and home equity lines of 
credit. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit - 2017Q3.” 




again, and Republican majorities in Congress are poised to curtail regulations and 
drastically cut taxes on corporations and the ultra-wealthy, suddenly unconcerned with 
adding upwards of $1.5 trillion to the deficit over the next decade. 
It is now routine to make student loan payments for decades after borrowing the 
money needed to finance a higher education. We swipe our credit cards every day to 
purchase anything from a single cup of coffee to an expensive dental procedure. We 
make regular payments to private lenders to pay for the cars we drive and the homes in 
which we live. We are mostly unconcerned or at least indifferent to the reality that our 
purchase histories and consumer activities are carefully monitored, recorded, quantified, 
and shared by credit bureaus like Experian and Transunion and companies like Google 
which silently monitor our “views” and “clicks” as we browse and shop on the internet.  
Perhaps most strikingly, the 45th President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, 
campaigning upon his business prowess and “art of the deal,” is unrepentant about the 
fact that his companies have undergone Chapter 11 bankruptcy on four separate 
occasions – more than any other company in the last 30 years.3 As Trump remarked in 
the first Republican Presidential debate on August 6th, 2016, “I have used the laws of this 
country ... the [bankruptcy] chapter laws, to do a great job for my company, for myself, 
for my employees, for my family.”4 Doing a great job for his companies, employees and 
for himself has meant legally outmaneuvering his creditors to shed the debts he owed to 
banks, employees, and suppliers.5 However, Trump did not shed all of his debt before 
entering the Oval Office. As of May 2016, he owed $713 million via 16 different loans to 
                                                 
3 Isidore, Chris. “Everything you want to know about Donald Trump’s bankruptcies.” CNN Money. August 
31, 2015. http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/31/news/companies/donald-trump-bankruptcy/index.html 





creditors, loans which pose numerous potential conflicts of interest. 6 Thus, like the 
investment banks bailed out with taxpayer money in 2008, Trump represents the strange 
case of the debtor who has become “too big to fail.” He is a living example of the saying: 
“If you owe the bank a hundred thousand dollars, the bank owns you. If you owe the 
bank a hundred million dollars, you own the bank.”7   
Trump’s history of bankruptcy and indebtedness appears to have done nothing to 
temper his willingness to judge others who find themselves in debt. When Puerto Rico 
was devastated by Hurricane Maria in September 2017, its finances were under the 
control of a Federal supervisory board put in place after Puerto Rico had effectively 
declared bankruptcy the previous May with a staggering debt burden of approximately 
$123 billion.8 Puerto Rico’s public infrastructure, including its power grid, had fallen into 
disrepair well before Maria, due to budget cuts and austerity measures imposed by high 
debt service costs.9 However, at the time of its bankruptcy declaration, Trump said on 
Twitter that there should be no “bailout” for Puerto Rico.10 After Hurricane Maria had 
crippled the island, knocking out power to 3 million American citizens, and creating the 
potential for a massive humanitarian disaster in the days and weeks after the storm, 
Trump took to Twitter to tell Texas and Florida that they were “doing great,” while 
warning, “Puerto Rico, which was already suffering from broken infrastructure &massive 
                                                 
6 Choma, Russ. “A Guide to Donald Trump’s Huge Debts—and the Conflicts They Present.” Mother Jones. 
December 12, 2016. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/guide-donald-trump-debt/ 
7 Graeber, David. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Updated and expanded ed. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 
2014, 1. 
8 Walsh, Mary Williams. “Puerto Rico Declares a Form of Bankruptcy.” The New York Times. May 3, 
2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html 
9 Vives, Ruben and Molly Hennessy-Fiske. “Puerto Rico's debt-plagued power grid was on life support 
long before hurricanes wiped it out.” The Los Angeles Times. September 28, 2017. 
http://beta.latimes.com/nation/la-na-puerto-rico-power-20170925-story.html 





[sic] debt, is in deep trouble…”11 Going further, the four time bankrupt President, himself 
in debt for hundreds of millions of dollars, tweeted, “Much of the Island was destroyed, 
with billions of dollars owed to Wall Street and the banks, which,sadly, [sic] must be 
dealt with.”12 Puerto Rico, with its long history of colonization and exploitation, was now 
suffering, in the words of San Juan’s Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz, a “slow death” at the 
hands of both debt and natural disaster, and it was being blamed for its tragic fate by 
someone whose career in real estate and politics was fueled precisely by failing to pay his 
debts.13  
We may chide Puerto Rico for its supposedly irresponsible behavior, or feel 
sympathy for Puerto Ricans suffering the effects of natural and economic disasters 
outside of its control. We may denounce Trump for his hypocrisy, or excuse him because 
he was savvy enough to game the system. We may have heard in the press that exotic 
debt-related securities called CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) and huge leveraged 
bets by investment banks were major factors in the 2008 financial crisis. But how much 
do we know about the networks of credit and debt that simultaneously shape our routine 
existence, make us feel obligated and responsible to repay money we’ve borrowed, and 
have the power to keep states and economies afloat, or bring them to their knees? Credit 
and debt affect us like two sides of the same coin: gift and risk, hope and despair. Credit 
is the life-blood of the capitalist economy, while its mercurial twin, debt, has the power to 
crash markets, destroy selective constituencies, and poison the body politic.  
                                                 




13 Anderson, John Lee. “The Mayor of San Juan on Trump’s “Big Mouth” and What Puerto Rico Needs.” 





As this dissertation will illustrate, the paradoxical and crisis-prone relationship 
between credit and debt in contemporary society cannot be fully grasped by any one 
discipline. This requires attention to debt’s history and to its politics. By “politics” I will 
refer to debt’s ability to influence the distributions of power, wealth, status and life 
chances among individuals and groups within or between societies. Too often when debt 
is discussed in scholarly debates it is drained of political content and left to appear as a 
technical feature of the market. Debt is depoliticized in two primary ways. On the one 
hand, debt is treated as a narrowly defined and technical feature of the economy to be 
properly managed through scientific calculation and expertise. On the other hand, a debt 
is routinely assumed to be a solemn moral obligation deriving from a voluntary 
contractual exchange, which must be repaid no matter what. In a fascinating way, debt 
straddles a fault line between the moral and the economic, between the ostensibly 
subjective realm of culture and religion and the objective realm of economic models and 
market necessities. The politics of debt traverse this dividing line, requiring an 
understanding of both dimensions and the ways in which they interact, infuse, and 
conceal each other. 
Following Friedrich Nietzsche, I will argue that it is better to consider debt less as 
a thing—a gift with strings attached; a promise to repay a quantifiable amount of money 
with interest by a certain date; a financial instrument—than as a relation between creditor 
and debtor through which power circulates, fashioning subjects on each side by imbuing 
each with relative rights, obligations, and status indicators.14 Through this power relation, 
                                                 
14 See Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, Keith Ansell-Pearson, and Carol Diethe. On the Genealogy of 






those fashioned as creditors are able to influence the current and future conduct of those 
in their debt. For the most part in contemporary capitalist society, creditors enjoy high 
status and moral superiority while debtors are routinely blamed for a lack of sound 
judgment and loose morals leading them down the path to insolvency and dependency. 
Moreover, creditors enjoy rights and legal apparatuses for enforcing repayment, seizing 
assets and punishing debtors in a variety of ways if they fail to repay the debts on time. 
However, this is not always the case, as evidenced by powerful debtors who wield 
outsized power when they are considered to be “too big to fail,” and manage to offload 
their moral and economic obligation to repay their debts onto others – à la Donald 
Trump.   
While debt has attracted considerable scholarly attention in disciplines beyond 
economics— anthropology in particular15—few studies in political theory or political 
science have addressed debt as an explicit object of scholarly concern. While political 
economists and political scientists have certainly been concerned with financial crisis and 
the influence of markets and economic phenomena on political policies, institutions, and 
divisions, they tend to portray credit and debt primarily as technical features of the 
banking or public finance systems.16 Political theorists who have written more critically 
                                                 
15 Key anthropological works on debt that have influenced my thinking include Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: 
Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies. The Norton Library N378. New York: Norton, 
1967; Roitman, J. “Unsanctioned Wealth; Or, The Productivity of Debt in Northern Cameroon.” Public 
Culture 15, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 211–37. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-15-2-211; Taussig, Michael. 
Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing. Nachdr. Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 2004; Peebles, Gustav. “The Anthropology of Credit and Debt.” Edited by D Brenneis and 
PT Ellison. Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 225–40; Peebles, Gustav. “Washing Away the Sins 
of Debt: The Nineteenth-Century Eradication of the Debtors’ Prison.” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 55, no. 03 (July 2013): 701–24. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417513000297; Graeber, David. 
Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Updated and expanded ed. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2014. 
16 See Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly. 13. printing and 1. paperback printing. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011; Reinhart, Carmen, 
and Kenneth Rogoff. “A Decade of Debt.” Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 




on debt tend to divide between Marxist and Nietzschean orientations, though several 
(including myself) blur this line. Marxist approaches tend to downplay the specificity of 
debt in favor of finance and the dynamics of capital more generally; they also tend to 
downplay debt’s role in shaping the views and self-conceptions of economic actors 
themselves.17 Nietzschean approaches tend to emphasize debt’s relation to morality and 
subjectivity, while neglecting to address the historically specific practices and 
technologies essential to debt’s operations in social, political and financial institutions.18 
Furthermore, while the data on contemporary levels of indebtedness show significant 
racial disparities,19 there are vanishingly few studies in political science that address the 
                                                 
Financial History of the World. New York: Penguin Press, 2008; Blyth, Mark. Austerity: The History of a 
Dangerous Idea. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015; and Dyson, Kenneth. States, Debt, 
and Power: “Saints” and “Sinners” in European History and Integration. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2014. 
17 See for instance Martin, Randy. Financialization of Daily Life. Philadelphia, Pa: Temple Univ. Press, 
2002; Martin, Randy. An Empire of Indifference: American War and the Financial Logic of Risk 
Management. Social Text Books. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007; Bryan, D., R. Martin, and M. 
Rafferty. “Financialization and Marx: Giving Labor and Capital a Financial Makeover.” Review of Radical 
Political Economics 41, no. Perelman, Michael. The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy 
and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2000; Harvey, 
David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Reprinted. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011; Harvey, David. The 
Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism. Pbk. ed. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011; Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. 
“New and updated ed.” -- Cover. London ; New York: Verso, 2010; Hackworth, Jason R. The Neoliberal 
City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism. 1. printing. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 2007; and Ascher, Ivan. Portfolio Society: On the Capitalist Mode of Prediction. New York: 
Zone Books, 2016. 
18 Most prominent among the recent Nietzschean theorists writing on debt is Maurizio Lazzarato, for whom 
Marx remains a persistent influence and interlocutor, yet takes a back seat to Nietzsche in Lazzarato’s work 
on debt. Lazzarato, M., and Joshua David Jordan. The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the 
Neoliberal Condition. Semiotext(e) Intervention Series 13. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2012; 
Lazzarato, M. (Maurizio), Joshua David Jordan, and M. Lazzarato. Governing by Debt. Semiotext(e) 
Intervention Series 17. South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e), 2015. See also Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. European Perspectives. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1983; Deleuze, Gilles, and 
Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1994; 
Goede, Marieke de. Virtue, Fortune and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance. Borderlines 24. Minneapolis, 
Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2005; Mitropoulos, Angela. Contract & Contagion: From Biopolitics to 
Oikonomia. Brooklyn, N.Y: Minor Compositions, 2012; Joseph, Miranda. Debt to Society: Accounting for 
Life under Capitalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014; Bissonnette, J. F. "Resisting the 
Discipline of Debt: The Unfulfilled Radicalism of the 2012 Quebec Student Strike." Theory & Event, vol. 
18 no. 3, 2015. Project MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/article/586145. 
19 See “The Complex Story of American Debt: Liabilities in Family Balance Sheets.” The Pew Charitable 




racial politics of debt.20 Consequently, we lack scholarly accounts that are able to 
adequately theorize debt’s functioning and political effects in contemporary society. 
The Color of Creditworthiness is a full-length study in political theory that 
addresses this sizable gap in the literature concerning both the historical and 
contemporary politics of debt and race. Moreover, this dissertation is one of the first 
systematic attempts to theorize the interlacing moral, economic and political dimensions 
of credit and debt in their rhetorical, material, and racialized deployments in the United 
States and the greater Atlantic world from the period of early capitalism to the present. It 
addresses the practices of debt and race together by demonstrating how debt functions as 
an asymmetrical power relationship that forms and governs racialized subjects based on 
evaluations of creditworthiness. I hope to illustrate that assemblages of credit and debt as 
well as creditor-debtor relations offer an exciting, underappreciated and exceedingly 
timely area of research for political theorists and social scientists who seek to better 
understand the intersections of religion, race, liberalism, capitalism, and democracy – 
                                                 
of-american-debt, and “Twenty-to-one: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs between Whites, Blacks, and 
Hispanics.” Pew Research Center, Social and Demographic Trends, July 26, 2011. 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-
hispanics/ 
20 A notable exception who I will draw on extensively is historian, sociologist and political scientist W. E. 
B. Du Bois. See Du Bois, W. E. B, David W Blight, and Robert Gooding-Williams. The Souls of Black 
Folk. Boston: Bedford Books, 1997, and Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction In America: An Essay 
Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played In the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy In 
America, 1860-1880.New York: Russell & Russell, 1962. More recent scholarship outside of the political 
science discipline that does engage the subjects of race and debt together includes Hartman, Saidiya V. 
Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America. Race and 
American Culture. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997; Nguyen, Mimi Thi. The Gift of Freedom: 
War, Debt, and Other Refugee Passages. Next Wave: New Directions in Women’s Studies. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2012; Hyman, Louis. Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink. 3. printing, and 
1. paperback print. Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 2013; Harney, Stefano, and Fred Moten. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study. 
Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2013; Joseph, Miranda. Debt to Society: Accounting for Life under 
Capitalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014; and McClanahan, Annie, Dead Pledges: 




issues whose imbrications have recently begun to garner serious attention in the field of 
political theory as a whole.  
In this study, I focus on how the ideas, practices, and institutions associated with 
creditworthiness, indebtedness and racial identity complicate, challenge and enrich our 
understanding of moral responsibility, capitalist economies, and the democratic ideals of 
freedom, equality, and pluralism. My intention, in Michel Foucault’s terminology, is to 
“problematize” debt from the perspective of the present moment.21 In so doing, I am 
influenced by the method of genealogy instigated by Nietzsche and put into practice by 
Foucault and his students in an effort to see debt “with new eyes” and to render strange 
this subject that we are confronted with on a daily basis.22 Thus, I find it necessary to 
disregard disciplinary boundaries that would portray credit/debt as a phenomenon whose 
different aspects could be understood in separation from each other, with its technical or 
economic aspects to be studied by economists, its public and governmental aspects to be 
understood by political scientists, and its “moral” or “cultural” dimensions to be properly 
understood by philosophers, theologians, or anthropologists. As Georges Dumézil argues, 
in “young fields of study” it is imperative to:  
make use of all the material that offers itself, no matter which particular 
disciplines share it for the moment, and without subjecting it to arbitrary 
categorizations of one’s own; to examine what is given at length, with all 
its obvious facts, which are often less than facts, and also its mirages, which 
are sometimes more than mirages…23    
 
                                                 
21 See Foucault, Michel, Paul Rabinow, and James D. Faubion. The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-
1984. New York: New Press, 1997, 312.  
22 Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality, 8.  
23 Dumézil, Georges. Mitra-Varuna: An Essay On Two Indo-European Representations of 




Attempting to adhere to this advice, I do my best to follow the networks that compose 
and animate debt wherever they lead, charting religious, racial, economic, technological 
and political aspects of creditor-debtor relations and showing how they intersect and 
function together simultaneously.   
 As we will see, debt is a curiously promiscuous subject whose historical, 
material, and conceptual plasticity implicates it in multiple zones of contemporary 
cultural, economic, and political life. For my part, having grown up in the 1990s and 
2000s—an era of easy and ubiquitous credit—I was motivated to study political economy 
in graduate school after witnessing the 2008 financial crisis firsthand working for the 
New York Attorney General’s Office in a bureau charged with investigating the financial 
services industry. Somewhat ironically, I completed my study of the politics of debt on 
“borrowed time,” deferring payment of my student loans from my undergraduate degree 
to make ends meet as I analyzed the intricacies of a system in which education and 
indebtedness had become almost synonymous.  
Consequently, my desire to study and comprehend debt is more than purely 
academic. It stems from a gnawing curiosity which Foucault might describe as the drive 
to discover that which “enables one to get free of oneself.”24 I wondered: if who we are in 
the very fiber of our being—our consciousness of our own identities and who we feel we 
ought to be as subjects—is imbricated with ideas, practices, and feelings of 
creditworthiness and indebtedness, might an altered or transformed understanding of 
credit and debt allow us not only to get free of debt in a material/economic sense, but to 
get free of our own indebted selves? Indeed, how might we readjust the ways in which 
                                                 
24 Foucault, Michel, The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage Books, 




we think about debt to gain insight into the actual forces and elements that compose it, 
and, ultimately, to transform the often cruel and life-negating ways in which debt takes 
hold of our bodies and minds?  
I set out here to reexamine, in broad theoretical terms, the moral, economic, and 
political work performed by the nexus of credit and debt at crucial inflection points in the 
history of capitalism in Europe and the Americas. Reevaluating debt in this manner 
involved taking a series of questions being asked quietly and in isolation by authors 
scattered across a number of disciplines, drawing them together, and presenting them 
with the volume turned up. The big questions (or puzzles if you like) guiding the chapters 
of this dissertation are summarized as follows:  
 How have religious and moralistic understandings of credit and debt shaped the 
rise of capitalism, and why is it that the morality of debt has become so deeply 
and persistently engrained in the ethos of capitalism?  
 What is the relation between colonialism, slavery, indebtedness and the formation 
of racial divisions in the United States, both past and present?  
 How do racialized economies of debt articulate with liberal and neoliberal 
political philosophies and practices of government?  
 How do conceptions and practices related to creditworthiness and indebtedness 
intersect with both the ideals and realities of American democracy?   
Ultimately, my aim is to make the case that reimagining credit and debt is a serious, 
legitimate, and pressing scholarly and political concern, and that confronting the 




necessary step toward achieving a more just, egalitarian, and pluralistic democratic 
society.    
In more concrete terms, this dissertation argues that in Europe, the United States 
and the greater colonial world from the period of early capitalism to the present, debt has 
served as a central rhetorical and material nexus for producing asymmetrical power 
relationships between subjects figured as creditors or debtors through techniques for 
evaluating creditworthiness in varying combinations of moral, racial, economic, and 
political terms. In proposing to view the creditor-debtor relation as the primary power 
relation underpinning capitalist society and liberal democracy, I challenge a foundational 
assumption in liberal political theory and neoclassical economics that views exchange 
between contracting citizens or free-market actors as axiomatic. By contrast, I argue that 
capitalism and liberal democracy are founded on asymmetrical power relations between 
creditor subjects who enjoy the political privilege of citizenship, the racial privilege of 
whiteness, and the economic privilege of creditworthiness and debtor subjects who find 
themselves in the subordinated position of being non-citizens, non-whites, and without 
credit.   
Chapter 1, “Debt, Subjectivity, and the Emergence of Capitalism,” sets the stage 
for this argument by putting Nietzsche and Max Weber into conversation to illustrate 
how religiously derived and morally imbued notions of indebtedness and 
creditworthiness contributed to producing the dominant model of the rational economic 
subject during the rise of early capitalism. Here I explore four key elements that 
intertwine in the creditor-debtor relation: power, suffering, morality and subjectivity. I do 




Morality. I argue that Nietzsche provides a “dramatization” of credit and debt that poses a 
challenge to politically hegemonic and culturally entrenched assumptions that present 
voluntary exchange between rational subjects as the fundamental relationship of the 
contemporary social order. I also show how Nietzsche theorizes debt as constitutive of 
the type of morality that shapes and makes intelligible the model of the subject: homo 
oeconomicus. Second, I bring Nietzsche’s account into conversation with Max Weber’s 
discussions of subject formation and credit in The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirt’ of 
Capitalism and other texts. Weber allows us to align Nietzsche’s genealogy more 
explicitly with debt’s role in the emergence of capitalism. To take Weber seriously is to 
reckon with evidence that homo oeconomicus as the dominant subjective figure framing 
our understanding of human conduct did not emerge out of nowhere, but instead was the 
result of the beliefs and practices of Protestant religious sects who sought to maintain an 
appearance of creditworthiness among their members as a sign of their chosen status.  
Chapter 2, “Indebted Servitude and the Afterlife of Slavery in America,” draws on 
the work of Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Saidiya Hartman to place 
the genealogy of debt sketched in chapter one into a colonial frame. The rise of debt as a 
technology of political, moral, and economic accountability and control occurred at the 
inflection point between proto-capitalist political economies premised on chattel slavery 
and the development of a modern industrial capitalism operating, at least on its face, via 
free exchange and free labor. In this chapter, I explore how race and debt functioned 
together as crucial political technologies through which the postbellum liberal capitalist 
regime was able to discipline and dispossess free blacks in the Reconstruction-era 




and liberation by articulating the ways in which debt provided a moral and economic 
armature to maintain power relations of servitude under the auspices of freedom. To do 
so, I look to Du Bois and Hartman whose work draws from both Marx and Foucault, but 
expands beyond traditional Marxist and Foucauldian limits by seeking to more fully 
account for the predominant roles that colonialism, chattel slavery, and racism played and 
continue to play in capitalist political economy and liberal governmentality. Finally, this 
chapter explores how an ascendant liberal governmentality maintained and justified 
processes of accumulation by dispossession and forced labor by rhetorically and 
materially deploying credit and debt in a way that intertwined the imputed racial 
characteristics of blackness with the moral stigma and material bonds of indebtedness. 
Chapter 3, “Neoliberal Governmentality and Indebted Control,” takes up Gilles 
Deleuze’s discussion of debt and control in his essay “Postscript on the Societies of 
Control,” as well as recent critical works on debt by Maurizio Lazzarato and Annie 
McClanahan. I argue that the contemporary debt economy, and credit scoring in 
particular, constitute a techno-political infrastructure of control in the United States 
today. First, I explicate the contours of neoliberal governmentality and argue that credit 
and debt and the power relations between creditors and debtors are at the center of its 
operations. Second, I focus on how practices of credit scoring have changed with the 
advent of debt securitization and the quantitative revolution in economics, leading to a 
model of “control by risk” rather than “control by screening.” Third, the chapter 
addresses a significant gap in the literature on both neoliberalism and debt by 
highlighting how processes of racial formation and structural racism persist through the 




of accounting now employed in the debt economy. I contend in this chapter that debt 
constitutes a relatively unacknowledged infrastructure of control which, alongside mass 
incarceration and a carceral education system, maintains conditions of class inequality, 
white supremacy and “subprime” status for people of color in contemporary America. 
Finally, chapter 4, “Toward the Abolition of Indebted Democracy,” explicates the 
ways in which political technologies of debt working within neoliberal governmentality 
and racial capitalism are eroding fundamental democratic values, institutions, modes of 
citizenship and forms of struggle. I argue that indebted control constitutes a dire threat to 
what has always been an imperfect and unfinished project of democracy in America. To 
support this claim, the first part of the chapter offers a critique of Wendy Brown’s recent 
book Undoing the Demos in which she argues that neoliberalism poses a dire threat to 
democracy as we know it. I argue that, in failing to address the geo-temporal specificity 
of American neoliberalism and the living history of American democracy, Brown’s 
political vision misses both the centrality of debt to the antidemocratic neoliberal project, 
and the continuity between liberal and neoliberal democracies as “white democracies” 
founded on and operating via the supremacy of the white citizen. In order to provide a 
more robust conception of democracy than that provided by Brown, I turn to the work of 
William Connolly on pluralization, as well as to the work of theorists in the black radical 
tradition including W. E. B. Du Bois, James Baldwin, Christina Sharpe, and Joel Olson. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I examine the intersection of citizenship, 
whiteness, and credit using the work of W. E. B. Du Bois and Joel Olson. I argue that 
American democracy is corrupted by the tyrannical power of the self-anointed “white” 




credit—whiteness as a presupposed badge of moral rectitude, economic creditworthiness 
and full political citizenship, which is predicated on maintaining the degraded, indebted, 
and inferior status of people of color. I trace the ways in which white credit racially 
divides the democratic polity – from the Southern strategy of Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan to the Presidency of Donald Trump. In part three, I show how the slow time of 
democratic erosion periodically gives way to the emergency temporality of the debt 
crisis, in which the rule of the demos is suspended to make way for a unilateral executive 
power to reinstate conditions of market activity and capital accumulation. I do so through 
a sustained analysis of the practice of installing emergency managers to take over control 
of insolvent cities and school districts in the state of Michigan, with a specific focus on 
the Detroit bankruptcy. I hypothesize that taken together, these dynamics of the debt 
economy have helped to sustain the American racial project of white democracy in the 
post-civil rights era and have contributed to the recent resurgence of proto-fascist white 
nationalism and “Trumpism.” The chapter concludes the dissertation with a call for debt 
abolition coupled with the reimagination of both debt and democracy. I hypothesize that 
debt abolition could serve as one potential strategy for fomenting fugitive movements 
toward what Du Bois calls an “abolition-democracy:” a democratic society firmly 
committed to dismantling the political economy of white supremacy in all of its guises. 
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“To breed an animal which is able to make promises – is that not precisely the 
paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to humankind?” 
 –– Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
“Time is money . . . credit is money . . . money is of the prolific, generating nature. 
Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more.”  
 –– Benjamin Franklin2  
 
“The Federal deficit is too high, it is unsustainable, and it is immoral to keep the 
country running on credit: we have to finally tighten our belts and pay it down.” This 
argument circulates widely today, both inside and outside of Washington, among both 
Republicans and Democrats. During his presidential campaign in 2016, Republican 
senator Ted Cruz framed the argument on his campaign website in terms of a 
skyrocketing “burden of debt on children born today,” with a graph showing an 
exponential growth in newborn indebtedness from 1970 to the present.3 Cruz makes what 
is primarily a moral argument about public debt, insisting, “current and projected rates of 
government growth are unsustainable, irresponsible, and constitutionally indefensible.”4  
He argues that the federal debt is responsible for stifling household wealth, 
unemployment, slow growth, student indebtedness, and that it is “not only irresponsible, 
but immoral and unjust to future generations.”5  
                                                 
1 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, Keith Ansell-Pearson, and Carol Diethe. On the Genealogy of Morality. 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 38. 
2 Quoted in Weber, Max, Peter Baehr, and Gordon C. Wells. The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of 
Capitalism and Other Writings. Penguin Twentieth-Century Classics. New York: Penguin Books, 2002. 
3 Cruz, Ted. “Five for Freedom.” Ted Cruz 2016, accessed February 12, 2016, 
https://www.tedcruz.org/five-for-freedom/  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
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Similarly, the non-partisan Brookings Institute issued a report targeting the 2016 
presidential candidates, which also argues that reducing the Federal debt should be a top 
priority. Fiscal policy experts Bob Bixby and Maya MacGuineas argue that “reducing the 
long-term debt is in fact an economic growth plan because government debt crowds out 
productive investment in people, machinery, technology, and new ventures, resulting in 
fewer job opportunities, lower wages, and slower GDP growth.”6 This argument differs 
from that of Cruz in that it seeks to make debt an issue of purely pragmatic and technical 
problem solving. As Bixby and MacGuineas put it, “It’s a matter of arithmetic, not 
ideology.”7 These two arguments encapsulate the somewhat puzzling contemporary 
political terrain of credit and debt. Issues surrounding debt of all kinds, from the Federal 
deficit to consumer credit card debt, from Greek sovereign debt to a city’s bond payments 
and credit rating, are presented either as moral questions relating to debt burdens and the 
obligation to repay them or as technical matters of “arithmetic” relating to the often 
arcane mechanics of economic and financial markets – sometimes as both 
simultaneously.  
Today, the grounds that serve as the basis for the prevalent moral evaluation of 
debt, nicely encapsulated in the statement “one has to pay one’s debts,” are rarely 
questioned.8 The notion that it is immoral to not repay a debt, that one must, no matter the 
circumstances, repay a debt with interest, and that in general, one should feel guilty for 
being in debt, has become like second nature in the United States and many other parts of 
                                                 
6 Bixby, Bob and Maya MacGuineas. 2015. “Why the Federal Debt Must be a Top Priority for the 2016 
Presidential Candidates.” The Brookings Institute. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/11/campaign-2016-ccf/bixby-
macguineas_final.pdf 
7 Ibid.  
8 Graeber, David. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Updated and expanded ed. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 
2014, 2.  
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the world. On the other hand, debt, and its more handsome and likeable twin, credit, have 
become ubiquitous and essential mechanisms for the functioning of modern capitalist 
economies. Debt in its economic and financial register, despite the frequent crises and 
disruptions it brings with it, is conceived of today, as Marieke de Goede puts it, as 
“legitimate, rational, and, above all, natural.”9 As De Goede notes in Virtue, Fortune, 
Faith: A Genealogy of Finance, many authors in the broadly defined field of political 
economy “assume finance to be an autonomous sphere or system with clearly defined 
boundaries and take for granted the unproblematic existence of money, banknotes, credit, 
financial instruments, etc., as a material starting point to their inquiries.”10  
While the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent global recession sparked new 
critical inquiry by a range of scholars across disciplines into questions related to debt and 
finance, little has changed both in terms of actual financial reform and in terms of the 
dominant assumptions guiding political debates. Debt remains, at least among 
mainstream economists, political scientists and policy experts, a highly depoliticized 
subject, either resting comfortably in a cloak of moral certainty or fenced off behind “a 
logic of calculability and an appearance of scientific objectivity.”11 It is my contention 
that both perspectives severely limit any discussion or debate about the ways in which 
debt structures how we think about ourselves, as well as any truly robust or strategically 
useful understanding of the role debt plays in the increasingly precarious variant of 
capitalism in which we live. If our current frames do not raise adequately political 
questions about economic life, then what questions should we ask to deepen our 
                                                 
9 Goede, Marieke de. Virtue, Fortune and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance. Borderlines 24. Minneapolis, 
Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2005, x.  
10 Ibid. xxv.  
11 Ibid., 3.  
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understanding of debt?  How should credit and debt be conceptualized in the post-crisis 
social, political, and economic conditions of early 21st century capitalism? By extension, 
which theoretical perspective gives us the resources to ask pertinent questions about 
credit and debt? Which perspective best allows us to traverse the disciplinary lines that 
separate economic, moral, and political questions about debt? Importantly, which 
perspective can lead to tactics that respond to the punitive and politically toxic effects of 
debt in the present? 
This chapter begins my effort to address these questions and to compose a 
political theory of debt that brushes against the grain of contemporary neoliberal 
consensus. I will explore four crucial elements that intertwine in the creditor-debtor 
relation: power, suffering, morality and subjectivity. I do so first by analyzing Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s account of credit and debt in On the Genealogy of Morality. Second, I bring 
Nietzsche’s account into conversation with Max Weber’s historical analysis in The 
Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirt’ of Capitalism in order to focus this genealogy more 
explicitly on debt’s role in the emergence of capitalism. In part one, I argue that 
Nietzsche provides a “dramatization” of credit and debt that serves as a much needed 
challenge to politically hegemonic and culturally entrenched assumptions that present 
voluntary exchange between rational subjects as the fundamental relationship 
underpinning the contemporary social order. I show how Nietzsche shifts the focus to 
present debt as an asymmetrical power relation that is constitutive of the type of morality 
of the subject that makes homo oeconomicus intelligible. In part two, I draw on Max 
Weber to carry this Nietzschean perspective forward into a more precise theorization of 
the role of debt in the rise of early capitalism in Northwestern Europe and the United 
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States. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the analytic purchase Nietzsche and 
Weber together can provide for a critical perspective on debt and subjectivity, as well as 
the limitations of their approach, which I address more fully in the next chapter.   
 
I. Dramatizing Debt 
My core contention in this chapter is that Nietzsche presents an unfamiliar 
perspective on debt that allows us to grasp simultaneously its political, moral, and 
economic dimensions. Adopting a Nietzschean perspective in an effort to reappraise debt 
offers three interrelated insights. First, Nietzsche connects material practices of credit and 
debt— often considered in a “technical,” “economic” or “financial” register—with the 
emergence of a morality of individual conscience and guilt.  Nietzsche contends that the 
creditor-debtor relation has entailed a set of techniques and practices whose effect has 
been to “give a memory to the animal, man.”12 In other words, the moral authority 
underpinning the power of debt is intimately involved with techniques for taking hold of 
the body, marking it, subjecting it to punishments, and training it so that it has “a right to 
make a promise,” so that it will not forget its obligations to others and so that it may 
exercise its “free will.”13 In short, I will argue that both the material and moral 
dimensions of debt contributed significantly to the emergence of the modern figure of the 
individual sovereign subject – subjected to discipline in order to endow her with the 
ability to hold herself accountable for her own actions.14  
                                                 
12 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, 41.  
13 Ibid., 40. 
14 As Foucault describes this modern subject in Discipline and Punish, “The man described for us, whom 
we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A 
‘soul’ inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises 
over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the 
body.” Foucault, Michel, and Alan Sheridan. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 2. Vintage 
Books ed. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995, 30. 
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Second, Nietzsche represents the fundamental type of social and economic 
relation as an asymmetrical power relation between creditors and debtors rather than an 
exchange relation between formally equal subjects. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
claim in Anti-Oedipus: “The great book of modern ethnology is not so much Mauss’s The 
Gift15 as Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. . . . [it] is an attempt—and a success 
without equal—at interpreting primitive economy in terms of debt . . . by eliminating 
every consideration of exchange or interest ‘à l’anglaise.’”16 For Nietzsche, the 
fundamental relationship lying at the heart of both monotheism and modern capitalist 
political economy is the relationship between creditor and debtor. Even a society that 
prides itself on a morally and legally binding contractual foundation and the rational 
pursuit of interests through “free” exchange remains entangled with unbalanced relations 
of force that tend toward disequilibrium and volatility. A focus on debt offers a window 
onto this “shadow side”17 of modern capitalist society, where power asymmetries both 
divide and order the body politic. 
 Third and finally, Nietzsche’s method is to present a “dramatization” of the ways 
in which debt figures into the genealogy of the modern subject. In using the term 
“dramatization,” I mean that Nietzsche portrays and politicizes the forces and events 
                                                 
15 Deleuze and Guattari certainly do not seek to diminish the importance of Marcel Mauss’s work, but they 
take him to task for hesitating between characterizing the primary relation involved in gift economies as 
one of debt or exchange. He left this question open while, they argue, Lévi-Strauss closed it “with a 
categorical reply: debt is no more than a superstructure, a conscious form whereby the unconscious social 
reality of exchange is converted into cash.” Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1994, 185. I will draw on Mauss at several 
point because his work indeed can be interpreted as being primarily about the ubiquity of debt relations in 
indigenous and Western societies.  
16 Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: Univ. of 
Minnesota Press, 1994, 190.  
17 See Atwood, Margaret. Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth. CBC Massey Lectures. Toronto, 
ON: Anansi [u. a.], 2008. 
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involved in the history of debt, morality and subjectivity in order to raise subliminal 
thoughts and critical judgments slumbering in that relation to a more active level. As 
Deleuze puts it, dramatization, if one is able to “dispense with all the Christian and 
dialectical pathos” that taints the word “drama,” is a way of sharpening the history of the 
particular will, the forces and the ways of being that contributed to the genesis of a 
particular object, action, feeling, or thought.18 For Nietzsche, thinking genealogically 
about phenomena like “debt,” “morality,” “reason,” or “the subject” means wading into a 
tumultuous “field of entangled and confused parchments,” a world in which “documents . 
. . have been scratched over and recopied many times.”19 A Nietzschean perspective 
insists that history does not proceed either by teleological progression or dialectical 
contradiction; rather it is figured by the perpetual drama of competing forces whose 
battles are inscribed on things and bodies, doubling them and giving them depth as 
objects of knowledge and forms of subjectivity.20 Nietzsche’s dramatization of debt 
then— and in this it is like all other accounts—remains an act of interpretation. Deleuze 
calls dramatization “the only method adequate to Nietzsche’s project.”21 This makes 
sense when we recall that according to Nietzsche: “the world is knowable; but it is 
interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.”22  
 In what follows, I articulate Nietzsche’s dramatization of debt and morality in 
order to provide a jumping off point for the further genealogical analysis of the role debt 
                                                 
18 Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. European Perspectives. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1983, 78. 
19 Foucault, Michel, and Paul Rabinow. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” The Foucault Reader. 1st ed. 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, 76. 
 
20 Ibid.  
21 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 79. 
22 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, Walter Arnold Kaufmann, and R. J. Hollingdale. The Will to Power. 
Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1968, 267.  
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has played in the emergence of a political and economic “spirit” of capitalism. While 
Nietzsche engages the theme of credit and debt in the most direct manner in the second 
essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, and this is where most theorists have turned in 
referencing Nietzsche on debt,23 I will begin with a statement from Twilight of the Idols. 
Remarking on those who have attempted to “make” morality and “improve” mankind, 
Nietzsche offers the formula: “every means hitherto employed with the intention of 
making mankind moral has been thoroughly immoral.”24 In pursuing the origins of 
morality, Nietzsche asks how morality or virtue are “made to dominate.”25 What he 
discovers and dramatizes vividly in the Genealogy, is that the basis for morality, rather 
than residing in some metaphysically ideal or universal realm, is very much a thing of 
this world. "Knowledge works as a tool of power,” Nietzsche declares, and he considers 
morality to be, in some sense, the ultimate form of knowledge: the knowledge that 
separates right from wrong, good from bad.26 The successful institutionalization of a set 
of virtues in an asymmetrical world requires all the tactics needed to dominate – the same 
means required for every victory: “force, lies, slander, injustice.”27 That is, the same 
moral obligations that bind debtors to creditors gain their force by means that most would 
                                                 
23 See Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. European Perspectives. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1983; Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1994; Roitman, J. “Unsanctioned Wealth; Or, The Productivity of 
Debt in Northern Cameroon.” Public Culture 15, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 211–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-15-2-211; Goede, Marieke de. Virtue, Fortune and Faith: A Genealogy 
of Finance. Borderlines 24. Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2005; Lazzarato, M., and 
Joshua David Jordan. The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition. 
Semiotext(e) Intervention Series 13. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2012; Graeber, David. Debt: The 
First 5,000 Years. Updated and expanded ed. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2014; and Joseph, Miranda. 
Debt to Society: Accounting for Life under Capitalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. 
24 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, R. J. Hollingdale, Michael Tanner, and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche. 
Twilight of the Idols: And, The Anti-Christ. Penguin Classics. London ;New York, N.Y: Penguin Books, 
1990, 69-70.  
25 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, 5.  
26 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 266.  
27 Ibid., 171.  
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denounce as “immoral.”28 Nietzsche suggests that this has been the case throughout 
history, evident in early and non-western societies, throughout the great organized 
religions of Hinduism, Judaism, and Christianity, underpinning the Kantian categorical 
imperative (which he suggests “smells of cruelty”) and the utilitarian moral psychology 
of his own 19th century, which he implies had “a secret, malicious, mean instinct to 
belittle man.”29  
I refer to these statements to emphasize both the imbrication of an ethos of debt 
with power and to turn our attention to Nietzsche’s insistent focus on the body as the site 
upon which the ethos is “inscribed.” His motto: “Belief in the body is more fundamental 
than belief in the soul.”30 Nietzsche insists on studying every “thou shalt” from a 
physiological as well as philosophical standpoint, rather than repeating what he deems to 
be the great error of philosophy, exemplified by one of his greatest adversaries, 
Immanuel Kant, who attempts to derive the limits of knowledge and morality from 
apodictic judgments and the deductive use of reason, abstracted from historical or bodily 
conditions.31 Nietzsche counters by arguing that the faith Kant and others have placed in 
the validity of deductive logical evaluation is just that—a faith—a moral phenomenon 
that Kant was not willing to subject to criticism.32 Nietzsche suggests that the 
subterranean task of Kant’s critical philosophy was to insulate the moral presuppositions 
that he held dear from the mortal danger posed by the critical use of reason, a danger that 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 69-70, and On the Genealogy of Morality, 11, 45.  
30 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 271. 
31 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Maudemarie Clark, and R. J. Hollingdale. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of 
Morality. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997, 3. 
32 Ibid., 4.  
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Kant understood only too well.33 The task Nietzsche sets himself, by contrast, is to 
surpass Kant by examining the bodily practices by which an ethos of indebtedness is 
established. 
 Nietzsche argues that this ethos involves obedience to custom, which he defines 
as the “traditional way of behaving and evaluating.”34 For a moral imperative or law to 
command the obedience of a body or group of bodies, a range of preconditions must be in 
place; a whole set of battles must have been won in advance, a whole drama must have 
unfolded. It is the history of these battles, this drama, and the conditions they put in place 
that Nietzsche writes in the Genealogy. These preconditions constitute the basis for the 
lived sense of responsibility and the ability or “right” to make promises and to keep them 
regardless of radical changes in circumstances. As we will see, these conditions consist of 
a set of rules, taboos, prescriptions, punishments, marks, rituals, symbols, sacrifices, 
habits, and routines that become the techniques for directing the endless unconscious 
struggle between forces in play within and between us. In effect, these techniques 
constitute an enormous “labour of man on himself” to produce consciousness, to 
engender an active desire to not let go, to hold onto events from the past, and, 
importantly, to combat the similarly powerful human capacity to forget.35  
                                                 
33 Ibid., 3. See also Connolly, William E. The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal 
Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2013, Chapter 3: “Shock Therapy, 
Dramatization, and Practical Wisdom.”  
34 Nietzsche, Daybreak, 10.  
35 Nietzsche discusses the importance of an active faculty of forgetting at the beginning of the second essay 
of the Genealogy. Nietzsche argues that an active ability to forget is of the utmost importance because it 
acts “like a doorkeeper or guardian of mental order, rest and etiquette” protecting the human organism from 
the chaos that would ensue if we were conscious of all our internal processes all the time or if we were 
unable to stop dwelling in the vast accumulation of past experiences while simultaneously trying to focus 
on the present moment. Nietzsche sees the power to forget as essential to the health and strength of an 
animal, because without it there would be no “happiness, cheerfulness, hope, pride, [or] immediacy.” 
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, 38-9. See also Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and R. J Hollingdale. “On 
the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” Untimely Meditations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
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To anticipate, Nietzsche himself will call for positive alternatives to the processes 
studied here. But for now it is important to see that consciousness, reflective action, 
purposiveness, a notion of self and responsibility are not innate human characteristics for 
Nietzsche; they are the result of a long, ongoing process of formation – what he considers 
to be the activity of culture. As Gilles Deleuze explains in Nietzsche and Philosophy, 
“This consciousness which is defined by the fugitive character of excitations, this 
consciousness which is itself based on the faculty of forgetting must be given a 
consistency and a firmness which it does not have on its own. Culture endows 
consciousness with a new faculty which is apparently opposed to the faculty of 
forgetting: memory."36 This memory, Deleuze remarks, is not only a trace of the past, but 
also “a function of the future . . . the faculty of promising, commitment to the future, 
memory of the future itself.”37  
This is the moment at which the curtain goes up on credit and debt. Indeed, not 
only Nietzsche, but anthropologists and economists agree that the crucial defining feature 
of the dyad “credit/debt,” is its ability to “link the present to the past and the future.”38 
Max Weber, from whom we will hear more soon, defines credit in its most general sense 
as “any exchange of goods initially possessed for the promise of a future transfer of 
disposal over utilities, no matter what they may be.”39 His definition suggests that for a 
creditor-debtor relation to come about, some conditions must already be in place so that 
the probability is good that “this future transfer of disposal will actually take place.”40 
                                                 
36 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 134.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Peebles, Gustav. “The Anthropology of Credit and Debt.” Edited by D Brenneis and PT Ellison. Annual 
Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 225–40. 
39 Weber, Max, A. M Henderson, and Talcott Parsons. Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization. Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2012, 180.  
40 Ibid. 
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However, this fairly abstract formulation does not specify what these conditions are. If 
the power of credit/debt resides in its ability to conjoin the respective futures and pasts of 
creditor and debtor, to “materialize their temporal bond” thus giving it an “immensely 
powerful capacity to construct and destroy community borders or build social hierarchy” 
then we must investigate, in further detail, the asymmetrical conditions and bodily 
techniques by which debt maintains its moral suasion over the body.41  
Nietzsche offers a response to this question in the Genealogy, which includes an 
interrogation of the specific conditions under which bodies, memory, credit and debt 
become sutured together. Nietzsche places the creditor-debtor relationship at heart of the 
activity by which culture produces “man”: “an animal which is able to make promises.”42 
He seeks to explain the power relationship by which the extension of credit by one 
party—be it a favor, money, a privilege, hospitality, a pleasurable act, a useful tool or 
something else—becomes etched in the memory of both parties in the form of a promise 
to repay it in the future. Nietzsche takes as his point of departure the fact that "the main 
moral concept 'Schuld' ('guilt') descends from the very material concept of 'Schulden' 
('debts').”43 Moreover, the English verb “shall” as in “Thou shalt” or “I shall”—
signifying a promise being made—can also be traced back etymologically to the Old 
English “scyld” and German “schuld,” which reinforces the notion that the ability to 
promise has its origins in material practices of debt.44 
                                                 
41 Peebles (2010).  
42 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, 38.  
43 Ibid., 43. 
44 “Shall (v.).”Online Etymology Dictionary. https://www.etymonline.com/word/shall 
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On the other side of this relation is the word “credit,” which traces back to the 
Latin “credere,” signifying “belief, faith, and trust.”45 According to Marieke De Goede, 
“credere” is also “indistinguishable from one’s personal reputation or status as worthy of 
being believed.”46 Credit, thus, can be traced back to that quality or status of the one who 
could be counted on to remember, to keep promises, and to repay debts.  
 Thus, the question becomes: how do you give memory to a dull, inattentive and 
whimsically forgetful human animal? Put differently, how do you fashion a creditworthy 
subject trustworthy enough to become indebted to you? According to Nietzsche, and as I 
will continue to illustrate in the chapters that follow, it is not by gentle solutions and 
methods. To make a memory, one must inflict pain on the body because pain, says 
Nietzsche, is “the most powerful aid to mnemonics.”47 We paid the price for becoming 
animals endowed with the power to remember in blood and tears. “[P]erhaps there is 
nothing more terrible and strange in man’s pre-history,” Nietzsche remarks, “than his 
technique of mnemonics.”48 Breaking a promise, an oath, a covenant, a pledge, or a pact 
arouses superstition and dread, even today, precisely because a promise had to be seared 
into the flesh; it had to be tattooed onto the body; it required “blood, torments and 
sacrifices”; it required potentially disfiguring mutilations.49 In short, inscribing a memory 
into the body involved a whole range of techniques and tactics, what philosopher 
Maurizio Lazzarato calls a “mnemotechnics” of cruelty and pain.50 Nietzsche adds to this 
list of administered tortures a set of “procedures and lifestyles” called “asceticism” 
                                                 
45 De Goede, Virtue, Fortune, and Faith, 6.  
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47 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, 41.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man, 40-1.  
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through which one trains and disciplines one’s own body in order to free a few central 
ideas from competition with others, in order to make them ubiquitous, unforgettable, and 
fixed in the memory.51  
The central and unforgettable moral idea that Nietzsche connects to these bloody 
“mnemotechnics” is the notion that every offence must be paid for by an equivalent pain 
inflicted on the body of whomever committed it: the “guilty” party.52 Nietzsche argues 
that this notion of a responsible, obligated, and guilty party emerged from the relation 
between creditor and debtor.53 It was precisely in the relation between creditor and debtor 
that promises were made and projected into the future. For the debtor, the responsibility 
for repayment was etched into his conscience by the threat of having to pawn something 
dear to him if he failed to pay: “his body, or his wife, or his freedom, or his life (or, in 
certain religious circumstances, even his after-life, the salvation of his soul, finally, even 
his peace in the grave.”54 Nietzsche is also keen to highlight that, in the event that the 
debtor failed to pay, the creditor could also inflict dishonor and torture on his body, 
giving the example, popularized by Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, of “cutting as 
much flesh off as seemed appropriate for the debt.”55 Therefore, the mnemotechnic 
                                                 
51 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, 41. 
52 Ibid., 43. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 44. 
55 Ibid. Nietzsche makes reference here to the Roman code of the Twelve Tables. It seems likely that he 
may have taken liberties with this point and been overly inspired by the story of Shylock taking a pound of 
flesh as payment for a debt in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. The primary penalties for non-
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them divide his body among them. If they cut more or less than each one's share it shall be no crime.” See 
The Twelve Tables. Internet History Sourcebook. http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/12tables.asp. 
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Nietzsche’s line about inflicting torture is not without evidence.   
1 | Debt, Subjectivity, and the Emergence of Capitalism 
31 
 
punishments for an insolvent debtor involved the seizing of his body, his family’s bodies, 
or even body parts as collateral payment for the debt.  
Here we note that while Nietzsche situates these practices in a somewhat vacuous 
“pre-history,” with a single reference to the Roman code of the Twelve Tables, these 
practices, in a variety of forms, did indeed exist and persisted at least from the 4th 
Century B.C.E. to the mid-19th Century. Selling debtors into slavery or committing them 
to years of indentured servitude were widespread practices in Europe, its colonies, and 
Africa at least up to the end of the Atlantic slave trade.56 And we also find historical 
examples of communities branding debtors’ bodies, pillorying debtors in the public 
square with an iron collar, and finally the ubiquitous practice of incarcerating debtors 
between the late 18th and early 19th centuries.57 Furthermore, as I will elaborate in the 
chapters that follow, forms of indebted servitude targeting former slaves and 
communities of color were reorganized and redeployed after the abolition of slavery in 
former European colonies including the United States. This legacy of racialized indebted 
servitude persists to this day.  
Returning to the matter at hand, the case of memory and compensation for the 
creditor is a bit more complicated. One might think—especially from a contemporary 
perspective in which a financial elite sits on top of the social hierarchy—that the creditor 
                                                 
56 Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, 350. 
57 See Peebles, Gustav. “Washing Away the Sins of Debt: The Nineteenth-Century Eradication of the 
Debtors’ Prison.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 55, no. 03 (July 2013): 701–24. It seems 
likely that Nietzsche had this more contemporary history in mind when he was writing the Genealogy. This 
is evidenced in a characteristically enigmatic statement where Nietzsche suggests that he is “measuring 
with the standard of pre-history (a pre-history which, by the way, exists at all times or could possibly re-
occur).” Hence, it seems evident that Nietzsche doesn’t locate his account of credit and debt in a prehistoric 
past which is dead and gone, but in a living, becoming history that in some sense “exists at all times” 
actualizing itself just as much in the heart of “modernity” as it does in ancient times. See Nietzsche, 
Genealogy of Morality, 50.    
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Nietzsche describes comes from the aristocratic nobility he praises in the first essay of the 
Genealogy. However, Nietzsche describes this aristocratic type as “a powerful 
physicality, a blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health […] unable to take his 
enemies, his misfortunes and even his misdeeds seriously for long . . . a power which is 
flexible, formative, healing and can make one forget [my emphasis].”58 It seems as 
though these nobles were endowed with a “faculty of forgetting,” and would be prone to 
overlook a sum lent to a friend or even an enemy. If this noble did remember the loan, it 
seems more than likely that she would simply treat it as a gift given out of a feeling of 
superabundance and spirit of generosity – an evocative display of prestige and power.  
Nietzsche’s descriptions of the morality of the powerful calls to mind several 
ethnographic accounts presented in Marcel Mauss’s classic anthropological study The 
Gift. For instance, Mauss says of the Andaman islanders of the Indian Ocean: “Each man 
and woman tried to outdo the others in generosity. There was a sort of amiable rivalry as 
to who could give away the greatest number of most valuable presents.”59 Similarly, 
among the Kwakiutl, Tlingit and Haida tribes of the Pacific Northwest in America, the 
“potlach” system of gifts was one of “constant give-and-take,” which functioned very 
much like a credit system wherein “the prestige of an individual [is] closely bound up 
with expenditure, and with the duty of returning with interest gifts received in such a way 
that the creditor becomes the debtor.”60 Mauss describes this as an “aristocratic type of 
commerce characterized by etiquette and generosity,” which “when it is carried out in a 
                                                 
58 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, 18, 24.  
59 Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies. The Norton Library 
N378. New York: Norton, 1967, 18.  
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different spirit, for immediate gain . . . is viewed with the greatest disdain.”61 In this type 
of gift/credit system, one was obliged to repay a gift out of respect and friendship and/or 
out of a desire to maintain one’s honor and status by returning the gift with an even 
greater and more magnificent gift.62 The primary ethos in play here seems to be one of 
generosity and competitiveness. 
Hence, we can say that in the Genealogy, Nietzsche dramatizes the distinction 
between this “chivalric-aristocratic” morality whose debt relations are infused with a 
spirit of generosity and a different type of “priestly” or “slave morality” whose debt 
relations are infused with a more punitive spirit of revenge.63 The former works by means 
that Nietzsche calls the “morality of culture.” This “morality of culture” certainly 
involves modes of training and correction. But they tend to be based on a collective logic 
amongst a group of relative equals, rather than through relations of asymmetrical 
responsibility. As Nietzsche points out, for much of human history, any actions that were 
done for reasons of personal utility or gain, or that fell outside of the clear boundaries set 
by custom and traditional modes of hierarchy would be considered suspicious and 
immoral by the group.64  
While the giving of gifts, the extension of credit, and the obligation to pay debts 
were essential elements of the social order in these societies—Mauss emphatically states 
that “a gift necessarily implies the notion of credit” and that all of the so called “archaic” 
societies he describes were well aware of credit—it generally involved a relation between 
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clans, or between a member of a tribe and all the other members.65 Mauss argues that in 
non-Western societies, and in the West before the rise of capitalism, groups and not 
individuals were the ones that exchanged gifts, made promises, and were bound by debts 
to each other.66 As Nietzsche says, the supposedly violent, barbarous and “uncivilized” 
men who were the objects of priestly hatred, were “strongly held in check by custom, 
respect, habit, gratitude and even more through spying on one another through peer-group 
jealousy.”67 It was only when engaged in warfare, raiding and pillaging that they acted 
with the cruelty of “wild beasts.”68  
Political economist Karl Polanyi reinforces this point in The Great 
Transformation, suggesting that if Adam Smith and his followers had actually consulted 
anthropological research, they would have realized that “man’s economy, as a rule, is 
submerged in his social relationships,” and that in traditional societies up to the end of 
feudalism, individuals’ economic interests rarely took precedence.69 It was, by contrast, 
the maintenance of social ties to the community— through codes of honor and 
generosity—that mattered most, almost to the point of making “any other behavior than 
that of utter self-forgetfulness simply not pay.”70  
How did this collective “morality of culture” involving an aristocratic culture of 
mutual indebtedness within a stratum shift to a punitive morality based on an 
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68 Ibid., 25.  
69 Polanyi, Karl, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Fred Block. 2010. The Great Transformation: The Political and 
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individualized responsibility for debt? Today, at least in the capitalist West, we tend to 
think of creditors as among the most powerful and elite members of society. But in 
Nietzsche’s dramatization the creditor is portrayed as someone with means enough to 
extend credit who is of a lower social status than the aristocratic nobles. In this creditor 
we can recognize the forbearer of the entrepreneur, an upwardly mobile member of the 
lower ranks seeking to propagate his type by means other than strength, by way of a 
“priestly” morality.71 Nietzsche says the logic of the creditor’s compensation is “strange 
enough” because this compensation takes the form of “pleasure” received from inflicting 
pain, from “the enjoyment of violating” and from the ability to “exercise power over the 
powerless without a thought.”72 Nietzsche suggests that this newfound power to inflict 
pain on the debtor would be “prized all the higher, the lower and baser the position of the 
creditor in the social scale” allowing him a taste of what it must be like to sit higher up on 
the totem pole, to be able to exercise power “without a thought.”73  In this sense, it is the 
creditor, more than the debtor, whom Nietzsche portrays as the figure of reaction and 
“ressentiment”; a member of the lower ranks who is eager and now able, through his 
position as creditor, to “take part in the rights of the master,” to share in “the elevated 
feeling of despising and maltreating someone as an ‘inferior’” or at least to witness the 
debtor humiliated and in pain at the hands of the authorities.74  
Nietzsche argues that it is this association between pain and compensation 
deriving from the sadistic relationship between creditor and debtor that gets “measured” 
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and codified in the legal sphere.75 The codification, legalization, and normalization of 
physical punishment that consists in causing suffering on the part of an individual, 
Nietzsche argues, should be traced back to the creditor-debtor relationship where the 
injured creditor receives the debtor’s suffering as compensation for a debt that cannot be 
repaid by other means.76 Here it is important to point out that causing suffering is not just 
a general way to take revenge on someone who breaks a promise. Nietzsche explicitly 
rejects this notion. It is specifically the pleasure derived from cruelty—“pleasure in its 
highest form”—a pleasure naively enjoyed without shame or bad conscience, a pleasure 
which was even more enjoyable to creditors of lower rank and social position because it 
allowed them to feel powerful, that served to redeem the debt. Thus, it is this nexus of 
debt, suffering and pleasure that becomes the “breeding-ground of the moral conceptual 
world of ‘guilt’, ‘conscience’, ‘duty’, ‘sacred duty’”; it is here that the ideas of guilt and 
suffering become inextricably crocheted together.77 
How exactly did this occur? Nietzsche argues that it was through this relation of 
creditor to debtor—which began to function in the mode of an individualized promise 
and individualized punishment—that man was transformed from a “beast of prey” into a 
“tame and civilized animal, a household pet.”78 Primarily on the side of the initial 
agreement between creditor and debtor, Nietzsche sees this taming effect as resulting 
from the fact that in making this agreement, “person met person for the first time, 
and measured himself person against person.”79 A creditor-debtor relationship between 
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individuals rather than groups and relying on individual trustworthiness would have to 
involve a new form of evaluation that was not simply prescribed in advance by custom. It 
would have to measure and compare person to person by examining individual qualities, 
setting prices and working out equivalent forms of punishment in the case that one’s 
calculations were wrong. Nietzsche sees here the origin both of the scientific notion of 
“objectivity” and the moral conception of justice which proclaims: “Every thing has its 
price: everything can be compensated for.”80 The key point to keep in mind is that the 
creditor, holding a power advantage, had the largest role in deciding what amount of 
collateral was needed to secure the loan. Thus a price was set, an equivalence fabricated, 
by and through an asymmetrical power relation between creditor and debtor.   
On the side of the debtor, the one evaluated and punished if she or he didn’t 
“measure up,” Nietzsche argues that the primary effect was not to make him “better,” but 
to sharpen his intelligence, lengthen his memory, make him more cautious, more 
calculating, less trusting, increasing the impetus for him to master his desires and turn 
them inward, to improve his powers of self-assessment and self-denial.81 It follows that 
Nietzsche sees the creditor-debtor relation as involved simultaneously in the birth of 
“man” as “the calculating animal as such”82 and as bringing about the “internalization of 
man.”83 A society in which the values of the creditor become dominant is one in which 
the human animal develops a “bad conscience” that preempts the need for external 
coercion by turning his unpredictable, wild, and violent instincts inward, creating “from 
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within himself . . . a torture-chamber.”84 Here we can see clearly the two processes 
targeted by Nietzsche’s critique that much later crystallize together in the dyad of 
creditor-debtor: the development of a capitalist social formation in which the calculating 
type of subject dominates, and with it, the deployment of an ascetic morality of 
punishment, denial, and guilt through the Protestant Reformation. It is here that we reach 
the point where Nietzsche’s Genealogy links up with the concerns of Max Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism. Thus, I turn to Weber to carry the 
genealogy of debt further and show how relations of credit/debt, in both moral and 
material form, shaped the figure we associate most with the political economy of 
capitalism: homo oeconomicus. 
 
II. Debt and the “Spirit” of Capitalism 
  
 Weber and Nietzsche share a similar desire to grasp how the variegated moral, 
political, and economic phenomena we associate with modern life in the “monstrous 
cosmos” of capitalism could have emerged from a vastly different social order.85 Like 
Nietzsche, Weber concerns himself with how capitalist subjects were created and trained. 
He is not satisfied with what he considers to be “naïve historical materialism” that 
explains subjective attitudes and “ideas” as a “superstructure” that is derivative of the 
material economic “base.”86 Instead, Weber’s hypothesis is that the type of conduct and 
attitudes toward life and work that have become embedded in the fabric of capitalist 
society had to first “emerge victorious over others” as a dominant “style of life” practiced 
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among groups and individuals before capitalism became fully institutionalized.87 Weber 
insists that the “rational” pursuit of economic interests, often presumed to be a universal 
characteristic of human behavior by economists and social scientists, had to become 
rational; homo oeconomicus as the dominant subjective figure guiding human conduct 
did not simply “blossom like a flower” as new technologies and innovations 
industrialized European and American societies’ modes of production and increased their 
capital reserves.88 Instead, homo oeconomicus, as the subjective representation par 
excellence of the “spirt of capitalism” made a violent entry on the scene and had to 
compete in a “hard struggle against a world of hostile forces,” in particular, the 
aristocratic type of culture and morality described by Nietzsche in the Genealogy, dubbed 
“traditionalism” by Weber.89 Here Nietzsche’s argument about power relations that 
produced “equivalences” is translated into a larger process by which capitalist 
subjectivities are produced.  
Weber’s argument, which dovetails with that of Nietzsche, looks to the power of 
religious beliefs and the practical ethics they inspire—specifically Protestant movements 
and their particular brand of “worldly asceticism”—to explain the emergence and spread 
of this “economic” self-understanding of human activity.90 However, it is important to 
note that Weber states emphatically that he does not seek to “replace a one-sided 
‘materialist’ explanation of culture and history with a ‘spiritual one.’”91 Rather he, like 
Nietzsche, is concerned with the imbrication of the material and the moral, with the 
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intersection of the ethical and the economic, and specifically with how Calvinism and its 
Protestant off-shoots—replete with codes of conduct and disciplinary techniques—
worked in tandem “with numerous other forces” to produce capitalism.92 For the 
purposes of this chapter, the goal is to remain in conversation with Nietzsche while 
foregrounding spiritual-material ways in which credit and debt influenced the formation 
of homo oeconomicus during the emergence of industrial capitalism chronicled by 
Weber.93 By paying close attention to three interrelated processes of subject formation 
identified by Nietzsche—the “internalization of man,” the artificial production of 
equivalences, and the formation of the human into a “calculating animal”—we can trace 
the ways in which each emerged in the disciplinary process through which Northern 
Europeans and Americans were constituted as creditors and debtors.   
 To some extent, the period of history that concerns both Nietzsche and Weber—
the period from the 16th to the 19th centuries that encompasses the Protestant 
Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French and American Revolutions and the birth of 
industrial capitalism—can be characterized as a great emancipation from dogmatism and 
a struggle for intellectual, religious, and political freedom. Politically and religiously 
there was a call for freedom both for the citizen and the believer; to these were joined the 
prerogatives of the free trader and free laborer, voluntarily entering into contractual 
relations at will.94  
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However, if we focus on shifts in the nexus of credit and debt in this period, a 
slightly different image comes into view. This freedom from the power of the king or the 
tyrant, from the ecclesiastical power of the Roman Catholic Church, was itself predicated 
on subtle, yet powerful forms of discipline and internal control that were intimately tied 
to the moral promise between creditor and debtor. As Lazzarato argues, debt is a 
mechanism for the production and “government” of a specific type of subject: the dark 
side of the rational and calculating homo oeconomicus, which he calls the “indebted man” 
or “homo debitor.”95 According to Lazzarato, the power of debt resides in its ability to 
exercise power without explicit recourse to repression or ideology: the debtor is free to 
conduct herself as she wishes, as long as she remains compliant with the norms of 
conduct conducive to repayment.96 If she acts irresponsibly, if she remains idle, if she 
spends too freely, she has herself to blame for her inability to repay.  
Lazzarato associates this form of indebted subjectivity with the contemporary 
political and economic conditions associated with neoliberalism. While I agree that this 
assessment pertains to the ubiquitous role debt plays today in political and economic life 
at the individual and collective levels, the relation between debt and subjectivity has a 
much longer history within capitalism than Lazzarato emphasizes in The Making of the 
Indebted Man.97 If we consider briefly the ways in which a feeling of indebtedness was 
                                                 
characteristic of humanism, classical liberalism and other schools of European Enlightenment thought. 
Conceptions of creditworthiness and indebtedness, as well technologies and financial arrangements of 
credit fueled and facilitated European colonial conquest, slave economies, and ideologies of white 
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consideration in the following chapter.   
95 Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man, 29.  
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97 I grant that Lazzarato has important polemical reasons for overstating the degree to which contemporary 
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internalized and perpetuated by the Protestant sects and transformed into an ethos of 
diligent work in a calling, this argument should become clear.  
 To begin, the “spirit” of capitalism, identified by Weber in its crystallized form in 
the writings of Benjamin Franklin, is not synonymous with greed, avarice, or self-interest 
in its “eudaemonistic,” hedonist or self-serving incarnation.98 What is particular about the 
“spirit” of capitalism is that the pursuit of profit and accumulation of wealth becomes an 
end in itself that is “coupled with a strict avoidance of all uninhibited enjoyment.”99 In 
other words, Weber asks how it was that a “traditionalist” ethic —in which one either 
worked to have enough and to get by in the accustomed manner, or practiced “avarice”—
was overturned in favor of a capitalistic ethos in which work and wealth became ends in 
themselves, that is, in which “avarice” became transfigured into a new kind of activity.100  
What is crucial here is the question of the mode of discipline required for a 
subject to become “diligent.” Diligence is irreducible to either avarice or traditional work. 
To be “diligent” a person must be “[c]onstant in application, persevering in endeavor” 
and certainly “not idle, not negligent, [and] not lazy.”101 As Weber remarks, “Capitalism 
has as little use for the undisciplined ‘liberum arbitrium’ type of worker, as it has for the 
businessman who is simply unscrupulous in his outward conduct.”102 He argues that the 
entrepreneurs who attempted to extract surplus value from workers by instituting 
“piecework,” appealing to the notion of a preexisting instinct for acquisitiveness or 
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interest in maximizing profit, met with serious resistance and much failure.103 While a 
large surplus population and low wages were very important factors in the development 
of large-scale industrial production, Weber insists that we must also account for the 
important qualitative shifts in the attitudes and conduct of both the laborer and the 
entrepreneur. What became indispensable was “a well developed sense of responsibility . 
. . along with a general attitude which  . . . does not continually seek ways of earning the 
usual wage with the maximum ease and the minimum effort, but performs the work as 
though it were an absolute end in itself—a ‘calling.’”104 Weber insists that this attitude 
could not be induced by wages alone. It had “to be the product of a long, slow ‘process of 
education.’”105 Weber’s research associates this type of education with the “innerworldly 
asceticism” taught by Calvinism and its Protestant descendants including the Methodists, 
Pietists, Baptists, Puritans, and Quakers.106  
Could it be that this “process of education” is the same as the one described in 
Nietzsche’s genealogy of the creditor-debtor relationship? This development of 
conscientiousness on the part of the Protestant worker corresponds rather well to 
Nietzsche’s discussions of “mnemotechnics,” the formation of “bad conscience” and its 
transfiguration into Christian guilt. Nietzsche argues in the Genealogy that the debt 
relations that held together tribal communities included a relationship of indebtedness to 
the ancestors that required collective forms of repayment through sacrifices and acts of 
obedience.107 As classical societies grew in strength and power, so did this feeling of 
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indebtedness to the founders such that it became a source of dread and fear that, 
Nietzsche suggests, eventually transfigured the ancestors into something obscure, 
mysterious and transcendent: gods.108 Such a process, he says, reached its culmination 
with Christianity, a state/monotheistic organization of society in which “the Christian 
God as the maximal god yet achieved . . . also brought about the appearance of the 
greatest feeling of guilt on earth.”109 In this account, the violent mnemotechnic practices 
associated with memory and debt became “moralized” and turned inwards against the self 
when the conditions of state monopoly on violence and the Christian doctrine of 
“brotherly love” forbade outward expressions of cruelty.110  
The historical events through which the feeling of guilt and dread associated with 
great indebtedness became internalized in the individuals and groups responsible for the 
birth of capitalism need to be explored here in greater detail with help from Weber. 
However, one thing that emerges in Nietzsche’s dramatization is the idea that the 
direction of debt between the community of Christians and their ancestors was altered. As 
God the “creditor” morphed into a singular transcendent deity distinct from the earth-
bound ancestors, the ancestors themselves became burdened with a debt: “original 
sin.”111 As the story goes, Adam and Eve failed to respect the gift they had been offered 
by God; they gave in to their passions and broke their promise not to eat the forbidden 
fruit, transforming what had been a gift relation into a relation of infinite debt whereby 
humanity must perpetually repay God for its sin. What Nietzsche finds insidious about 
this version of Christianity with respect to the feeling of “schuld” (debt/guilt) is what he 
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refers to as “Christianity’s stroke of genius”—the crucifixion of Christ—“God sacrificing 
himself for man's guilt, none other than God paying himself back, God as the only one 
able to redeem man.”112 Christianity succeeded in transfiguring an injunction to give 
thanks to the gods through regular material sacrifices into an infinite debt that is only 
redeemable through God’s grace. Moreover, this infinite debt becomes internalized and 
generalized with the foreclosure of any possibility for a “once-and-for-all payment.”113 In 
the hands of Christianity’s adept “ascetic priests,” the self-torture of bad conscience 
“grows wide and deep,” developing “its most horrific hardness and sharpness.”114 
 The question then becomes: how specifically did this sense of infinite debt and 
bad conscience work its way into the minds and bodies of enough Northern Europeans to 
spark the widespread transformation of values essential for the emergence of capitalism? 
The answer, for Weber, begins with Martin Luther and his emphasis on the “fulfillment 
of innerworldly duties” arising from one’s “station in life,”115 as well as his ambiguous 
position on the Deuteronomic prohibition on usury and the taking of interest.116 However, 
it is the arrival of the doctrine and practices of Calvinism that Weber views as the most 
crucially important event shaping the modern capitalist form of subjectivity. Weber, like 
Nietzsche, concentrates on “the effects of the subjective appropriation of ascetic 
religiosity on the conduct of the individual” and the ways in which Calvinism worked at 
the affective level to channel “the psychological drives [Antriebe] which led people to 
behave in a certain way and held them firmly in this path.”117 In some sense, we can say 
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that Weber, like Nietzsche, “dramatizes” Calvinism and the forms of “innerworldly 
asceticism” it induced in its adherents. Weber composes an image of its “ideal type” by 
condensing the geographical and temporal variations and off-shoots of Calvinism—
Puritanism, Methodism, Presbyterianism, etc.—into their “most logically consistent 
form” in order to focus attention on Calvinism’s general form and effects.118 
 The element of Calvinist doctrine that serves as the crux of Weber’s analysis is 
the dogma of “election by grace” or “predestination.”119 Weber quotes from the 
Westminster Confession of 1647 for an elaboration of this fateful set of beliefs: “Man, by 
his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good 
accompanying salvation.”120 According to Calvin, God predestined some to everlasting 
life, while he chose to “pass by” the majority, ordaining them to dishonor and wrath for 
their sin as an example of his “glorious justice.”121 Calvin was trained as a jurist, and the 
logic of his arguments for predestination became stricter and sharper over time as he 
refined them in the course of polemical arguments with his opponents.122 In brief, Calvin 
followed in the path blazed by Augustine and his followers, arguing that religious 
redemption results only through the grace of a wholly “objective power” and has nothing 
to do with the believer’s merit; grace is an unexpected and unimaginable “gift,” not an 
exchange or quid pro quo.123 God does not exist for man’s sake; man exists to glorify 
God. Only an “elect” few were chosen for this purpose, to reflect the glory of divine 
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justice, while the rest were condemned to eternal death.124 To put it succinctly, all are 
guilty, most damned, a few saved.  
 This religious outlook resonates with Nietzsche’s account of the infinite debt in 
early Christianity. Humanity exists in a state of deep indebtedness, i.e. sin, with 
absolutely no way to “will” its way back to solvency and salvation. In its purest form, the 
doctrine of predestination suggests that the great creditor, God, may grant mercy to some 
of his indebted creatures as part of a spectacular display of the glory and effervescence of 
God’s power, but the greater part of humanity is born submerged in debt—“underwater” 
so to speak—with no way to swim to the surface on its own. Calvin also preempts the 
question of Christ’s martyrdom wherein one might argue that Christ died for our sins “out 
of love for the debtor”125 (for the moment setting aside Nietzsche’s cynical 
interpretation), by making it clear that Christ only sacrificed himself for the benefit of the 
elect.126   
 As Weber tells it, belief in Calvinism’s rhetoric of intractable guilt and uncertain 
grace unleashed powerful drives of fear, anxiety, despair and a “tremendous inner 
loneliness” for individual Calvinists.127 On the paramount question in the lives of 
Reformation Christians, the Calvinist was “obliged to tread his path alone.”128 The 
cascading effects of the “inner loneliness” and self-abnegation caused by predestination 
included a turn away from the joys of cultural life, sensual and emotional experience, and 
the values of friendship and community, in favor of a “pessimistic individualism.”129 
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Calvinism preached distrust of Churches, institutions and friends. The deepest 
community was to be found “in the secrets of a solitary heart.”130 Therefore, in 
Calvinism, we find a powerful mechanism through which the burden of existential debt 
was placed squarely and singularly on the individual shoulders of men and women of 
faith. While the idea of existential debt as sin and its affective power originated well 
before Calvin or the Reformation, Calvinist theology served to pressurize and intensify it 
in the echo chamber of the Christian conscience.  
If the Christian sheep was now in a state of fearful and anxious paralysis as she 
considered her fate in the beyond, what of the shepherd? Here Nietzsche’s analysis of the 
“ascetic priest” in the Genealogy becomes pertinent to understanding Calvin as a 
catalyzing figure between the Reformation and the revolutionary rise of modern 
capitalism. Calvin, the one who crafted and instituted the doctrine of predestination and 
accelerated feelings of doubt, terror, and uncertainty in his flock, apparently considered 
himself to be an “instrument” of God’s will.131 He felt no doubt about the fact that he was 
one of the “elect.”132 In this respect, Calvin exhibits many of the features of the “ascetic 
priest”:  
The ascetic priest must count as predestined saviour, shepherd and defender 
of the sick herd in our eyes: only then do we understand his immensely 
historic mission. Rule over the suffering is his domain, his instinct directs 
him towards it and his own special skill, mastery and brand of happiness are 
to be had in it. He must be sick himself . . . but he has to be strong, too, more 
master of himself than of others, actually unscathed in his will to power, so 
that he has the trust and fear of the sick and can be their support, defence, 
prop, compulsion, disciplinarian, tyrant, God.133  
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Following in the path of Augustine, it is arguable that Calvin’s theological conversion, 
his break with the Catholic Church, and his view of God as largely indifferent to the 
plight of the greater part of humanity caused him severe internal suffering and torment. 
However, he was strong-willed enough to master these torments, to become an emissary 
of the great creditor himself, and by doing so, he was able to install himself as a spiritual 
authority in his own right. 
Calvin’s transformative message is that the majority of people are sick, sinful, 
irredeemable and damned. “He brings ointments and balms with him, of course; but first 
he has to wound so that he can be the doctor.”134 A Nietzschean reading of Calvin 
suggests that Calvin wounded through his insistent arguments on behalf of predestination. 
He intensified feelings of terror, throwing “the human soul out of joint, plunging it into 
terrors, frosts, fires and raptures,” figuring fellow Christians as insolvent debtors, and 
goading them to break themselves “on the cruel wheel of a restless and morbidly lustful 
conscience.”135 He cut off traditional communal models of mutual aid and 
institutionalized forgiveness in both a spiritual and material sense. In sum, Calvin helped 
bring into being a darker more painful birth of the individual than that recorded in 
celebratory accounts of the rise of Enlightenment thinking by creating an atmosphere that 
spread “the most extreme fear, the agony of the tortured heart, the paroxysms of unknown 
happiness, the cry for ‘redemption.’”136 
 What ointment did Calvinists provide to ease the spiritual suffering they 
unleashed? They insisted that despite the fundamental uncertainty of grace, congregants 
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had a duty to consider themselves elect, and, crucially, while they could not earn 
salvation, they could search for signs of it. “[T]ireless labor in a calling was . . . the best 
possible means of attaining this self-assurance.”137 Tireless labor in carrying out one’s 
worldly duties, conducting oneself with diligence and forethought, working with 
efficiency and an ascetic zeal, this type of conduct was not a means of obtaining 
salvation, but it was an indispensable sign of one’s state of grace.138 One’s faith had to be 
tested in an “objective” and material sense, as a sign in this world, of one’s salvation in 
the next.139 The Calvinist was not directed toward humbleness, self-mortification, or 
charity as a means of salvation; she was enjoined to self-assurance, self-help, to create 
her own “certitudo salutis.”140 
In the case of Calvinism, the ascetic priest channels the pathos of the tormented 
individual backwards toward the self, ridding it of “all small and petty forms of lethargy, 
apathy and depression.”141 It then spurs it towards “self-discipline, self-surveillance, and 
self-overcoming.”142 This self-control, this disciplined conduct was no longer, then, the 
prerogative of a spiritual aristocracy of monks in the monastery, as it had been in the 
Catholic forms of monastic asceticism.143 It was advanced as a governing maxim of the 
spiritual lives of ordinary people, the “ethos” by which they would pursue their secular 
occupations. The Calvinist mantra became: “God helps those who help themselves.”144 
To have the slightest chance of at least keeping up with the interest on the infinite 
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existential debt one had accumulated, and in order to reassure oneself and convince 
others that, in death, this debt would be redeemed, the Calvinist had to take responsibility 
for herself and become vigilantly focused on conducting herself in the image of the 
dutiful laborer perpetually contributing to the glory of God on earth.145 Even as the 
distinction between merit and sign began to slip in later versions of Calvinism, the focus 
on disciplined economic activity in a calling was retained.  One was systematically 
impelled to produce oneself as a creditworthy subject.  
 
III. The Making of the Creditworthy Subject 
 
 
At this point in the genealogy of homo oeconomicus, the story of homo debitor 
(the indebted subject) becomes more tightly glued to the story of what we might call 
“homo fidelis” – the subject worthy of trust and credit. We have seen how the subjective 
internalization of debt in Calvinism instigates a form of askesis through which the subject 
must fashion herself in a way that will be “appraised” as elect and worthy by her 
Protestant peers. We have seen how Calvinist doctrine engendered powerful negative 
affects in its congregants through doctrinal and rhetorical means. What remains to be 
more fully explained is how these affects were funneled into the diligent pursuit of work, 
entrepreneurial activities and the “economic” institutions of credit and debt in capitalism. 
The “productive” power of the credit/debt dyad146 goes beyond punishment and 
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repression to create and train subjects, to take a careful hold of the body in order to guide 
it and to shape the quality of its conduct, intensifying its capacities and improving its 
efficiency.  
The genealogy of credit and debt that we have traced so far from Nietzsche to 
Weber runs parallel to Michel Foucault’s “genealogy of the modern ‘soul’” and 
articulation of “disciplinary” power in Discipline and Punish.147 Foucault’s question 
there revolved around a shift from the spectacular but imprecise and inefficient juridical 
power of the sovereign that largely treated its subjects “wholesale,” as if they were an 
“indissociable unity,” and a new mode of power, developing between the 18th and 19th 
centuries, that was able to work the body “retail,” singling out the individual and 
“exercising upon it a subtle coercion . . . obtaining holds upon it at the level of the 
mechanism itself – movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over 
the active body.”148 This was the meticulous power of “disciplines” developed in a range 
of institutions—from the military encampment to the hospital to the prison to the 
factory—that concentrated the object of power upon the individual body, the modality of 
power toward a constant coercion and supervision of activity.149 The task of these 
meticulous practices was to produce the norms obedience and utility, and to identify 
those classes and aspects of regularized selves in need of more ruthless practices of 
correction, exclusion or confinement.  
While Foucault focuses on shifts in the discourses and practices of punishment 
from the 16th to the 19th centuries in Europe and the United States, such shifts in the 
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economy of power can also be traced in the intersecting modes of religious and economic 
asceticism associated with “creditworthiness.” They, too, contributed to refashioning the 
human subject into homo oeconomicus the “calculating animal.” The human is not a 
“calculating animal” by nature, and the origins of “calculation, measure, evaluation, 
comparison, and accounting” are not found in exchange relations of equivalence. They 
are lodged in asymmetrical debtor-creditor relations.150 As Deleuze and Guattari argue, 
there is no reason to postulate exchange as the basis for pre-capitalist or capitalist society: 
“society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be to circulate 
or to cause to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where the essential thing is to 
mark and be marked. There is circulation only if inscription requires or permits it.”151  
We have seen to some extent how the bodies of Protestant congregants were 
marked as indebted and coded so that diligent labor in a calling became the primary 
method of evaluation that set some apart as less indebted and more worthy of credit, trust, 
and esteem. Correspondingly, those deemed to be ‘idle” were judged harshly in the 
theological sense in which their debts would remain irredeemable and they would not be 
welcome in the kingdom of heaven, and the worldly sense in which they would be 
marked as sinful, criminal, unsteady, dangerous and dispensable. In this sense, the state 
of indebtedness, imbalance and disequilibrium valorizes an increase in the duration and 
intensity of labor. It also serves as a principle for differentiating, dividing and stratifying 
laboring bodies. Hence debt is not a pathological condition in the emergent capitalist 
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economy, the disequilibrium between subjects that it engenders is in many ways 
“functional and fundamental” to its operation.152  
 How were the distinctions between creditworthy and unworthy inscribed on the 
body, and how did this process flow from religious sects into a secularized capitalist 
political economy? To begin, Weber makes clear that bodily practices and, in particular, 
the socializing power of the sect as organizational form were essential to shaping 
Protestant subjects’ conduct in the “rational” and “calculating” direction highly 
conducive to capitalist production and accumulation. As William Connolly argues in 
Capitalism and Christianity, American Style, a close reading of Weber’s text reveals that 
“a complex set of beliefs, habits, techniques of induction, and larger institutional 
processes” contributed to the making of the Calvinist individual “as a type” involving 
“materialized disciplines such as prayer, ministerial drumming, bodily revulsion against 
the 'magical' practices of Catholicism, local regulation through recognition, gossip and 
informal punishments, and sufficient religious capture of the state to incorporate several 
of those strictures into criminal codes and police enforcement."153 The “sanctification by 
works” wrought by Calvinism raised formerly monastic practices with limited scope to 
the level of a systematic method for conducting and appraising one’s whole life “in every 
hour and every action.”154 Christian monasticism had developed ascetic practices 
including regular confession, strict timetables, hard physical labor, silent reflection and 
constant prayer, as means of systematically releasing man from “the power of irrational 
impulses [Triebe] . . . to subject him to the supremacy of the purposeful will, and to 
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subordinate his actions to his own continual control and to the consideration of ethical 
consequences.”155 The Protestant revolution diverted these disciplinary practices from 
more isolated, esoteric and unproductive purposes in the monastery and set them loose in 
the economic world of secular occupations.156 The transfer of these methods into the 
world of work and business, and their ability to exert “methodical control over the whole 
man” were crucial to the “tremendous world-conquering power” of capitalism.157  
 Part of this power derived from the form of the Protestant sect and its institution 
of what Weber terms a “spiritual aristocracy.”158 The impetus to put one’s faith to the test 
in the secular world and to judge whether someone signified grace or damnation, 
according to Weber, “cut unsparingly into all social feelings.”159 The gulf separating the 
elect from the damned in Calvinist dogma was transfigured into a social gulf between 
those who considered themselves worthy of God’s credit and their “sinful” neighbors 
deserving of “hatred and contempt . . . as enemies of God, who bear the mark of eternal 
damnation upon them.”160 Attempts to socially segregate “regenerate Christians from the 
unregenerate” resulted in the formation of sects.161 These Protestant sects were essential 
to instilling in their members the qualities of creditworthiness now associated with homo 
oeconomicus.  
Weber details important denominational differences between Pietism, Methodism, 
and the Baptist movement in The Protestant Ethic, and within each he pays attention to 
how the ideas of signifying debt and deserving election often slipped into one another. 
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But he focuses more directly on the general disciplinary effect of the Protestant sects on 
Christian conduct and creditworthiness in his later essay “The Protestant Sects and the 
Spirit of Capitalism.” Drawing on his own ethnographic research among the Protestant 
sects in America, Weber argues that the discipline of the Puritans was vested in the hands 
of laymen rather than the hands of ordained priests or ministers.162 In order to maintain 
one’s status as one of God’s elect, a sect member had to hold his or her own under 
constant surveillance and in constant judgment according to the norms of conduct 
modeled and reproduced by the group.163 The watchful gaze of every member of the sect 
intensified the pressure on each individual to maintain good conduct by holding each 
accountable for her slightest actions and faults.164 In this way, Protestant sects shifted the 
operation of power from a vertical relation between pastor and flock to horizontal 
relations by which each member kept others in check. If we think of the Protestant sect as 
a disciplinary institution, then Foucault’s analysis of the disciplinary function of power in 
prisons, schools, and factories applies here as well. Protestant sects were an early 
breeding ground for the “multiple, automatic and anonymous power” that functioned as a 
network of relations “from top to bottom, but also . . . from bottom to top and laterally” 
holding the whole together while traversing it in its entirety with effects of power.165 
Here we see the consolidation of practices by which “supervisors [are] perpetually 
supervised.”166 
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To what extent did this kind of discipline help form the subject as a “calculating 
animal”? As Weber, and more recently, Mary Poovey argue, practices of rational 
accounting and bookkeeping were essential to bringing capitalism and a conception of 
economic rationality into existence.167 What is less remarked is that these actuarial 
practices had religious equivalents in the types of “moral” accounting engaged in by 
members of the Protestant sects. As we saw in the previous section, the Protestant sects 
popularized the image of God as an infallible creditor keeping a detailed and constant 
account of each Christian’s behavioral credits and debits. For instance, Weber says John 
Bunyan took this image to “a characteristically tasteless extreme” when he argued that 
the relation between the Christian sinner and God is like relation between a customer and 
shopkeeper.168 “One who has once got into debt may well, by the product of all his 
virtuous acts, succeed in paying off the accumulated interest but never the principal.”169 
Weber suggests that “religious account-books in which sins, temptations, and progress 
made in grace” were tabulated were common among the Protestant sects as well as 
among some groups of Catholics.170 While the Catholic used the spiritual account book 
under the paternalistic supervision of the priest, the “conscientious Puritan” used it to 
supervise his own state of spiritual credit; he “felt his own pulse with its aid.”171 This 
practice was widespread, and extended up to Weber’s exemplar of the “spirit” of 
capitalism, Ben Franklin, who kept a “tabulated statistical book-keeping on his progress 
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in the different virtues.”172 Here we discern again a connection between religious beliefs 
understood in terms of credit and debt, the practice of carefully accounting for one’s 
actions, and the spread of certain norms of conduct associated with homo fidelis by way 
of an “uninterrupted play of calculated gazes” turned toward the self and others.173  
   In terms of the Protestant sects’ more direct involvement in commerce and 
banking, it is important to note that Calvin “abandoned the doctrinal condemnation of 
loans at interest and generally recognized the morality of commerce.”174 Calvin’s deft 
exegetical reading of the Biblical prohibition of usury effectively demolished the 
religious taboos placed on moneymaking that had acted as a fetter on business activities 
throughout the medieval period.175 According to economic historian Ben Nelson, Calvin 
opened the floodgates on the taboo against usury such that merchants, lawyers, and 
business spokespeople rushed in to assure its demise. As Nelson puts it, “In the 
pamphlets of the late sixteenth century, we are no longer in the atmosphere of the 
confessional; we are in the counting house.”176 After Calvin, accumulating wealth and 
earning interest from moneylending were considered desirable as long as they contributed 
to the prestige of the sect, passed the Golden Rule test of “individual conscience” and the 
proceeds were not spent on luxury or idle pursuits.177  
 In the case of the United States, Weber discerns an even more direct connection 
between Protestant asceticism and credit. At least up to end of the 19th century, Weber 
argues, “the question of religious affiliation was almost always posed in social life and in 
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business life which depended on permanent and credit relations.”178 Congregations 
served to guarantee the “moral quality of a person” and often literally backed up the 
credit of a businessman.”179 Admission into a congregation involved a probationary 
period where a new member’s conduct was inquired into going back to early childhood, 
and those with a poor record of behavior would not make the cut.180 Hence, we find here 
further evidence of Protestant sects’ involvement in making distinctions of status within a 
population by identifying a “spiritual aristocracy” based on ethical conduct – conduct 
which also guaranteed excellent credit in the economic sphere. As Weber explains, 
admission to a reputable sect could secure for an individual almost unlimited access to 
credit in the region, not because the congregation could guarantee payment if a member 
failed to pay his debt, but because a well reputed sect “would only accept for membership 
one whose ‘conduct’ made him appear to be morally qualified beyond doubt.”181  
What sect contributed to creditworthiness in the world of business? Among the 
Quakers, the conduct associated with piety was also viewed as ensuring integrity and 
“fostering habits of prudence and forethought, important items in obtaining that standing 
and credit in the commercial world . . . requisites for the steady accumulation of 
wealth.”182 Similarly, Weber notes the proverbial expression “honest as a Huguenot” was 
common in the seventeenth century.183 Perhaps most important, idleness and wasting 
time were, for Puritans, among “the first and most serious of all sins.”184 According to 
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Presbyterian Richard Baxter, author of  “The Christian Directory” and “The Saint’s 
Everlasting Rest” two representative Puritan texts, “What is really reprehensible is 
resting on one’s possessions . . . enjoyment of wealth [and] its consequences of idleness 
and the lusts of the flesh.”185 Baxter’s advice to those who sought signs of their own 
grace was to “‘do the works of him who sent him, as long as it is day’ . . . it is only 
action, not idleness and indulgence, that serves to increase his glory.”186 As Weber notes, 
Franklin’s maxim “Time is money” was not yet current. But it existed in a spiritual sense 
because any moment wasted meant “one less hour devoted to labor in the service of 
God’s glory.”187 For Puritans like Baxter, seizing opportunities for private economic 
profit was no longer restricted; it was commanded since it would be sinful not to profit 
from opportunities revealed by God.188 Hence, the qualities conducive to maintaining 
spiritual and material credit were “drummed” into the members of Protestant sects. In 
particular the supreme emphasis on ceaseless and systematic labor in a secular calling as 
the highest ascetic path and surest way of producing visible proof of one’s “deserving” 
status was, according to Weber, “the most powerful lever imaginable with which to bring 
about the spread of that philosophy of life  . . . here termed the ‘spirit’ of capitalism.”189  
This finally brings our genealogical account of the constitution of homo 
oeconomicus through the internalization of debt and the projection of creditworthiness 
back to more familiar figures of liberal government and political economy: Ben Franklin 
and Adam Smith. Take Weber’s illustration of the “spirit” of capitalism in a famous 
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“little sermon” from Franklin: “time is money . . . credit is money . . . money is of the 
prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget 
more.”190 There is no longer any mention of God’s glory or election by grace, and 
Franklin seems to have shifted the magical and creative power onto money itself. This 
Yankee son of a Calvinist transferred its disciplines into a secular calling. The generation 
and accumulation of surplus value through the use of time and credit became ends in 
themselves. And this process is not simply automatic. It involves a particular form of 
conduct. One must not sit idle, says Franklin, or money cannot proliferate through wages; 
one cannot let money sit idle either or it cannot multiply through lending at interest. One 
must become “a good paymaster” in order to become “lord of another man’s purse.”191 
Franklin teaches the qualities of the good creditworthy subject (the “deserving” debtor): 
industry, frugality, punctuality in payment, and justice in all dealings.192 Franklin insists 
that one must conduct a perpetual account of the smallest details of one’s actions:  
The most trifling actions that affect a man's credit are to be regarded. The 
sound of your hammer at five in the morning, or eight at night, heard by a 
creditor, makes him easy six months longer; but if he sees you at a billiard 
table, or hears your voice at a tavern, when you should be at work, he sends 
for his money the next day; demands it, before he can receive it, in a 
lump.193  
 
He cautions that one who had good credit should not rest easy, but keep a careful budget 
of expenses and income in order to live within his means while saving for the future. If 
one is known for “prudence and honesty” one may extend one’s buying power through 
credit. With no mention of God, grace, sin, or redemption, Franklin internalizes and 
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celebrates all the qualities of the ascetic Protestant subject, the subject who, as we have 
seen, has been forged through a long process of training and discipline in which memory 
and conscience are created through the “mnemotechnics” of credit and debt. Weber 
makes clear how Franklin expresses an “ethos” – a set of duty-bound steps one must take 
to serve the general principle productive economic utility.194 The principles of conduct 
Franklin puts forth are only ethically prescribed if they serve “useful” economic ends that 
increase the proliferation of money and the productivity of labor. Any “unnecessary 
surplus” of this or that virtue, would, according to Weber, seem like “unproductive and 
reprehensible profligacy.”195  
One can also discern a connection between Franklin’s “little sermon”— that 
presents the ethical products of Protestant asceticism as deriving from the self-generating, 
almost spiritual power of money—and certain passages in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations. In Wealth of Nations, Smith praises “parsimony” as productive of value while 
castigating the wastefulness created by “prodigality.”196 Smith even calls idleness and 
unproductive consumption “perversions” because they act as a drain on the wealth of the 
entire country.197 Such a judgment is encapsulated by his statement: "every prodigal 
appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor."198 One sees in 
these statements by Smith a prime example of the ways in which the beliefs and practices 
of Protestant asceticism were taken up, in a loosely secularized form, in order to valorize 
the desirable traits of homo oeconomicus— productivity, diligence, self-control, 
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parsimony—in opposition to the qualities associated with the traditional/aristocratic way 
of life, which, as we see in Smith, are now judged to be perverse and even criminal.  
As both Weber and Nietzsche make clear, the shift in values that allowed 
entrepreneurs and financiers to surmount traditional taboos on the uses of public and 
private credit and moral limitations of work intensity and duration involved political and 
ethical struggles. Weber notes that the pioneering entrepreneur must have required a 
tremendous inner strength, self-control, clarity of vision, vigor, and an irrational (by 
previous standards) commitment to business—qualities that were valorized and 
propagated amongst the Protestant sects—in order to thrive in the face of the suspicion, 
hatred, and moral indignation he would have surely provoked.199 If Franklin or Smith had 
expressed a “philosophy of avarice” in such a direct fashion before the events of the 
Reformation made it intelligible and morally acceptable, they likely would have been 
condemned and burned as heretics.200  
As Georges Bataille argues in The Accursed Share, the importance of the 
Reformation from an economic standpoint involved its ability to conceal new economic 
ideas and practices under an unassailable cloak of moral authority and spiritual 
guidance.201 The interests and principles of capitalism would have been extremely 
difficult to defend a priori. However, from the lips of “men of unassailable moral quality, 
speaking to down-to-earth interests on behalf of higher powers” and through the 
disciplining effects of the worldly ascetic sects they inspired, the world was turned on its 
head.202 What had been considered a fundamentally “immoral” style of life that 
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prioritized self-interest, individualism, infinite accumulation of wealth, usury, unending 
work, and maximum productivity—qualities that ultimately benefitted the bourgeois 
creditor, merchant, and industrialist—came to occupy the dominant moral position that 
articulated what we would now consider to be “capitalist” priorities in political, social, 
and economic life.203 In those places where populations were heavily influenced by the 
Protestant ethos, the asymmetries of the credit/debt relation became absorbed into a 
secularized ethos that shaped their character traits, respective disciplines and conceptions 




 The notion that I have introduced in this chapter is that engaging in a genealogical 
investigation of the connections between credit, debt, Christianity and the economic 
subject of capitalism challenges widely held views about the ways in which capitalism 
developed and how it functions to this day. If, following Nietzsche and Weber, we do not 
distinguish, in advance, a natural separation between the moral and material realms, and 
if we follow the advances of power relations as they constitute the boundaries of the 
theological and the economic, it becomes very difficult to claim that capitalism derives 
from a natural human propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange” or from a natural 
evolution in the division of labor, or as the rational consequence of people acting out of 
wealth maximizing self-interest, or from the “spontaneous” self-organizing power of the 
market.204  
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Rather, as I have argued in this chapter, this sea change was driven, at least to a 
significant degree, by spiritual anxieties, religious doctrine, sectarian discipline of 
conduct, status distinctions and material asymmetries generated through the frame of 
creditor-debtor relations. According to Nietzsche, it was the monotheistic transformations 
of Judeo-Christianity that transmuted debt from something binding community members 
together through webs of mutual dependence and collective obligations to its ancestors, 
to a “mnemotechnics” of internalized pain, making subjects infinitely accountable, 
predictable and responsible to a creditor God. Weber helps us understand how the infinite 
guilt of Christian sin became productive and secularized by Luther and Calvin into a 
worldly calling and ascetic drive to endless toil and acquisition of wealth. While this 
Protestant asceticism was initially spurred by fear of eternal damnation and the desire to 
offer signs of one’s “election by grace,” it eventually overturned taboos on moneymaking 
and usury, contributing to the rise of an class of entrepreneurs infused with the “spirit” of 
capitalism, many of whom came to the New World to seek their fortune and spread the 
glory of God.  
However, as we will see in the next chapter, early capitalism was not just born in 
the European metropole, and was not simply derived from the gradual secularization of a 
voluntarily adopted religious ethos characterized by the morality of debt. The rise of 
capitalism was also fueled by European conquest, colonialism, and the genocide and 
dispossession of Native peoples, which made way for the development of plantation 
economies employing the forced labor of exiled indentured servants and slaves imported 
from Africa. Networks of credit and debt were essential to the colonial and slave 
economies and societies, and, as we shall see, the fashioning of racialized and indebted 
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subjects was strategically important to the liberal capitalist governmentality that followed 
slavery’s abolition.  
 
2 | Indebted Servitude and the Afterlife of Slavery in 
America 
 
“With treasure and precious blood your freedom has been purchased. Let these 
sufferings and sacrifices never be forgotten when you remember that you are not now a 
slave, but a freedman.” 
 — Isaac Brinckerhoff, Advice to Freedmen1 
 
“The keynote of the Black Belt is debt; not commercial credit, but debt in the sense of 
continued inability on the part of the mass of the population to make income cover 
expense.” 
— W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk2 
"My Friend, you was [sic] once a slave. You are now a freedman. . . . Your 
knowledge of what may rightly be expected from you is limited. There is much for you to 
learn.”3 So begins one of many manuals seeking to offer “friendly” advice to freed slaves 
in the American South on how to inhabit their newfound status as free. The abolition of 
slavery in the United States after the Civil War led to a massive upheaval in the racialized 
labor regime of a rapidly industrializing capitalism, offering the potential for, in the 
words delivered by Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg, “a new birth of freedom.” However, 
the realities of slave abolition also defy the conventional narrative of an upward, 
modernizing progression from slavery to freedom – from a system that treated some 
humans as property and significantly relied on their forced labor, to one that ostensibly 
would treat these same humans as citizens with rights entitling them to own property, to 
compensated work as free laborers, and to participate fully in the political process as 
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equals. Coercive labor regimes that continued well after emancipation in the United 
States, the West Indies, South America, India, China, and elsewhere suggest that 
accumulation by dispossession, terror, and involuntary servitude persisted in new ways 
and under different guises from the late 19th century well into the 20th century.4  
Many scholars have disclosed the travestied freedom brought about by 
emancipation, the unfulfilled promises of Reconstruction, and the glaring contradictions 
that have haunted liberal empire since its inception.5 However, as Mimi Thi Nguyen 
notes, these disclosures have hardly attenuated continued liberal invocations of freedom 
as its redeeming telos, “an at-times blunt instrument, for the disposition of hope and 
despair, life and death.”6 In this chapter, I seek to move beyond simply disclosing the bad 
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faith inherent in the ideal of freedom and liberation of the post-emancipation world, 
which, while certainly representing a breach with the system of chattel slavery that had 
preceded it, left the majority of former slaves unfree by any definition, and in some 
respects worse off than before. This chapter contends that debt provided a moral and 
economic armature well-suited to maintaining power relations of servitude under the 
auspices of freedom. 
The rise of debt as a technology of political, moral, and economic accountability 
and control occurred at the inflection point between proto-capitalist political economies 
premised on chattel slavery and the development of a modern industrial capitalism 
operating, at least on its face, via free exchange and free labor. In the first chapter I drew 
on Nietzsche and Weber to illustrate how the morality of debt affected the subject 
formation of Europeans and Euro-Americans through the widespread cultivation of a 
Protestant ethic of individual responsibility and disciplined labor. While Nietzsche and 
Weber focus our attention on debt, credit, and the moral suasion and bodily discipline 
required to produce a subject such as homo oeconomicus, they ignore how debt also 
played a significant role in cultivating labor discipline and fashioning the subjectivities of 
formerly enslaved and indigenous peoples in the Americas and the greater Imperial 
world. In this chapter, I seek to turn our  attention from the metropole to the colony and 
the plantation in order to understand the ways in which the dispossession, racialization 
and management of indigenous and enslaved peoples was intimately involved in the rise 
of liberal political philosophy, bourgeois morality, indebtedness and capitalist political 
economy. Moreover, I will account for the ways in which credit and debt facilitated and 
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legitimated the continuation of conditions of colonialism and servitude well past the 
abolition of chattel slavery and into the period of “modern” industrial capitalist 
development.  
To do so, I look to thinkers whose work draws from both Marx and Foucault, but 
expands beyond traditional Marxist and Foucauldian limits by seeking to more fully 
account for the predominant roles that colonialism, chattel slavery, and racism played and 
continue to play in capitalist political economy and liberal governmentality. I ask how it 
was that changes in discourses and practices of power associated with liberalism were 
able to maintain forms of domination, dispossession and subjection of the newly 
emancipated black citizenry. To answer this question, I engage particularly the work of 
W. E. B. Du Bois and Saidiya Hartman to argue that race and debt functioned together as 
political technologies which, together with outright coercion and violence, helped 
institute a new regime for disciplining and controlling the free black population in the 
postbellum American South. Debt and racism proved to be potent forces for shaping the 
social order, contributing significantly to the development of industrial capitalism in the 
United States. Finally, this chapter will show how an ascendant liberal governmentality 
maintained and justified processes of accumulation by dispossession and forced labor by 
rhetorically and materially deploying the creditor-debtor relationship to control formerly 
enslaved populations in a way that intertwined the racial marker of blackness with the 
moral stigma and material bonds of indebtedness. 
 
I. “Primitive” Accumulation and Racial Capitalism 
 
Marx’s discussion of so called “primitive” accumulation in the final chapters of 
Capital is a useful starting point to focus our attention on capitalism’s connections with 
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colonialism, plantation slavery, colonial displacement and other coercive modes of 
accumulation. Consider a brief summary of Marx’s primitive accumulation thesis. In 
Capital, Vol. 1, Marx engages in a critique of the classical political economy of theorists 
like Adam Smith and David Ricardo and their conceptions of value, commodities, 
money, labor, markets and capital. For the greater part of Capital, Marx offers an internal 
critique of key conceptions in the political economy of his time. He focuses on the 
production process rather than exchange and circulation, and that leads him to a 
revolutionary reappraisal of the origins of surplus value in the exploitation of the laborer 
by the capitalist entrepreneur. However, in the last chapters of the book, Marx begins to 
reassess the great revolving mechanism of the capitalist mode of production he has 
described up to that point with the suspicious feeling that something crucial was left out. 
He writes: 
The whole movement . . . seems to turn around in a never-ending circle, 
which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive accumulation . . . an 
accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production 
but its point of departure.7 
 
While Adam Smith addresses what he calls a “previous” accumulation of land and 
resources in The Wealth of Nations, Marx takes aim at the way Smith places the events 
by which his mythical capitalist accumulates wealth in an unexamined time and place 
before the narrative gets started. Smith’s account presents the entrepreneur as having 
acquired his stockpile of money by honest means and hard work, while those without a 
similar stockpile may have lost out due to their profligate character.8 Marx takes note of 
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the sleight of hand in Smith’s account, arguing, “primitive accumulation plays the same 
role in political economy as original sin does in theology.”9 Smith’s narrative places the 
origin of capitalism in a mythical past where, instead of Adam and Eve eating the 
forbidden apple and falling from grace, we find a natural division between two sorts of 
people “one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal élite; the other, lazy rascals, 
spending their substance, and more, in riotous living.”10  
Smith’s narrative naturalizes a socio-economic cleavage that was emergent at his 
time. A small minority was accumulating great wealth exponentially, while the great 
majority, to use Marx’s vivid language, had “nothing to sell except their own skins.”11 
The Smithian story also silences further investigation into the ugly history of the events 
by which this moral and economic stratification became institutionalized. By contrast, 
Marx seeks to lift the veil on what Foucault calls the “subjugated knowledge”12 of 
primitive accumulation to counter Smith’s tale of the original economic sin of the 
profligate laborer. Marx counters Smith’s inoculating tale with his argument that “the 
methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic,” and have historically been 
exemplified by “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force.”13 The 
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exemplary acts of violence Marx chronicles shift the focus away from the European 
metropole and focus squarely on the colonial context:  
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement 
and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, 
the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of 
Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all 
things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These 
idyllic proceedings are the chief moment of primitive accumulation. Hard 
on their heels follows the commercial war of the European nations, which 
has the globe as its battlefield. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands 
from Spain, assumes gigantic dimensions in England's Anti-Jacobin War, 
and is still going on in the shape of the Opium Wars against China.14    
 
Marx does not detail the transition from feudal and mercantilist social relations to those 
of industrial capitalism as a glorious revolution or as a natural progression out of a human 
propensity to barter and exchange. He analyzes it as a transnational set of processes 
involving conquest, plunder and enslavement in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. 
The history Marx tells records how agrarian populations were, in his words, “forcibly 
expropriated from the soil, driven from their homes, turned into vagabonds, and then 
whipped, branded and tortured by grotesquely terroristic laws into accepting the 
discipline necessary for the system of wage-labour.”15 He thus disrupts the idyllic 
historical narrative that supports Smith’s liberal characterization of laissez-faire politics 
and the birth of free markets. 
The type of narrative Marx seeks to debunk—one that naturalizes a particular 
social order by curating a myth of its past—is, of course, not uniquely employed by 
Smith. A range of early modern political theorists including Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke employ this rhetorical strategy to various political ends. For instance, Locke’s Two 
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Treatises of Government (1689) provides a similar narrative for the origin and foundation 
of private property that naturalizes and justifies Europeans’ dispossession of and 
dominion over Indigenous peoples. Here Locke argues that while God “gave the world to 
men in common” he clearly meant for it to be subdued and cultivated and thus primarily 
“gave it to the use of the industrious and rational.”16 As Locke’s argument goes, 
“Whatsoever [man] removes out of the state of nature . . . he hath mixed his labour with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”17 In 
territories deemed “vacant” or at least not already governed under the laws of a European 
sovereign state wherein “the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions,” 
Locke declares: “As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use 
the product of, so much is his property.”18  
 Locke argues that this principle holds going as far back as the Biblical days of 
Noah and Abraham, but the main exemplar of wild and unimproved lands in Locke’s 
account is America, or in his words the “inland, vacant places of America” where one 
could, in his view, appropriate land without prejudicing or encroaching upon the rest of 
mankind.19 Locke’s narrative of property that represents “the so-called new world as 
vacant and uninhabited by Christian civilized persons” offers an early exemplar of what 
Lisa Lowe identifies as a “central trope of settler colonialism” employed by Europeans to 
“banish, sequester, and dispossess indigenous peoples of their land.”20 Despite his rosy 
portrayal, it appears Locke would have known quite well that settler colonialism entailed 
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quite a bit of encroachment upon Indigenous peoples, including their violent repression 
and removal.  Locke was employed as the secretary for the proprietors of the colony of 
Carolina, helping pen its constitution, and later as secretary and treasurer for the English 
Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations.21 Historian David Armitage argues that Locke 
is “a crucial link in the historical chain joining liberalism with colonialism” considering 
that no figure as canonical in the history of political thought “played as prominent a role 
in the institutional history of European colonialism before James Mill and John Stuart 
Mill.”22 
 In his role as both colonial administrator and political philosopher, we see in the 
Two Treatises, Locke’s effort to justify processes of “primitive accumulation” in the New 
World, and not only Indian expropriation and removal, but also chattel slavery on the 
plantations his employers began cultivating in the new Carolina colony. His contribution 
to the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, alongside its insistence on religious 
toleration, assumed the existence of slavery in the colony and included the provision 
clearly stating, "Every Freeman of Carolina shall have absolute <power and> Authority 
over his Negro slaves of what opinion or Religion soever.”23 One can thus trace from 
Locke to the founders of the American republican a logic that seeks freedom from 
tyranny, political equality, and the sanctity of free trade and private property for white 
men on the one hand, while sanctioning the brutal treatment and enslavement of “certain 
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Barbarous men” and women, namely those identified and branded at the time as 
“Indians” and “Negroes.”24 
Marx’s interpretation of classical political economy and liberal political theory 
has inspired critical efforts to reread thinkers like Smith and Locke and to dramatize the 
history and functioning of capitalism in ways that do not disavow its imbrication with 
violent forms of coercion and dispossession. In Marx’s counter-narrative, capitalism 
begins with violent forms of accumulation that dispossess the majority and privatize 
capital in the hands of a few – a process often described as the “enclosure of the 
commons.”25 This stage is then followed by a process of “proletarianization” whereby the 
great mass of the dispossessed are then forced to sell their labor for wages in order to 
survive. These dual processes of dispossession and compulsion correspond in liberal 
discourse, Marx notes ironically, to the dual freedoms of property and contract, whereby 
the worker ends up “free” from material resources and to sell his or her labor as a 
commodity on the market.26 Once capitalist production is in full swing and a working 
class has become accustomed by “education, tradition and habit” to its requirements, 
Marx insists that the “silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the 
domination of the capitalist over the worker.”27 While he admits that “direct extra-
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 The enclosure of public common lands and their transformation into private property, it has been widely 
argued, constituted an important event in the origin of capitalism. See Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, Ernest 
Mandel, Ben Fowkes, and David Fernbach. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, “Chapter 27: The 
Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Land,” Penguin Classics. London ;New York, N.Y.: 
Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1990; Polanyi, Karl, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Fred 
Block. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. “Chapter 3: 
Habitation versus Improvement.” 2. Beacon paperback ed., [reprinted]. Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 2010; 
and Thompson, Edward Palmer. The Making of the English Working Class. [Partly extended and rev. ed.] 
London: V. Gollancz, 1980. 
26 Marx, Capital, 272-3.  
27 Ibid., 899. 
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economic force” may still be used, it now plays a minor role, to be used in exceptional 
cases.28 
Marx’s critique of “primitive” accumulation sets the stage for our analysis of the 
intersections of capitalism, debt, and race, but it is necessary to build on Marx’s analysis 
using a deepening body of interdisciplinary scholarship that alters the concept of 
“primitive” accumulation to encompass the ongoing phenomena of settler colonialism, 
land and resource dispossession, enslavement, forced labor and racism that continued to 
be part and parcel of capital accumulation throughout the industrial revolution and, as I 
argue in later chapters, continue up to the present day. 29   
David Harvey offers a prominent reconceptualization of primitive accumulation 
from within a solidly Marxist framework, in which he focuses on the central role played 
                                                 
28 Ibid. Max Weber echoes this argument in The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism, suggesting 
that once the capitalist “spirit” and mode of production come to dominate, they calcify into an “iron cage” 
into which the individual is born and must conform to their values in order to survive. Both Marx and 
Weber, at least in these passages, give the sense that once capitalism got past the initial stage of violent 
accumulation through conquest, it was able to function almost automatically and largely peacefully, 
normalizing its subjects into the proper comportments, habits of mind, and conceptions of contract and 
property befitting waged labor. They both are somewhat consistent in their temporal framing, suggesting an 
“open” period of volatility and uncertainty during the emergence of capitalism, followed by a closed 
mechanistic period once the machine had all its parts and no longer require the processes it had relied on to 
get going. Weber, Max, Peter Baehr, and Gordon C. Wells. The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of 
Capitalism and Other Writings. Penguin Twentieth-Century Classics. New York: Penguin Books, 2002, 13. 
29 A range of scholars have contributed to rethinking Marx’s concept of “primitive” accumulation, viz., 
Kropotkin, Petr Alekseevich, and Marshall Shatz. The Conquest of Bread and Other Writings. Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995; 
Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel Hill, N.C: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000; Perelman, Michael. The Invention of Capitalism: Classical 
Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 
2000; Harvey, D. “The ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession.” Socialist Register 40 (2004): 
63-87; Federici, Silvia. Caliban and the Witch. 2., rev. ed. New York, NY: Autonomedia, 2014; Glassman, 
J. “Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by ‘Extra-Economic’ Means.” 
Progress in Human Geography 30, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 608–25. doi:10.1177/0309132506070172; 
Alfred, Gerald R. Wasaʹse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom. Peterborough, Ont. ; Orchard 
Park, N.Y: Broadview Press, 2005; Smith, Andrea. Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian 
Genocide. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005; Goldstein, A. “Finance and Foreclosure in the Colonial 
Present.” Radical History Review 2014, no. 118 (January 1, 2014): 42–63. doi:10.1215/01636545-2349095; 
Coulthard, Glen Sean. Red Skin, White Masks Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014; Lowe, Lisa. The Intimacies of Four Continents. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2015. 
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by credit and debt in the accumulation process.  He stresses how “accumulation based on 
predation, fraud, and violence” cannot be relegated to some “original stage” of capitalism 
nor can it be placed exterior to the capitalist system.30 For this reason, Harvey advocates 
renaming “primitive” accumulation “accumulation by dispossession.”31 Drawing on Rosa 
Luxemburg who argued that capital accumulation functioned through colonial policy and 
an international loan system in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Harvey stresses the role 
credit, debt, and finance continue to play in ongoing modes of capital accumulation by 
dispossession. Focusing on accumulation by dispossession not only highlights the role of 
the state in capitalist accumulation, it highlights how, in Harvey’s words, the “credit 
system and finance capital have . . . been major levers of predation, fraud and thievery . . 
. [leading to] the promotion of debt encumbrancy that reduces whole populations, even in 
the advanced capitalist countriesf, to debt peonage.”32 In Harvey’s view, accumulation by 
dispossession through mechanisms of credit and debt is a central feature of what 
“contemporary capitalism is all about.”33   
From a different angle, Cedric Robinson argues in his highly influential work 
Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition that Marx’s theorization of 
capitalism is insufficient because it does not account for the ways in which race and 
racism were essential to the “development, organization, and expansion of capitalist 
society” from the time of its feudal beginnings on European soil onwards.34 Like Harvey, 
Robinson asserts that Marx was wrong to assign slave labor and other coercive labor 
                                                 





34 Robinson, Cedric J. 2000. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel Hill, N.C: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2.  
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regimes, as well as their racializing effects, to “some ‘pre-capitalist’ stage of history. 
Instead, he suggests that it is far more accurate to talk of “primitive” accumulation as an 
ongoing phenomenon of what Robinson terms “racial capitalism.”35 In conversation with 
Robinson and others, Lisa Lowe elaborates the ways in which violent accumulation 
continues well beyond the founding moments of settler colonial conquest and 
appropriation of land and labor. She argues that the operations that constitute “primitive” 
accumulation, including “settler seizure and native removal, slavery and racial 
dispossession, and racialized expropriations of many kinds . . . are imbricated processes, 
not sequential events; they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary moment, not 
temporally distinct nor as yet concluded."36 Lowe writes, “The abstract promises of 
abolition, emancipation, and the end of monopoly often obscure their embeddedness 
within colonial conditions of settlement, slavery, coerced labor, and imperial trades.”37 
Moreover, like Robinson, Lowe emphasizes the role that improvised racial categories 
have played in the accumulation process by dividing humanity, from the European 
perspective, into those deserving of rights and liberties and those deserving the status of 
“barbarians,” non-human chattel, or sub-human and expendable labor.38 
Rethinking accumulation by dispossession as a standard feature of racial 
capitalism suggests, as Glen Coulthard argues, the need to avoid economic reductionism 
in examining both historical and contemporary relations of colonial and capitalist 
domination.39 Coulthard insists that power functions along racial, gendered, state, 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 4.  
36 Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents, 7.  
37 Ibid., 16.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Coulthard, Glen Sean. 2014. Red Skin, White Masks Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 14.  
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nationalist and other axes in unique ways that call out for a “radical intersectional 
analysis,” which engages a “diversity of interlocking oppressive social relations.”40 This 
is an important insight for considering the racialized effects of credit and debt in both 
Marx’s time and ours. As we will see, colonial relations of domination involving the 
creation of conditions of perpetual indebtedness for certain populations existing within 
and alongside market relations of production based on wage labor – the primary focus of 
Marx’s critique of capital. Engaging in an intersectional analysis of modes of colonialism 
operating within and alongside capitalism allows us to anticipate practices of 
accumulation by dispossession cloaked in egalitarian principles and justified as fulfilling 
so called “progressive” political ends.41 Moreover, as Coulthard emphasizes, from the 
perspective of colonized Indigenous peoples, “proletarianization” is not the dominant 
feature of capitalist expansion and development; it is dispossession.42 Shifting away from 
a conceptual framework dominated by the white male proletariat allows us to focus on 
the dynamics of accumulation by dispossession which, I will argue, serve to control 
formerly colonized and enslaved peoples, in particular through the formation of an 
indebted subjectivity branded by race. 
 Hence the need, in my view, for combining the subaltern Marxian analysis of 
accumulation by dispossession coming out of the black radical tradition, postcolonial 
studies, and indigenous studies with a Foucauldian perspective that examines power-
knowledge relations shaping conduct and the formation of subjectivities through the lens 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 15.  
41 Ibid., 12.  
42 Ibid., 13.  
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of discipline and governmentality.43 A turn to governmentality seems particularly apt in 
that accumulation by dispossession does not always proceed by overt forms of violence, 
but, as Coulthard notes, often functions through the selective granting, management, and 
recognition of freedom.44 In particular, this chapter examines the ways in which liberal 
governmentality deployed the rhetoric of freedom, rights, and personal responsibility to 
solicit the participation of former slaves in their own domination.45  
                                                 
43 The use of Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” is now ubiquitous in the literature of a range of 
disciplines including political theory, sociology, geography and anthropology. For my purposes I am drawn 
to one of Foucault’s later definitions of governmentality that defines it as an “analytical grid” for 
examining the power relations through which one “conducts the conduct of men.” See Foucault, Michel, 
and Michel Senellart. 2010. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978 - 79. Michel 
Foucault’s Lectures at the Collège de France. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 186. I adopt a theoretical 
approach focused on governmentality for its ability, on the one hand, to destabilize assumptions about the 
explanatory power of ready-made structures, institutions, and objects like “the state,” “capitalism,” or even 
some versions of “neoliberalism,” and, on the other hand, for the emphasis it puts on a genealogical 
understanding of the shifting technologies and alliances that continuously produce these phenomena as 
unstable but real forces in the world. For a list of important works in the literature on governmentality 
informing this project, see Burchell, Graham, and Michel Foucault, eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality ; with Two Lectures and an Interview with Michel Foucault. 1. publ. London [u.a]: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; Rose, Nikolas, Pat O’Malley, and Mariana Valverde. “Governmentality.” 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2, no. 1 (December 2006): 83–104. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.105900; Ong, Aihwa. Neoliberalism As Exception: Mutations In 
Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2006; Elden, Stuart. 
“Governmentality, Calculation, Territory.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25, no. 3 
(2007): Amoore, Louise, and Marieke de Goede, eds. Risk and the War on Terror. London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2008: 562–80. doi:10.1068/d428t.; Dean, Mitchell. Governmentality: Power and Rule In 
Modern Society. 2nd ed. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2010; Spence, Lester. Stare in the Darkness: The Limits of 
Hip-hop and Black Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011; Soss, Joe, Richard C. 
Fording, and Sanford Schram. Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of 
Race. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011; Dilts, Andrew. "From 'Entrepreneur of the Self' to 'Care 
of the Self': Neo-liberal Governmentality and Foucault's Ethics." Foucault Studies. No. 12, October 2011; 
Lazzarato, M., and Joshua David Jordan. The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal 
Condition. Semiotext(e) Intervention Series 13. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2012; Walters, William. 
Governmentality: Critical Encounters. Critical Issues in Global Politics. New York: Routledge, 2012; 
Nguyen, Mimi Thi. The Gift of Freedom: War, Debt, and Other Refugee Passages. Next Wave: New 
Directions in Women’s Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012; Joseph, Miranda. Debt to Society: 
Accounting for Life under Capitalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014; Coulthard, Glen 
Sean. Red Skin, White Masks Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2014; and Lowe, Lisa. The Intimacies of Four Continents. Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2015. 
44 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 16.  
45 Ibid. 
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 It must be noted that Foucault, notwithstanding his notable discussion of race and 
racism in the 1976-77 Collège de France lectures entitled “Society must be Defended,”46 
largely left issues of settler colonialism, chattel slavery, and modern racialized labor 
regimes unexplored. Ann Laura Stoler points out that Foucault’s Eurocentric focus on the 
production and treatment of “internal enemies” like the mad, sexually deviant and 
criminal, however valuable, led him to ignore the importance of the global theatre of 
colonialism as a crucial context in which to explore “the gritty historical specificities of 
what racial discourse did both to confirm the efficacy of slavery and to capture new 
populations in the transition to wage-labor.”47 In order to adapt Foucault’s concepts of 
discipline and governmentality to better account for race, I find it helpful to augment 
Foucault’s notion of subject formation with Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s 
conceptual framework of “racial formation.” This framework considers race as “an 
unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by 
political struggle.”48 The formation of racial concepts and their attachment to certain 
bodies get taken up for use in a variety of what Omi and Winant call “racial projects:” the 
use of race to represent, organize and govern bodies and social structures.49 It is thus my 
contention that a focus on accumulation by dispossession, governmentality, and racial 
                                                 
46 In these lectures Foucault defines “racism” as the introduction of “a break into the domain of life that is 
under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.” He argues that racism 
involves discursive techniques and political practices that separate out groups within a population, identify 
those sub-groups judged to be a threat or risk to the health of the general population, and legitimate this 
group’s expulsion, rejection, political death, or even extermination. Foucault, Michel, Mauro Bertani, 
Alessandro Fontana, François Ewald, and David Macey. "Society Must Be Defended": Lectures At the 
Collège De France, 1975-76. New York: Picador, 2003, 254-6.  
47 Stoler, Ann Laura. 2004. Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things. 6. print. Durham: Duke University Press, 91-3.  
48 Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 
1990s. 2nd ed. New York London: Routledge, 55. 
49 Ibid., 55-6.  
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formation together allows for a more compelling analysis of the “gritty historical 
specificities” of how credit and debt became imbricated with race as part of a 
reorganization of racial capitalism after the abolition of slavery in America. 
 
II. Emancipation and the Gift of Freedom 
 
After over two hundred years of systematic domination, forced labor, subjection 
to brutal abuse and punishments of all kinds, murder, rape, and treatment as a less than 
human form of property, how could it be that the freed slaves in the United States owed 
anything at all to their former masters? How could they be indebted to the nation that had 
profited so richly from their enslavement and only reluctantly declared them free? How 
could the event of emancipation— understood colloquially among former slaves in the 
biblical terms of “Jubilee”50 (the cancellation of all debts)—sow the seeds of the 
freedman’s return to bondage? In Scenes of Subjection, her brilliant study of slavery, 
Reconstruction and black subject formation in 19th century America, Saidiya Hartman 
explains the logic of this dynamic in terms of the “gift of freedom.” She finds in Isaac 
Brinckerhoff’s practical manual for former slaves Advice to Freedmen, an exemplar of 
the postbellum narrative by which freedom granted became a gift that demanded 
recompense. In a section entitled “How You Became Free,” Brinckerhoff writes:  
To accomplish this [securing your freedom] the government has spent many 
millions of dollars; many parents have given up their sons, and many wives 
their husbands. Many thousand households at the north are clothed in 
mourning, and many tears are shed for the dead who have been slain. With 
treasure and precious blood your freedom has been purchased. Let these 
sufferings and sacrifices never be forgotten when you remember that you 
are not now a slave, but a freedman.51  
                                                 
50 Jubilee refers to a year in which creditors cancelled debts and freed those enslaved through debt bondage. 
See Graeber, David. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Updated and expanded ed. Brooklyn, NY: Melville 
House, 2014, 82; Deuteronomy 15:1–3.  
51 Brinckerhoff, Advice to Freedmen, 7.  




This selective interpretation of the events of the Civil War seeks to establish a debt owed 
by freed blacks to the American government and ostensibly the Union soldiers and their 
families for the blood and treasure expended in securing their freedom. There is no 
mention of the suffering and massive sacrifices endured by blacks under slavery, nor of 
the role they played in securing their own freedom by engaging in a massive general 
strike and fighting as soldiers for the Union.52  Hartman shows how these textbooks 
create a narrative origin story by which “the burden of debt, duty, and gratitude foisted 
onto the newly emancipated in exchange or repayment for their freedom is established.”53 
Any notion that freedom would mean rest, idleness, enjoyment, and a reduced burden for 
the former slave was immediately quashed in these texts. Advice to Freedmen continues:  
With the enjoyment of a freedman's privileges, come also a freedman's 
duties and responsibilities. These are weighty. You cannot get rid of them. 
They must be met. And unless you are prepared to meet them with a proper 
spirit, and patiently and cheerfully to fulfil these obligations, you are not 
worthy of being a freedman.54 
  
Thus, Hartman notes, “[e]mancipation instituted indebtedness. Blame and duty and blood 
and dollars marked the birth of the free(d) subject.”55 
 The event of emancipation in the United States exemplifies a key strategy of 
liberal governmentality: “the gift of freedom” becomes a way of including the formerly 
colonized and enslaved in the polity. It employs freedom as a “force” that unevenly 
extends the promise of life, but demands repayment and sacrifice in return.56 In her 
                                                 
52 See Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk 
Played In the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy In America, 1860-1880. New York: Russell & Russell, 
1962, in particular Chapter IV “The General Strike” and Chapter V “The Coming of the Lord.” 
53 Hartman, Saidiya V. 1997. Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century 
America. Race and American Culture. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 130. 
54 Brinckerhoff, Advice to Freedmen, 7. 
55 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 131.  
56 Nguyen, The Gift of Freedom, 5.  
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penetrating treatment of the subject, Mimi Thi Nguyen draws on Mauss, Derrida, and 
Foucault to theorize the gift of freedom as a “world shaping concept” that produces both 
“promise and duress.”57 As she puts it, the gift of freedom generates “a relation between 
giver and recipient that engenders a debt,” a debt which evinces “those imperial remains 
that preclude the subject of freedom from being able to escape a colonial order of 
things.”58 She, like Hartman, construes the gift of freedom as “a surface on which power 
acts,” engaging in imbricated projects of subject formation, racial formation and capital 
accumulation.59  
Emancipation—“by virtue of the gift of freedom and wage labor”—incorporated 
blacks into the democratic “narrative of the rights of man and citizen” as well as the 
liberal narrative of social contract and free labor, while simultaneously maintaining the 
legacy of slavery through the “unyielding fabrication of blackness as subordination,” 
dependency, indebtedness, and criminality.60 This was accomplished “under the aegis of 
formal equality.”61 The freedman is now addressed by white saviors as a human, an 
individual and a “friend;” this recognition serves not to elaborate the civil or human 
rights he now possesses, but to ensure that he is aware of the duties he and his community 
are now obliged to carry out.62 Indeed, the gift of freedom is presented as contingent: “I 
believe that if you and your people will follow wise counsels, and try to do right and 




60 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 119. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Here I remind the reader of Nietzsche’s words in Twilight of the Idols: “We no longer have any sympathy 
today with the concept of ‘free will’: we know only too well what it is – the most infamous of all the arts of 
the theologian for making mankind ‘accountable’ . . . Men were thought of as ‘free’ so that they could 
become guilty.” Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, R. J. Hollingdale, Michael Tanner, and Friedrich Wilhelm 
Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols: And, The Anti-Christ. Penguin Classics. London ;New York, N.Y: Penguin 
Books, 2003. 
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improve the advantages which you now have, you will become worthy and respected 
citizens of this great nation [my emphasis].”63 As Brinckerhoff addresses his old and dear 
friend the “Negro”: unless you “patiently and cheerfully” fulfill your weighty new 
obligations, “you are not worthy of being a freedman.”64 Hence, the gift of freedom 
institutes a racial debt to “white” society borne by the black population. Brinckerhoff 
reminds the freedmen that their former masters and even some of their northern 
abolitionist friends fear that they are “helpless and dependent as children” and will 
become a “burden to the community . . . that the government will be compelled to feed 
and clothe.”65 Thus, in order for the blacks to become worthy of citizenship and social 
esteem in the eyes of both Northern and Southern whites, they are enjoined to take 
individual responsibility for paying back their debt of gratitude to the nation through 
good future conduct. “Your future history must, under God, be wrought out by 
yourselves,” but “you need not fear. Put your trust in God, and bend you back joyfully 
and hopefully to the burden."66  
Finally, the power of the debt created through the gift of freedom involves a 
relation to time and memory. The notion that freedom ought to be considered an 
enormous “gift” given to former slaves by northern benefactors reinforces an 
interpretation of the past that emphasizes white sacrifice by courageous soldiers and 
mothers over the sacrifices of slaves forced to toil endlessly for hundreds of years. 
Another manual, Plain Counsels for Freedmen, even suggests that the “sacrifices” of 
former slave owners, bitter and resentful for losing their privileged status, wealth and 
                                                 
63 Brinckerhoff, Advice to Freedmen, 4. 
64 Ibid., 7. 
65 Ibid., 10. 
66 Ibid., 7-8, 10. 
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“property,” should be respected and “sore toes” should not be stepped on for fear of 
arousing anger and inflaming prejudice.67 This amnesiac memory of slavery emphasizing 
“paternalism, dependency, and will-lessness” and disavowal of the enormous injury and 
injustice committed by whites, “was to be seared into the minds of the freed.”68  
Many former slaves rejected this narrative and felt that they couldn’t owe any 
debt that they had not already paid back a thousandfold,69 If anyone was owed a debt, it 
was the freedmen, many of whom demanded some form of reparations, of which, land 
would be the crucial component.70 While these counter-arguments may have had some 
traction with the Union government toward the beginning of the Reconstruction period—
especially considering the government’s promise that freed slaves would receive up to 
forty acres of confiscated land for three years which they would then be entitled to 
purchase—they fell on deaf ears once the period of “Redemption” was underway in 
1876.71 
 It seems clear that the purpose of the emancipation narrative of the gift of 
freedom, disseminated in works like Advice to Freedmen and other similar texts,72 was, 
on the one hand, to wipe away the public memory of the suffering and injustices of 
slavery in order to void the freedmen’s claims to retribution, reparations, or 
                                                 
67 Quoted in Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 149. 
68 Ibid., 131-2.  
69 Ibid. 
70 Du Bois, W. E. B, David W Blight, and Robert Gooding-Williams. 1997. The Souls of Black Folk. 
Boston: Bedford Books, 56. 
71 Blackmon, Douglas A. 2012. Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from 
the Civil War to World War II. London: Icon, 18. 
72 See Brinckerhoff, Isaac W., Isaac W. Brinckerhoff, and J. B. Waterbury. Advice to Freedmen. 
Freedmen’s School and Textbooks, v. 4. New York, N.Y: AMS Press, 1980; Waterbury, Jared Bell. 
Friendly Counsels for Freedmen. Place of publication not identified: Book On Demand Ltd, 2013; Fisk, 
Clinton Bowen. Plain Counsels for Freedmen: In Sixteen Brief Lectures. Boston: American Tract Society, 
1866; Brown, H. E., and Clinton Bowen Fisk. John Freeman and His Family. New York, N.Y.: AMS 
Press, 1980; Waterbury, J. B. Southern Planters and the Freedmen. New York: American Tract Society, 
1860. 
2 | Indebted Servitude and the Afterlife of Slavery 
88 
 
redistribution, and on the other hand, to convince former slaves that they were owed 
nothing, and, in fact, were individually responsible for paying back the debt of their 
manumission to the creditor nation by joyfully returning to work on the plantations. As 
Hartman explains, “blacks gained entry to the body of the nation-state as expiators of the 
past, as if slavery and its legacy were solely their cross to bear.”73 Advice to Freedmen 
puts it bluntly: “Though you have for generations been a dependent and enslaved race, 
yet with many visible marks of degradation still upon you, there is evidence of a God-
given manhood within, which only needs to be properly developed and rightly cultivated 
to make you happy, prosperous, and useful [my emphasis].”74 Blacks, now refigured as 
responsible liberal individuals, would bear the lion’s share of the cost of dealing with the 
degradations wrought by slavery, displacing “the nation’s responsibility for providing 
and ensuring the rights and privileges conferred by the Reconstruction Amendments” by 
becoming the “locus of blame and site of aberrance.”75 
 
 
III. Liberal Governmentality and Indebted Servitude 
The granting of freedom through slave emancipation was leveraged to institute an 
indebted class of subjects who were encouraged to never forget the sacrifices endured by 
their white benefactors and by the white nation. This deliberate entwinement of indebted 
and racial identities was deployed as a crucial aspect of the post-emancipation strategy of 
liberal governmentality. I will elucidate the features of this governmentality as it relates 
to the American context, but it should be kept in mind that debt was important for the 
                                                 
73 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 133.  
74 Brinckerhoff, Advice to Freedmen, 5.  
75 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 118.  
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transnational retooling of liberal governmental strategies for maintaining white 
supremacy and European domination in colonial and postcolonial contexts.  
 To reconfigure the black man as an individual in the wake of the Civil War meant 
placing all blame and responsibility for his highly precarious social, economic, and 
political position in the fractious American nation on his shoulders alone. This nascent 
individuality, marked by blackness, the sign of a “dependent and enslaved race,” is 
described by Hartman as a “burdened individuality.”76 “Burdened individuality” conveys 
the antagonistic production of a raced individual subject: at once “freed from slavery and 
free of resources, emancipated and subordinated, self-possessed and indebted, equal and 
inferior, liberated and encumbered, sovereign and dominated, citizen and subject.”77 
Advice to Freedmen and manuals like it contributed to a governmentality that produced 
this burdened individuality by treating the enormous problems following in the wake of 
slavery— psychological trauma, economic crisis, social dislocation, political suppression 
and rampant white prejudice and violence— as if they could all be solved through the 
development of the conduct and character of the individual freedman.78 Former slaves 
would have to be “abstinent in the present in the hopes of securing the future.”79 This left 
the period of repayment for the gift of freedom subject to compounding interest, and, as 
we will see, ultimately infinite and irredeemable. Nguyen remarks that “what is given” 
under the auspices of liberal empire, whether it be sovereignty, freedom or virtue, “is 
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always ‘to come’ because the debt extends endlessly.”80 Emancipation thus offers a twist 
on a classic legal maxim: freedom delayed is freedom denied.   
This brings us to a second major feature of the strategic deployment of debt in 
post-abolition liberal governmentality. Instituting a debt gives the “creditor” the 
legitimate power to discipline the debtor’s conduct. The debt instituted by the gift of 
freedom was to be paid back through disciplined conduct, the conduct of a docile, 
rational and “cheerful” economic subject in the making. One could say that the former 
slave was recaptured as soon as she was set free. The debt of emancipation contributed to 
a project of subject formation that managed the conduct of former slaves by subjecting 
them to new forms of discipline and inciting them to self-discipline through combinations 
of hope, guilt, and brute force. According to Nguyen, debt’s power of subjection comes 
from its ability to maintain a tight hold on the debtor. It maintains this hold by figuring 
the indebted subject as liable for past actions in order to shape her “possible desires, 
movements, and futures” in ways conducive to repayment.81 Emancipation’s contingent 
promise of freedom thus created an awesome power of subject formation and social 
control. As W. E. B. Du Bois notes in Souls of Black Folk:  
Away back in the days of bondage they thought to see in one divine event 
the end of all doubt and disappointment; few men ever worshipped Freedom 
with half such unquestioning faith as did the American Negro for two 
centuries. To him, so far as he thought and dreamed, slavery was indeed the 
sum of all villainies, the cause of all sorrow, the root of all prejudice; 
Emancipation was the key to a promised land of sweeter beauty than ever 
stretched before the eyes of wearied Israelites."82 
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The agents of Reconstruction harnessed former slaves’ affectively intense faith in the 
promise of freedom and fused it to the imperative to take individual responsibility to 
repay the debt owed for the blood and treasure said to have been spent on their behalf. 
Taking responsibility meant cultivating and conducting himself in the ways desired by his 
new creditors. As Advice to Freedmen insists, “Now, my friend, just repeat that wise 
saying over and over until you get it by heart. Remember it. ‘THE SUREST WAY TO 
IMPROVE ONE’S CONDITION IS TO IMPROVE ONE’S SELF [author’s 
emphasis].”83 The debt of freedom demands self-improvement, i.e., the cultivation of a 
particular form of subjectivity and conduct as its recompense. 
 I will note here a few parallels between the abolition of slavery in the European 
colonies and the United States and shifts in the operations of power that Foucault traces 
in Discipline and Punish. First, Foucault maps a shift from the eighteenth to the 
nineteenth century in criminal punishment where the model of the “superfluous, 
gratuitous, spectacular, and wasteful sovereign power” that exacts torture on the body of 
the criminal gives way to a “technology of subtle, effective, economic powers” that seeks 
to both reform the criminal and appropriate his labor.84 With the rise of social contract 
theory, crimes are no longer considered as committed against the sovereign, but against 
“society”; hence the notion of the criminal as owing a “debt to society.”85 The convict 
now appeared not as the sovereign’s property, but as a “slave at the service of all” whose 
body ought to be used and appropriated to pay back the debt he owes.86 Here we see the 
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dynamic by which the sovereign’s subject or slave/property becomes a free member of 
civil society through the social contract, and then plunges back into a form of slavery 
once he is branded a criminal/debtor. It is important to note here the thin line separating 
the slave, the debtor, and the criminal.   
Second, this discursive shift corresponded with the mounting influence of the 
bourgeoisie who sought reforms in the administration of justice that would reduce 
corruption and waste, police theft, and above all aid the disciplining the burgeoning 
industrial labor force. Foucault notes a widespread fear of the poor and lower classes who 
had become outlaw targets of a newly constituted disciplinary power that sought to fine 
tune the machinery of justice to allow for “a closer penal mapping of the social body.”87 
From the police and criminal justice system, to the army, to hospitals, schools and 
factories, Foucault argues, “The disciplines established an ‘infra-penality’; they 
partitioned an area that the laws had left empty; they defined and repressed a mass of 
behavior that the relative indifference of the great systems of punishment had allowed to 
escape.”88 He details how the disciplinary institutions subjected workers, soldiers, pupils, 
and so on to “a whole micro-penality” of time (lateness, absences, interruptions), of 
activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behavior (impoliteness, disobedience), 
of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body (‘incorrect’ attitudes, irregular gestures, 
lack of cleanliness), and of sexuality (impurity, indecency)89 This “micro-penality” 
disciplining everyday conduct was essential to managing populations in space and time in 
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ways that expanded the productive forces of a growing capitalist economy while 
maintaining the boundaries of an unequal political and social order.  
What Foucault does not discuss is how this shift also corresponds to the formal 
abolition of slavery, mounting white fears about the “proximate dangers” presented by 
the uncontrolled black populations in their midst, and ensuing efforts on the part of 
colonial managers, plantation owners, government bureaucrats and entrepreneurs to 
develop the “infra-powers” necessary for transforming former slaves into an itinerant and 
docile source of labor.90 Hartman emphasizes how abolitionist discourse that had invoked 
a natural right to life and liberty in the antebellum years became, in the postbellum 
period, much more ambivalent, elitist and racist, emphasizing a contractual notion of free 
labor and inordinately concerned with the cultivation of discipline and manhood in the 
freed.91 Du Bois notes that the stated goal of the Freedmen’s Bureau in the postbellum 
South was “to introduce practicable systems of compensated labor,” in which “laborers 
must be free to choose their employers . . . and there was to be no peonage or forced 
labor.”92 Efforts were made to confront both the “tyrant” slaveholder who sought to 
return the freedmen to a condition of slavery, and the “idler” freedmen who supposedly 
viewed freedom as “perpetual rest.”93 Manuals like Advice to Freedmen attempted to not 
only figure the freedman as a debtor who must return to work, but to incite blacks to 
discipline themselves and the quality of their work and lifestyle. In a Foucauldian sense, 
the goal was to “normalize” blacks to the standards of a “rational, docile, and productive 
working class,” shaping them into “ascetic and acquisitive” subjects, while eradicating all 
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“intemperate notions” through education, religion, and, if necessary, compulsion.94 
However, as evidenced in Advice to Freedmen, and expressed by Hartman, “three 
centuries of black servitude could not relieve the nation’s anxiety about the productivity 
of black labor or assuage the fear that the freed would be idle if not compelled to 
work.”95 
Hartman notes in reference to the work of David Brion Davis that Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon, which Foucault singles out as the great “laboratory” and diagram 
of modern disciplinary power,96 is itself a “parodic intensification of the ideals of 
plantation management.”97 Within the transatlantic capitalist system, strategies for labor 
management were traded from plantation to factory, suggesting that the agents seeking to 
implement systems of wage labor always had one eye trained on slavery.98 Moreover, as 
Lisa Lowe argues, contrary to humanist narratives of morality and progress, the abolition 
of slavery, at least in the British Empire, can be viewed as “a pragmatic attempt to stave 
off Black revolution and to resolve difficulties in the sugar economy resulting from the 
inflexibility of slave labor.”99 She cites documentary evidence that the British Colonial 
Office was worried about a repeat of the Haitian Revolution100 in its own West Indian 
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colonies, seeing in abolition an expedient solution to increase its revenues through more 
efficient means of extracting profit from free labor.101 One way that this concern 
instantiated itself in practice was through the supplementation of black slave labor with, 
in the words of the Colonial Office, a “free race . . . who could be kept distinct from the 
Negroes”; i.e., imported Chinese indentured laborers who could serve as a “figure” of 
freedom, while allowing planters to continue benefitting from a range of intermediate 
forms of coerced labor.102 In this way, the liberty of contract granted to former slaves in 
the United States as well as to Chinese and South Asian “coolie” laborers throughout the 
British Empire, served primarily to entrap them in systems of debt bondage.103   
This leads us to consider the third dimension of debt as a feature of liberal 
governmentality: its deployment to enact and legitimate a new racialized regime of 
involuntary servitude, which, following Hartman, I will refer to as “indebted 
servitude.”104 Indebted servitude describes the racial governmentality associated with the 
reorganization of the capitalist political economy in the postbellum American South. The 
deployment of the bonds of debt through the extension of the freedom of contract and 
credit to the newly minted black citizens were the hallmarks of this regime. 
Understanding the life conditions of postbellum southern blacks in terms of “indebted 
servitude” serves, in Hartman’s words, “to amplify the constraints of conscience 
(discipline internalized and lauded as a virtue), the coercion and compulsion of the free 
labor system, and the 'grafting of morality onto economics' in the making of the dutiful 
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free laborer and similarly to illuminate the elasticity of debt in effecting peonage and 
other forms of involuntary servitude."105 It also seeks to capture how blacks were 
introduced to the exchange relations of the “free market” through, on the one hand, the 
moral deployment of the debt of emancipation that demanded their labor and proper 
conduct as repayment and on the other, coercive contractual arrangements that effectively 
sanctioned their re-enslavement through an interminable extension of credit.106  
The whitewashing of slavery’s past, the fashioning of former slaves as indebted 
beings, responsible for their own fates, onerous labor and share contracts, and the ever-
present threat of terroristic white violence combined to effectively create the conditions 
for the next installations of oppression, this time in the form of debt peonage and convict 
labor. To quote Union General Alfred H. Terry, the postbellum situation for blacks in the 
South fast became “a condition of servitude worse than that from which they have been 
emancipated—a condition which will be slavery in all but its name.”107 Blacks who 
sought to practice freedom as mobility, land ownership, and self-sufficiency—true to the 
Republican ideal of the self-sufficient yeoman farmer—were discouraged, attacked, and 
eventually criminalized as new means of managing black “freedom” were instituted.108 
These compelling means centered on arrangements that substituted the creditor-debtor 
relation for the master-slave relation. As Du Bois puts it in his description of the “Black 
Belt” region of Georgia between the end of the Civil War and the period of his own 
observation in 1890, “The keynote of the Black Belt is debt; not commercial credit, but 
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debt in the sense of continued inability on the part of the mass of the population to make 
income cover expense.”109 The U.S. government had reneged on its promise to distribute 
land to the former slaves, and intimidation and violence by whites made it nearly 
impossible for blacks who had managed to save enough money to purchase land.110 
Despite conditions of extreme necessity, many former slaves avoided returning to labor 
on the plantations for a fixed annual wage—the most prominent contractual labor 
arrangement directly after the war promoted by the Freedmen’s Bureau—because this 
arrangement too closely resembled the gang labor conditions of slavery.111 Instead, many 
entered into share contracts with white landowners to maintain some semblance of 
freedom from white supervision in their daily lives. The hope was to make enough to 
eventually buy property of their own.112 Initially, with cotton prices inflated due to 
wartime shortages, sharecropping looked like the best compromise between black 
laborers and white planters, allowing both certain advantages. For the freedman it offered 
“an escape from gang labor and day-to-day white supervision,” while for the planter it 
stabilized the workforce and tied the sharecropper and his family to the land for the 
duration of the contract. It also provided “a way to reduce the cost and difficulty of labor 
supervision, share risk with tenants, and circumvent the chronic shortage of cash and 
credit.”113 As Eric Foner notes, postponing payment until the end of the year and paying 
in a share of the crop instead of cash can essentially be understood as “an interest-free 
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extension of credit from employee to employer, as well as a shifting of part of the risk of 
farming to the freedmen.”114 
This de facto assumption of risk by black sharecroppers backfired when cotton 
prices collapsed soon after the war. The collapse in prices created an enormous debt crisis 
that bankrupted many small farmers and plantation owners. It contributed to the rise of a 
local merchant class whom Du Bois describes as “part banker, part landlord, part 
contractor, and part despot.”115 Sharecroppers would have to set aside between a quarter 
to a third of their yield to pay rent to the landowner, with the rest spent to cover interest 
and principal on food and planting supplies purchased from local merchants on credit at 
the beginning of the planting season.116 Merchants essentially operated like a company 
store, selling farmers food, supplies, medical care, etc., on credit; the better the crops did, 
the more tenants were encouraged to borrow.117 Moreover, any attempt by blacks to 
diversify their crops was impeded because cotton was the sole currency accepted as 
payment by landlord or merchant under this system. High cotton production was 
necessary to maintain one’s line of credit, but this overproduction of a cash crop made 
farmers even more dependent on merchants for food and supplies.118  
With cotton prices depressed the majority of tenants would end the year either 
barely breaking even or in debt, meaning they had worked the entire year for “board and 
clothes.”119 "So skillfully and so closely has he [the merchant] drawn the bonds of the 
law about the tenant, that the black man has often simply to choose between pauperism 
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and crime.”120 Thus, Du Bois helps us see how Blacks, figured as existentially indebted 
to whites for the gift of their freedom, became materially indebted in fact. The entreaties 
on the part of the Freedmen’s Bureau and its agents for blacks to be thrifty, austere, 
diligent, pious and hopeful proved wholly inadequate for achieving a truly unencumbered 
freedom. Impeded by racism and violent intimidation that made it almost impossible in 
practice to exercise their de jure right to own property, beholden to merchants and 
landlords who restricted their ability to farm the land as they saw fit and charged them 
usurious levels of rent and interest, and assuming enormous risk by tying their livelihoods 
to commodity price fluctuations, emancipated Southern black families soon became 
locked into a system of debt peonage.  
Despite its importance, sharecropping encompassed only one vector of the tangled 
field of power relations governing black labor and life in a way resulting in indebted 
servitude and dispossession. The so called “Black Codes”—statutes passed soon after 
emancipation in nearly every former Confederate state targeting African Americans’ 
conduct, ranging from labor contracts, work activity, migration and civil and legal rights 
to bodily gestures and speech patterns to private life and sexuality—were another crucial 
element that instituted what Hartman characterizes as a “micropenality of everyday 
life.”121 Eric Foner describes the Codes as an attempt to establish the state in the place of 
the former master by devising a legal means of subordinating “a volatile black population 
that regarded economic independence as a corollary of freedom and the old labor 
discipline as a badge of slavery.”122 Du Bois describes them as “an astonishing affront to 
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emancipation” and a “plain and indisputable attempt on the part of the Southern states to 
make Negroes slaves in everything but name.”123  
For our purposes, the most important provisions of the Black Codes involved the 
compulsion to sign labor contracts at the beginning of the year, making it a crime to be 
without a contract or to leave work before its term expired.124 Moreover, the Black Codes 
effectively destroyed the advantages blacks might derive from a free market in labor by 
making it illegal for them to seek out better labor conditions through movement between 
counties or states and by imposing “antienticement” provisions punishing competition 
among white employers for black labor.125 If a black man or woman attempted to break 
his or her contract or was deemed in any way to fit the description of a “vagrant”— 
defined as “the idle, disorderly, or those who ‘misspend what they earn’—they could be 
arrested (in many states, not just by an officer of the law, but by any white person) fined, 
whipped, pilloried or sentenced to involuntary plantation labor for up to a year.126  
While the Codes initially targeted blacks overtly, after they were challenged and 
overturned by Federal Reconstruction authorities, states adopted colorblind language that 
maintained the discriminatory application of the laws to the black population alone.127 
These codes, with their detailed regulation of black bodies, not only bolstered white 
sovereign and juridical rule, but offered legitimating cover for extrajudicial forms of 
disciplinary power and violence that severely limited almost all expression of black 
freedom. As Union general and statesman Carl Schurz observed during his travels 
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throughout the South during Reconstruction, “A negro is called insolent whenever his 
conduct varies in any manner from what a southern man was accustomed to when slavery 
existed.”128 Thus any “unbecoming” deviations in black conduct from the norms of white 
supremacy including “one’s dress, demeanor, movement through public space, tone of 
voice and companions” were severely policed and punished with penalties ranging from 
fines, to involuntary servitude, to violent intimidation by the Ku Klux Klan, to the 
murderous spectacle of lynching.129  
The final dimension cementing white racial domination of the indebted black 
citizenry, was the convict-leasing system that involved a massive collusion between local 
and states governments and private corporations in the commodification of involuntary 
black labor. Focusing solely on agricultural labor obscures the importance of burgeoning 
southern industrial operations in coal mining, lumber and turpentine, railroad 
construction and other industries that had begun leasing slaves during the war and whose 
postwar boom relied heavily on black convict labor.130 Convict-leasing—the process by 
which local and state governments leased their prisoners to private companies for a share 
in the profits of their labor —became a prevalent source of government revenue, private 
capital accumulation and a tool for politically and economically resubordinating African 
Americans between end of the Civil War and the 1940s.131 The convict-leasing system 
relied on several interlocking features of the legal order and Southern political economy 
that contributed to its mass criminalization of black life. First, the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolishing slavery contained a loophole that “specifically permitted involuntary servitude 
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as a punishment for ‘duly convicted’ criminals.”132 Second, the contract requirements and 
broad vagrancy restrictions of the Black Codes made it extremely easy for local justices 
of the peace, sheriffs, or almost any white person to arrest and imprison African 
Americans. As Blackmon explains, whites very soon realized that “the combination of 
trumped-up legal charges and forced labor as punishment created both a desirable 
business proposition and an incredibly effective tool for intimidating rank-and-file 
emancipated African Americans and doing away with their most effective leaders.”133 
Third, in most southern states county sheriffs, deputies, justices of the peace and even 
witnesses were not salaried. They were paid by fees charged to those who entered the 
court system.134 These fees were levied on the accused whether or not they were found 
guilty. In a sharecropping economy in which blacks were paid in shares of cotton rather 
than cash and often had little or no savings, simply being caught up in the “justice” 
system was enough to condemn a freedman to involuntary servitude in a mine shaft or 
lumber camp.135 A thriving market in prison labor soon emerged with companies lining 
up to access this new source of forced labor. They contracted not only with state prisons, 
but directly with county sheriffs, paying their fees and offering a share of future 
profits.136    
Conditions for leased convict laborers, for instance at J. W. Comer’s Eureka mine 
complex in Alabama, were, almost unbelievably, more brutal than under the slave 
regime, with accounts of grueling physical labor, cramped and louse-infested living 
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conditions, starvation, chaining, whipping, and other forms of torture.137 As one prisoner 
leased to the Eureka mines reported, “Day after day we looked Death in the face & was 
afraid to speak.”138 The brutal conditions of the convict-leasing apparatus reinforced and 
worsened the situation of black debt peonage, with white farmers and creditors “swearing 
out criminal warrants” accusing indebted black sharecroppers or tenant farmers of fraud 
rather than threatening eviction.139 To avoid the more dire prospect of being sent to a 
labor camp, the debtor would “confess judgment”—confessing responsibility for the 
crime before trial (an early precursor of the “plea deal”)—allowing his or her employer to 
act as a “surety” by paying any criminal penalties and forfeiting a bond that would, in 
return, be paid back by the debtor’s uncompensated work for as long as it took to 
repay.140 For the period of the debt’s repayment, which could be extended indefinitely 
through the addition of fees for clothing, medical expenses, broken tools and so on, the 
formerly autonomous sharecropper was now considered a “convict” laborer, bound by 
debt to the landowner, and legally subject to criminal treatment like shackling and the 
lash; a slave in all but name.141  
As Du Bois describes it, the state of affairs created by this system of indebted 
servitude was actually worse than slavery in the respect that the interest the master had in 
taking care of his valuable slave property was now gone. It was replaced by state and 
local law enforcement that viewed criminalization as a source of revenue and by 
companies with “no other interest than to wring out of [the convict], without regard to his 
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ultimate condition, all that was possible during the limited term of his thralldom.”142 Du 
Bois suggests that nowhere else in the modern world was there such an open and 
conscious effort to deploy the criminal justice apparatus for “deliberate social 
degradation and private profit as in the South since slavery.”143 In addition, Blackmon 
and Du Bois both note that the racialized convict-leasing system was used as a tool not 
only to control black workers, but to discipline the white labor market and undermine 
union struggles for better wages, while destroying the prospect of class solidarity across 
racial lines.144 
 
IV. Debt and the Denigration of Blackness 
 Indebted servitude in the postbellum South was instituted and maintained through 
physical violence and coercion, but these were linked to networks of power/knowledge 
governing the conduct of subjects fashioned simultaneously as blacks, debtors and 
criminals. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the regime of indebted servitude 
over the rural black population in the South coexisted nationally and transnationally with 
similar regimes governing other racialized indentured laborers imported into both the 
United States and the British colonies. A crucial dimension of racial capitalism involves 
the management of labor and extraction of value through the joint formations of debt and 
racial identity. Emphasizing this point, Lisa Lowe insists, “capitalism expands not 
through rendering all labor, resources, and markets across the world identical, but by 
precisely seizing upon colonial divisions, identifying particular regions for production 
and others for neglect, certain populations for exploitation and still others for 
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disposal.”145 Thus, debt played a major part in the racial project of refashioning the post-
abolition black subject and the cultural meaning of blackness, keeping in mind that a 
racial project is a political projects that use race to represent, organize and govern bodies 
and social relations.   
Here we may gain insight from Coulthard’s reading of Frantz Fanon which argues 
that colonial-capitalist hegemony proceeds just as much through the production of 
“colonized subjects” as it does through overt violence.146 In a famous passage in Black 
Skin, White Masks, Fanon analyzes his encounter with a white child who sees him and 
exclaims, “Look, a Negro! . . . Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!”147 Fanon explains 
how he goes from feeling like an active lively subject, a “man among men,” to being, 
under the white gaze, an “object in the midst of other objects . . . [like] a chemical 
solution is fixed by a dye.”148 The white child’s reaction bursts Fanon’s image of himself 
apart and puts him back together as a new self. Fanon details his experience of this 
process as it operated, in spite of his attempts to intellectualize race, in his day-to-day 
encounters with whites:  
It was not really dramatic. . . And then the occasion arose when I had to 
meet the white man’s eyes. An unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real 
world challenged my claims. In the white world the man of color encounters 
difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Below the corporeal 
schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema. The elements that I used 
had been provided for me . . . by the other, the white man, who had woven 
me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories.”149 
 
                                                 
145 Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents, 150.  
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147 Fanon, Frantz, and Charles Lam Markmann. 1968. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press, 
112.  
148 Ibid., 109.  
149 Ibid., 110-12.  
2 | Indebted Servitude and the Afterlife of Slavery 
106 
 
 Just as the white child had internalized and expressed derogatory racial categories and 
terminology, Fanon had absorbed what he calls a “historico-racial schema,” feeling its 
mark and its weight. The white gaze made him feel shame at being recognized not as a 
man but as a “Negro.”150  
Coulthard highlights Fanon’s insight that over time the combination of everyday 
practices that produce racialized/colonized subjects and the structural inequalities they 
express and support come to be viewed as part of the natural order of things.151 Focusing 
on the transition from slavery to freedom and the deployment of debt therein allows us to 
trace very important changes in the capitalist order of things that coincide with the shifts 
in liberal governmentality producing “black” and “white” as operative racial categories. 
As I noted earlier, we can trace the slippage that develops between the slave, the debtor, 
and the criminal in liberal discourse as these identifying markers start to collapse together 
with the abolition of slavery and the advent of a new set of interrelated practices and 
routines—that include but are in no way limited to sharecropping, the Black Codes and 
the convict-leasing system (in the American context)—that sought to manage and restrict 
the conduct of former slaves, to maintain their dispossession and forcibly extract their 
labor, and to shape their subjectivity in racialized psycho-social terms. These 
transformations in the networks of power/knowledge working on formerly enslaved 
populations in the American South helped to catalyze a shift in the significance of 
blackness from being a badge of slave status to being, in Fanon’s terms, a “corporeal 
malediction” advertising indebtedness and criminality.152 In this sense, the gift of 
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emancipation with its ensuing transfer of debts and responsibilities to the freedmen and 
the concomitant transformation of labor regime from chattel slavery to one largely 
characterized by debt peonage, significantly contributed to the “thousand details, 
anecdotes, [and] stories” that altered the “historico-racial schema” of blackness as it 
entered the era of modern industrial capitalism.153  
This shift dovetailed with what Hartman calls a transition in “the register of 
blackness from status race—blackness ascribing slave status—to formal race—a 'neutral' 
conception of race undergirded by notions of biological and cultural difference.”154 
Indebted servitude coincided with the prominent rise in the late nineteenth century of a 
scientific/anthropological racism, which sought to naturalize racial difference as 
something in-grown and attributable to “objective” observations of immutable biological 
or cultural differences.  Both indebted servitude and scientific racism extended and 
perpetuated the “stigma of inferiority based on race.”155 Drawing on the evidence 
presented thus far in this chapter, it seems reasonable to conclude that not only the stigma 
of slavery but the history of travestied emancipation, indebted servitude and systematic 
criminalization formatted the social terrain in ways that aided and abetted a transformed 
liberal racism that mapped Blackness onto “backwardness” and qualities characteristic of 
the profligacy detested by those infused with the capitalistic ethos. Freed slaves were 
actively disallowed by the Federal government, state authorities, and a hostile white 
citizenry from becoming landowning, self-sufficient yeoman farmers – the very goal and 
ideal of freedom expressed in the recorded testimony of former slaves.156 Instead, 
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through law, education, selective opportunities, deceit, intimidation, legalized force, and 
extra-legal violence, many African Americans became entrapped in perpetual conditions 
of indebtedness and/or were captured and criminalized in a nexus of predatory policing 
and imprisonment for profit. It was under these historical circumstances that Blackness 
came to be associated with  unbecoming descriptors like “shiftless,” “careless,” “lazy,” 
“ignorant,” “irrational,” “irresponsible,” “sullen,” “delinquent” and so on, denoting an 
unproductive, untrustworthy and dangerous type of person, prone to committing the 
greatest sin imaginable in an era of triumphant capitalist expansion : viewing freedom as 
“perpetual rest.”  
Du Bois makes note of this phenomenon in Souls when he addresses the “car-
window sociologist” whose cursory visit to the South and observation of black farm 
laborers confirms black “shiftlessness”157 He counters that, if observed more closely, it 
will be discovered that these men are indeed hard and willing workers; they have little 
incentive to work “beyond the mere pleasure of physical exertion” and display “a fine 
disdain for mere cash” because in their circumstances diligence and acquisitiveness 
simply do not pay.158 Indeed, Du Bois relates further:  
They are careless because they have not found that it pays to be careful; 
they are improvident because the improvident ones of their acquaintance 
get on about as well as the provident. Above all, they cannot see why they 
should take unusual pains to make the white man’s land better, or to fatten 
his mule, or save his corn. On the other hand the white land-owner argues 
that any attempt to improve these laborers by increased responsibility, or 
higher wages, or better homes, or land of their own, would be sure to result 
in failure. He shows his Northern visitor the scarred and wretched land; the 
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ruined mansions, the worn-out soil and mortgaged acres, and says, This is 
Negro freedom!159 
 
Emancipation replaced slavery with the obligation to work off an irredeemable debt, 
thereby undermining in practice the conduct and demeanor it demanded in principle. The 
historical events of the postwar periods of Reconstruction and Redemption produced an 
environment in which the freed slaves, struggling mightily to live their lives in 
accordance with the American dream of freedom they were promised, were bound to fail 
– economically, politically, and by the sanctimonious double-standard of white morality. 
These structural failures, largely the result of continued attempts to maintain white 
superiority and control, were then blamed on the individual failings or collective racial 
flaws of the black population; thus they were used to solidify white prejudice and the 
need for additional measures to discipline and control Blacks.   
 The constant duress of being unable to pay the landowner or merchant at the end 
of the season, having the product of one’s labor appropriated by creditor and landlord in 
good times and bad, boredom and monotonous work with no time or money for leisure, 
the constant risk of arrest and thralldom as a convict laborer, and the ever-present feeling 
of objectification through the “contempt and pity”160 of the white gaze: these 
accumulated experiences left an indelible mark on Black American subjectivity in the 
years after slavery. However, as Du Bois is keen to point out: many blacks endured 
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against all odds and were able to obtain land and become free peasant-proprietors while 
even more continued to work tirelessly as paragons of the liberal virtues of thrift, 
diligence, sacrifice and faith in God, hoping to one day be delivered from debt 
bondage.161  
Thus, this enduring derogatory image of blackness at least in part derives from 
hostile white observations and depictions of the effects of indebted servitude on the black 
population beginning in the Reconstruction era. These effects have been severed from 
their particular and historically situated causes and reconfigured as the in-born and 
timeless characteristics of the black race. Put differently we might say, following 
Miranda Joseph, that race operates like a form of fetishism, in which the “empirically 
visible object”—the black body—is fetishized as the source of perceived pathology, 
obscuring the historically specific relations of power/knowledge constitutive of actual 
inequalities and power asymmetries between populations.162 In this way, the contours of 
race and a racist social order are normalized and perpetuated, at least in part, through a 
canny strategy of public forgetting, disavowal, and myth-making by the dominant group 
in order to erase the evidence of the power struggles productive of the differences and 




My goal in undertaking this analysis has been to draw together Marxian and 
Foucauldian insights and conceptual tools with those of political theorists in the Black 
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radical tradition and indigenous studies including Du Bois, Robinson, Hartman, Lowe, 
and Coulthard, in order to theorize the historical intersection of race and debt as a 
significant aspect of the strategic reorganization of liberal governmentality and racial 
capitalism in the United States. This hybrid theoretical framework allows us to identify 
important ways in which creditor-debtor power relations shaped public memory, modes 
forced labor and wealth extraction, and the contours of blackness and anti-black racism in 
the post-bellum American South. To go further, however, it is also my contention that 
this analysis of the racialized power relations of credit and debt in the 19th century is 
highly relevant (arguably essential) to understanding the political economy and 
governmentality of today’s incarnation of racial capitalism.  
Indeed today, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Occupy Wall Street, the 
conflict between Greece and the EU, and most recently the bankruptcies of Detroit and 
Puerto Rico, the debt economy, the politics of creditor-debtor relations, and the racial 
politics of debt have captured the public’s attention perhaps more than ever before. Gilles 
Deleuze argued in the 1990s that the disciplinary “environments of enclosure” subjected 
to such rigorous theorization by Foucault were “in crisis” and in the process of being 
replaced by “societies of control.”163 In this new iteration of capitalist society, Deleuze 
insists, “man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt.”164 In the next chapter, we will 
examine the neoliberal politics of indebted control, and philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato’s 
claim that in the 21st century “Everyone is a 'debtor,' accountable to and guilty before 
                                                 
163 Deleuze, G. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59: 3-7. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/778828 
164 Ibid. 
2 | Indebted Servitude and the Afterlife of Slavery 
112 
 
capital."165 With the neoliberal turn to a service, information-technology and finance 
driven economy in the capitalist metropole, Lazzarato argues, “the creditor-debtor 
relationship [has become] a centerpiece of politics.”166  
While these accounts declare the danger of debt as a technique of control now 
affecting the majority of the population, they fail to mention or engage with debt’s 
racialized deployment throughout the long history of colonialism and capitalism. Thus, in 
the chapter that follows, our first goal will be to understand how techniques of political, 
economic, and social control through credit and debt have both transformed and persisted 
since the nineteenth century. Our second goal will be to sketch out how, in an age of 
technological sophistication, high finance, and indirect forms of control, credit and debt 
continue to intersect with a reinvented politics of anti-black racism, white supremacy, and 
accumulation by debt and dispossession. 
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“Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt.” 
— Gilles Deleuze1 
 
Recent financial and political crises in the United States, such as the 2008 
Financial Crisis, the Great Recession and foreclosure crisis, the European sovereign debt 
crisis, as well as unprecedented municipal and state budget crises have urged scholars to 
critically reexamine the role of finance in both domestic and international politics. A vast 
and expanding literature in political theory, political economy, geography, sociology, 
cultural studies and beyond interprets and explain the roots of recent financial crisis, 
growing income inequality, and political instability with reference to the phenomenon of 
“neoliberalism” – normally considered as set of ideas shaping policies and institutions, or 
as the preeminent ideology of late capitalism.2 More recently, and especially following 
the publication of philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato’s The Making of the Indebted Man, 
critical theorists have begun to focus their attention on the nexus of credit and debt 
working within neoliberal political economy as an essential topic of study and criticism.3 
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While credit and debt have proven themselves essential engines of innovation in late 
capitalism—driving economic value creation with the explosion of the financial economy 
in the 1980s and 90s—this credit-fueled financial revolution has simultaneously brought 
about conditions of market volatility, financial crisis, wage stagnation, and higher levels 
of indebtedness for the majority of the American population, with the most damaging 
effects concentrated among Black and Latino communities.4 At the same time, the logic 
of credit and debt, in particular quantitative forms of credit and risk evaluation, have 
come to figure prominently in widely adopted techniques of management and accounting 
that, since the mid-1970s, have been deployed to reinvent, refashion, and discipline 
individuals, populations, institutions, cities, and states as “entrepreneurs of themselves” 
both within the United States and transnationally.  
 This chapter contributes to the scholarly literature on neoliberalism, while 
pushing the debate in new directions in two primary ways. First, I argue that the 
operations of credit and debt and the power relations between creditors and debtors 
function at the strategic heart of neoliberalism. In making this argument, I find it useful, 
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as others have, to consider neoliberalism as a “governmentality” rather than as a set of 
policies or as an ideology. One of the most important tactics of the credit/debt apparatus 
under neoliberal governmentality, I will argue, is the way in which it acts on time and 
conceptions of temporality as both a means of value production and as a means of 
indirectly shaping and controlling the conduct and subjectivities of the indebted.  
Second, the chapter addresses a significant gap in the literature on neoliberalism 
and debt by highlighting how processes of racial formation and structural racism persist 
through the ostensibly “colorblind” free-market rationalities of neoliberal 
governmentality and the purportedly objective modes of accounting employed in the debt 
economy. While there is certainly an argument to be made that the contemporary 
neoliberal debt regime reinforces and legitimates class inequalities and contributes to the 
precarity of labor in general, I argue here that debt constitutes a relatively 
unacknowledged infrastructures of control which, alongside mass incarceration, 
maintains conditions of white supremacy while relegating people of color to “subprime” 
status in contemporary America. 
 The chapter pursues these arguments in three parts. First, I give a brief synopsis of 
neoliberal governmentality and its shift from a disciplinary society to what Deleuze calls 
“a society of control.” Second, I present my theoretical arguments on the place of debt 
within neoliberal governmentality through a close engagement with Maurizio Lazzarato’s 
The Making of the Indebted Man and Annie McClanahan’s Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, 
and Twenty-First Century Culture, with a particular focus on the ways in which 
techniques for evaluating creditworthiness have changed from the 19th to the 21st century. 
Third, I identify the role of creditor-debtor relations as a vehicle for propagating 
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surreptitious neoliberal forms of colorblind or “blackboxed” racism and white supremacy 
in the contemporary United States. 
 
I. Neoliberal Governmentality 
 Neoliberal governmentality problematizes government primarily in terms of how 
to reinvent the overall exercise of political power based on the principles of a capitalist 
market economy.”5 Rooted in the writings of Austrian political and economic thinkers 
such as Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and the “Chicago School” of economics in 
the United States, prominently represented by Milton Friedman and Gary Becker, 
neoliberal governmentality repudiates the logic of what political economist Mark Blyth 
calls “embedded” liberalism––associated with Keynesian economics and the institutions 
of the welfare state––that advocates for state intervention in market processes to ensure 
full employment, economic growth, and social welfare.6 Playing on fears that state 
intervention and planning directed toward social rights and economic redistribution will 
foreclose upon individual freedoms, distort market efficiencies and hinder competition 
and economic growth, neoliberal governmentality deploys discursive, technical, and 
political means of making the market the only legitimate site for the production of 
knowledge about proper conduct and the primary medium of governmental intervention.  
 While neoliberal discourse employs anti-statist rhetoric, neoliberal 
governmentality in its “actually existing” historically and geographically specific 
                                                 
5 Foucault, Michel, and Michel Senellart. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures At the Collège De France, 
1978-79. Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 131. 
6 Blyth, Mark, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change In the Twentieth 
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Hackworth, Jason R. The Neoliberal City: 
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manifestations has transformed the state into an active partner in the promotion, 
protection, and expansion of market processes.7 As Andrew Dilts puts it, neoliberalism 
does not call “for a laissez-faire space for economic activity, but for an entirely new 
governmentality that subsumes the political order, the notion of sovereignty itself under a 
grid of economic analysis and market intelligibility."8 Notwithstanding its proponents’ 
anti-statist rhetoric of small government, deregulation, and privatization—neoliberal 
pundit Grover Norquist famously remarked, “I don't want to abolish government. I 
simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in 
the bathtub”9— state intervention into economic and social affairs is not actually reduced 
with neoliberalism; it is transformed. According to Michel Foucault, while governmental 
regulation of markets is supposed to be light or non-existent according to neoliberal 
rhetoric, neoliberal governmentality actually involves heavy governmental intervention in 
the “technical, scientific, legal, geographic . . . broadly, social factors” of a polity in order 
to ensconce market competition in the very fabric and depth of society.”10 And, as in the 
liberalism of the 19th and 20th centuries, neoliberal governmentality doesn’t simply 
involve the state and society, but extends to the formation of the political/economic 
subject itself. Foucault argues that what is new with neoliberalism is the reworking of 
“homo oeconomicus” from “the partner of exchange” theorized by classical liberals like 
                                                 
7 See Brenner, Neil, and Nik Theodore. "Cities And The Geographies Of "Actually Existing 
Neoliberalism"" Antipode 33, no. 3 (2002): 349-79, and Connolly, William E. The Fragility of Things: 
Self-organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism. Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2013, 20-1.  
8 Dilts, Andrew. "From 'Entrepreneur of the Self' to 'Care of the Self': Neo-liberal Governmentality and 
Foucault's Ethics." Foucault Studies. No. 12, October 2011, 139. 
9 Norquist, Grover. Interview with Grover Norquist. Morning Edition. National Public Radio (NPR), May 
25, 2001. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1123439 
10 Foucault, Michel, and Michel Senellart. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures At the Collège De France, 
1978-79. Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 141, 145. 
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Adam Smith into the “entrepreneur of himself”: the subject considered to be “human 
capital,” simultaneously an investor and investment.11 Analyzing the theory of “human 
capital” in the work of Chicago School economist Gary Becker, Foucault suggests that 
the neoliberal model of subjectivity seeks to produce an “eminently governable” subject; 
no longer the partner of exchange pursuing interests largely independent of and intangible 
to the exercise of power, but human capital responding systematically to artificial 
modifications in the variables of the environment.12 In a neoliberal utopia, the conduct of 
the docile and diligent individual worker—already the long ripening fruit of the 18th and 
19th century disciplines—would become ultimately tractable, manageable and predictable 
such that the worker would cease even to consider herself a worker selling or exchanging 
her labor-power and instead treat herself as an entrepreneur of/investor in herself: capital 
personified.13 In sum, neoliberal governmentality involves the combination of a market-
based regime of truth14 and an ever-shifting set of tactics, techniques, strategies and 
machines through which “the governed” and the “governors”—be they individuals, 
populations, cities, groups, quasi-governmental agencies, states, transnational 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 226, 233.  
12 Foucault, Michel, and Michel Senellart. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures At the Collège De France, 
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3 | Neoliberal Governmentality and Indebted Control 
119 
 
organizations, etc.—are induced to adopt and conform to the principles of competition, 
privatization, efficiency, risk management, austerity, flexibility and personal 
responsibility embodied by the figures of the market and the entrepreneur.15    
It is arguable that Foucault’s late analysis of neoliberalism in The Birth of 
Biopolitics lectures— a governmentality that theorizes human subjects as a type of 
“capital” that would be “eminently governable” through an emphasis on self-discipline 
and personal responsibility combined with an indirect and minimal form of political 
power operating through the “spontaneous” order of the market—provided an almost 
preternatural vision of the major shifts in the operations of power/knowledge that would 
soon rise to dominate capitalist societies from the 1980s onward. In his famous essay 
“Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Gilles Deleuze clarifies and raises the political 
stakes of what Foucault only suggested with curiosity in the Biopolitics lectures. Deleuze 
argues that by the early 1990s the disciplinary “environments of enclosure” subjected to 
such rigorous theorization by Foucault had been in crisis for some time and had been 
overlaid (not supplanted by) by the assemblages of what he calls “societies of control.”16 
For Deleuze, “control” (as opposed to discipline) no longer operates through the 
spaces of enclosure, rigid segmentation, and hierarchical organization represented by the 
factory, which distributes, orders, and composes bodies into useful formations in space.17 
Instead, control functions through continuous modulations and adjustments to open 
systems that are “ultra-rapid,” “free-floating” and “continuously change from one 
                                                 
15 Ong, Aihwa. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham [N.C.]: 
Duke University Press, 2006, 4. 
16 Deleuze, G. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59: 3-7. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/778828 
17 Lazzarato, Maurizio. “Life and the Living in the Societies of Control” in Fuglsang, Martin., and Bent 
Meier Sørensen. Deleuze and the Social. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, 180.  
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moment to the other . . . like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point.”18 
Deleuze conjures the “frightful” image of a society of continuous training, education, and 
monitoring that takes the corporate form and its ethos of “endless competition” as its 
model.19 In other words, control societies function in a perpetual state of becoming or 
what Deleuze terms “perpetual metastability;” they leave nothing alone for long because 
they possess a “machinic” infrastructure of instant communication, monitoring and 
intervention that allows for updates and correctives in real time. 20   
 In his essay “Life and the Living in the Societies of Control,” Maurizio Lazzarato 
suggests that while disciplinary techniques were “fundamentally structured in space, the 
techniques of control . . . allow one to bring time and its virtualities to the foreground.”21 
Control, as Deleuze conceives it, functions by collapsing the limits of space through 
information technologies that allow subjects to coexist and communicate virtually in 
time, accessing, relaying, and responding to information in the blink of an eye.22 To the 
extent that control embraces and attempts to capture and regulate what Lazzarato refers to 
as “the time of the event”—processes of variability, becoming, creativity, even 
“disruption” and crisis— it rejects closed systems, rigid institutions and fixed identities, 
dismissing them as obsolete.23 For this reason, Deleuze suggests that in societies of 
control it is no longer the mark of the signature identifying an individual that matters, but 
rather the numerical language of codes and passwords that “mark access to information, 
                                                 
18 Deleuze, G. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59: 3-7. 
19 Ibid., and Deleuze, Gilles, and Martin Joughin. Negotiations: 1972-1990. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997, 174-5.  
20 Deleuze, G. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59: 3-7 and Deleuze, Negotiations, 
174.  
21 In Fuglsang, Martin and Meier, Deleuze and the Social, 180.  
22 Ibid., 180.  
23 Ibid., 178.  
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or reject it.”24 It is in respect to this dynamic that Deleuze suggests that individuals have 
become what he calls “dividuals.”25  
Steven Shaviro, in his essay “The 'Bitter Necessity' of Debt: Neoliberal Finance 
and the Society of Control,” offers some helpful insight into Deleuze’s somewhat cryptic 
notion of the “dividual.” He explains that whereas “disciplinary societies operate directly 
on human bodies and physical objects, by managing the thermodynamic flows of energy 
that pass through them,” control societies “work by abstracting bodies and objects into 
data,” through which “they can then command the movements of these bodies and 
objects.”26 To the extent that our human identities are now virtually and digitally 
mediated by networked machines and, importantly, collections of “data” about us—our 
credit scores, web browsing habits, shopping preferences, medical records, criminal 
records, employment histories, political donations, social media “likes,” etc.—they no 
longer congeal into stable “individual” identities, but instead are “continually being 
decomposed and recomposed, on various levels through the modulation of numerous 
parameters.”27 This, Shaviro argues, is the phenomenon that Deleuze’s concept of the 
“dividual” is trying to express. If dividuals are rhizomatic assemblages of data, these 
assemblages are segmented by their differential access to a range of social goods such as 
services, spaces, information, and, of course, credit. Whether or not dividuals are granted 
or denied access to these and other goods at a particular moment in time depends on how 
the mix of their data is interpreted by a service provider, a bank, a school, a credit bureau 
                                                 
24 Deleuze, G. 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59: 3-7.   
25 Ibid. 
26 Shaviro, S. 2011. The Bitter Necessity of Debt: Neoliberal Finance and the Society of Control. 
Concentric: Literacy & Cultural Studies, 37 (1), 73-82. 
27 Ibid.  
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or a police force. Despite the apparent lack of direct physical coercion, the difference 
between being able to access or being denied a medical procedure, a home loan, or a job 
opportunity based on collections of data that largely do not reside in one’s control, poses 
serious bodily consequences. Thus, Shaviro writes, “Media are extrapolated from our 
bodies; and they redound back upon our bodies and our sensoria,” leaving “no part of us 
unaffected.”28 
 Here we arrive at Deleuze’s famously pithy remark toward the end of his essay: 
“Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt.”29 Deleuze juxtaposes indebtedness 
with enclosure or confinement, the signature technique of the disciplinary society that 
functions through manipulating spatial logics and forms of organization to increase the 
efficiency and productivity of the bodies of the governed, while at the same time 
encouraging conformity and docility. Deleuze associates debt with “control”: a newly 
developing mode of power that operates indirectly and virtually, collecting and 
accumulating data to be evaluated through predictive models that allow for a hold on 
bodies (singular or collective) not primarily through space, but in time. To this crucial 
theme—how it is that debt governs and controls by its grip on the time of the indebted—
we will return shortly. 
While Deleuze does not use the word neoliberalism, his emphasis on the rise to 
prominence of the corporate form and ethos, of money, finance, and, above all, debt, 
allows us to surmise, with Shaviro, that the neoliberal governmentality theorized by 
Foucault and Deleuze’s societies of control, are part of the same abstract machine.  
Shaviro points to a key passage in Foucault’s Biopolitics lectures, where he explicitly 
                                                 
28 Ibid.  
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theorizes a post-disciplinary social arrangement in a way quite close to Deleuze’s control 
society.30 Here Foucault describes neoliberalism as “the image, idea, or theme-program 
of a society in which there is an optimization of systems of difference, in which the field 
is left open to fluctuating processes” and “in which there is an environmental type 
intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals.”31 As Shaviro suggests, 
Deleuze and Foucault have often been pegged as postmodern critics of “Marxist 
economism,” but when both contemplated “the futurity knocking at the door, they both 
rediscover the force of the economic, returning with a vengeance.”32 Deleuze’s essay 
seems to be a warning that the “flows, rhizomatic structures, and open systems,” he 
theorized with Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus should not be 
understood as liberating in themselves, but, in fact, “have their own traps, their own 
mechanisms of oppression, their own devices of exploitation and subordination.”33 
 Above all, the type of freedom preached by neoliberal market evangelists such as 
F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Gary Becker, is precisely the freedom enjoyed by the 
one who is no longer a worker, but “human capital,” no longer confined, but in debt. A 
governmentality that not only deregulates market forces, but actively seeks to transform 
all governmental functions and institutions based on a market logic of competitiveness, 
and to instill the logic of investment capital into the hearts of worker and manager alike is 
one through which, as Shaviro remarks, “the ‘free market’ functions as an instrument of 
control.”34 In many respects, this was always the logic at the heart of liberalism. As 
                                                 
30 Shaviro (2011).  
31 Foucault, Michel, and Michel Senellart. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures At the Collège De France, 
1978-79. Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 259-60. 
32 Shaviro (2011).  
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Foucault instructs, “Freedom is something which is constantly produced. Liberalism is 
not acceptance of freedom; it proposes to manufacture it constantly, to arouse it and 
produce it, with, of course, [the system] of constraints and the problems of cost raised by 
this production.”35 With the advent of neoliberalism we must submit to what Hayek calls 
the “bitter necessity” of free market competition with “its calculus of credit and debt” in 
all spheres of life; market competition is now “forcibly built into all situations, and made 
into a necessary precondition for all potential actions.”36 Therefore, it is to an analysis of 
the type of freedom and control enacted through credit and debt under neoliberalism that 
we now turn. 
   
II. Theorizing the Neoliberal Politics of Debt: Lazzarato and 
McClanahan 
 
Steven Shaviro employs Deleuze’s essay on societies of control to draw our 
attention to the importance of debt within neoliberalism. Here we seek to more fully 
theorize the work credit and debt perform in neoliberal governmentality with the help of 
philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato’s groundbreaking work The Making of the Indebted Man 
and cultural theorist Annie McClanahan’s profoundly researched and truly 
interdisciplinary study Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and Twenty-First Century Culture, 
which thinks both with and against Lazzarato’s work. Both thinkers are clearly 
influenced by the work of Deleuze and offer an analysis of how debt works, on the one 
hand, to enact a form affective, indirect, virtual, and temporal control at both a personal 
and population-wide scale; however, on the other hand, this does not exclude debt’s 
coupling with more violent, coercive, and punitive modes of power. Indeed, Lazzarato’s 
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emphasis on debt’s dual operation as a form of “subjection” and “machinic subjugation,” 
and McClanahan’s theorization of debt’s contemporary connection to racialized forms of 
punishment, incarceration, and wealth extraction, suggest that neoliberal governmentality 
is a species of racial capitalism that has become adept at hiding its authoritarian and 
white supremacist tracks under cover of an individualizing morality of debt and the 
impartial, data-driven effects of the market.  
While Lazzarato leans heavily on Foucault’s analyses of governmentality, 
liberalism and neoliberalism in the Collège de France lectures, he takes Foucault to task 
for neglecting to address “the functions of finance, debt, and money, even though these 
constituted the strategic mechanisms of neoliberal government starting in the late 
1970s.”37 Foucault’s textual and somewhat biographical focus on “ordoliberal” and 
neoliberal economic theory and thinkers in his lectures appears to miss the changing 
techno-political developments through which these theories were materialized as actual 
modes of governing social relations. Somewhat uncharacteristically, Foucault fails to 
consider the practices through which the discourse of neoliberal theory was being 
enacted. 38 By contrast, Lazzarato, following Deleuze (who did not miss the rising 
importance of finance and debt, and, in fact, had insisted on the importance of the 
creditor-debtor relation at least since he published Nietzsche and Philosophy in the 
sixties), offers an analysis of debt, considered as a power relation between creditor and 
debtor, which, he argues, “intensifies mechanisms of exploitation and domination at 
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every level of society.”39 Indeed, he clearly states that debt “represents the economic and 
subjective engine of the modern-day economy. Debt creation, that is, the creation and 
development of the power relation between creditors and debtors, has been conceived as 
the strategic heart of neoliberal politics.”40 
Lazzarato agrees with Foucault that neoliberalism induces in the “practices of the 
self” associated with the figure of homo oeconomicus a transformation from the “partner 
of exchange” to the “entrepreneur of himself;”41 however he insists that one must 
recognize alongside the entrepreneur another subjective figure: homo debitor, the 
“indebted man.”42 Lazzarato contends that the neoliberal turn in the ethical formation of 
the subject involves not only an imperative to rationally conceive of oneself as “human 
capital;” it also includes a moral imperative for those who can only invest in their human 
capital on credit: “the morality of the promise (to honor one’s debt) and the fault (of 
having entered into it).”43 This morality of debt may sound familiar because Lazzarato 
bases his analysis of the neoliberal debt economy on a theory of debt that we encountered 
in the first chapter: Nietzsche’s genealogical account tracing bourgeois morality back to 
the power relation between creditor and debtor. Remember that this is debt conceived as 
a “mnemotechnic” device for making the subject responsible (i.e. capable of keeping his 
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43 Ibid., 30.  
3 | Neoliberal Governmentality and Indebted Control 
127 
 
promise to repay the creditor) through cruelty, punishment, pain, bad conscience and 
feelings of guilt.44 
Lazzarato also draws on an early essay by Karl Marx, “Comments on James 
Mill,” in which Marx considers the case of a rich man offering credit to a poor man. 
There Marx notes that the credit system is a bit of a fly in the ointment of classical 
political economy and the labor theory of value because “all the social virtues of the poor 
man, the content of his vital activity, his existence itself, represent for the rich man the 
reimbursement of his capital with the customary interest.”45 In a statement that seems to 
prefigure the neoliberal idea of human capital and identifies the importance of the 
morality of credit/debt as a mode of capitalist accumulation, Marx writes: 
 “Credit is the economic judgment on the morality of a man. In credit, the 
man himself, instead of metal or paper, has become the mediator of 
exchange, not however as a man, but as the mode of existence of capital and 
interest. . . . Within the credit relationship, it is not the case that money is 
transcended in man, but that man himself is turned into money.”46  
 
Marx considers it “vile” to “estimate the value of a man in money,” suggesting 
(implicitly) an isomorphism between the subject position of the debtor and that of the 
slave, inviting a critique of capitalism’s role in alienating and exploiting both.47 
However, Marx does not explore the connections between slavery and debt here, instead 
shifting his analysis to debt’s effect on the class relationship between capitalist and 
worker. Marx argues that debt intensifies “the antithesis between capitalist and worker” 
because the indebted worker becomes wholly dependent on the arbitrary judgments of the 
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capitalist creditor, whose purview is not just the worker’s productivity, but his “entire 
existence.”48 Owing to this asymmetrical creditor-debtor relationship, says Marx, “ 
[m]utual dissimulation, hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness” are carried to such extremes 
that one without credit is not just judged to be “poor,” but to him is attached a “pejorative 
moral judgment that he possesses no trust . . . and therefore is a social pariah, a bad 
man.”49  
 According to Lazzarato, Marx shows us how the creditor-debtor relation in 
capitalism functions differently but in a way complementary to the labor-capital relation. 
As he suggests, “credit does not solicit and exploit labor but rather ethical action and the 
work of self-constitution at both an individual and collective level” [author’s emphasis].50 
Credit does not depend, like the wage, on a worker’s intellectual or physical resources, 
but rather on a subjective measure of her ethical action that serves as a predictor of her 
“solvency” – her future ability to repay.51 Hence, in the capitalist debt economy the 
evaluation of a subject’s solvency/insolvency becomes synonymous with a moral 
determination of good/bad, and as Marx points out, insolvency carries with it a social 
stigma, attaching to the “insolvent” debtor the status of persona non grata, pariah, even 
criminal (the “bad man”).52 Lazzarato recognizes that it is through this moral force of 
debt that “capital is able to appropriate not only the physical and intellectual abilities the 
poor man employs in his labor [in the workplace], but also his social and existential 
forces” i.e. his lifestyle, social behavior, values – the choices he makes about what to do 
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with his time outside of work.53 It is in this sense that Lazzarato argues both that debt 
“breeds, subdues, manufactures, adapts, and shapes subjectivity” and that the “debt 
economy combines ‘work on the self’ and labor, in its classical sense, such that ‘ethics’ 
and economics function conjointly.”54   
  If it is true that the wage contract and the debt obligation have functioned conjointly 
throughout the history of capitalism, if ethics and economics have operated together since 
capitalism’s inception, then what is different about debt’s function in neoliberal 
governmentality? This is where it is helpful to turn to Annie McClanahan’s work because 
she draws on critical theory, social studies of finance, economic history, as well as 
literary analysis to provide an in-depth and multifaceted look at what is specific to credit 
and debt in 21st century culture. Importantly, her book offers a critique of what she calls 
“the emergent body of post-crisis critical theory on debt” that has largely focused on 
subjectivity, singling out Lazzarato’s work as an exemplar of this trend.55 McClanahan 
notes that much of this work, following Lazzarato, returns to Nietzsche and Marx 
because these 19th century philosophers offer resources for understanding how credit is 
both “intensely personal and profoundly dehumanizing,” how credit turns one’s social 
personhood and credibility into “an asset to be priced,” and how being in debt is 
associated with guilt and shame.56  
 At one level, McClanahan is clearly influenced by Lazzarato and his camp in that 
she too is intrigued by the somewhat paradoxical way in which “debt persistently and 
simultaneously occupies the logic of quantitative, scientific objectivity and of qualitative, 
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even moral, subjectivity.”57 Not only this, she argues that consumer debt in particular 
connects the scale of everyday experience to the macro scale of the global financial 
system and its larger structural dynamics. Consumer debt is “at once specific and 
systemic, everyday and epochal.”58 However, she reproaches Lazzarato and other 
contemporary theorists of debt for thinking that Nietzsche and Marx’s 19th century 
conceptions of credit evaluation and indebtedness somehow anticipated the “intensified 
relationship between subjectivation and economic value demanded by late capitalism” 
and perfectly encapsulate the particular circumstances of the debt economy today. 
Lazzarato was perhaps too hasty in turning back to Nietzsche, “mnemotechnics,” and the 
morality of debt. By contrast, McClanahan seeks to update our understanding of credit 
and debt through a more careful historical analysis of shifts in the evaluative technologies 
of credit and debt, and through an analysis of debt’s representations in advertising, 
literature, poetry, art, and other cultural artefacts.   
One important shift McClanahan traces that has been a hallmark of neoliberal 
governmentality is the “securitization” of debt. She argues that the securitization of 
debt—the technical ability to quantify credit “risk,” and package, price, and sell debt as a 
commodity to investors on global secondary markets—has transformed credit/debt into 
an “industry in itself” rather than an aid to consumption.59 To make a long story short, 
after the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in 1974, which outlawed 
credit discrimination based on age, religion, race, nationality, sex, or marital status, 
lenders turned to sophisticated new methods of credit monitoring that relied on statistical 
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models to analyze data collected by retailers and credit bureaus.60 This mounting quantity 
of granular data about consumer behavior combined with increasing technical precision 
in evaluating consumer credit risk allowed banks to hedge loans made to borrowers with 
riskier credit profiles by setting interest rates based on statistical calculations of risk.61 
Rather than screening out and excluding candidates deemed too risky, banks could now 
make the riskier loans, price the risk “objectively” based on the borrower’s credit data, 
and bundle the loan with others into a security that would be “tranched” (divided) into 
different risk categories62 and sold to investors hungry for a steady stream of interest 
payments (lower risk loans producing the lowest return, higher risk paying higher 
interest).63  
As McClanahan observes, the securitization of debt shifted the whole model of 
credit markets from one funded through a bank’s own deposits to one funded by a 
growing market of “far-flung investors,” greatly increasing credit market liquidity as “the 
value of a ‘fixed’ asset like a house, or the value of mortgage payment on that house, 
could suddenly flow across the country in a single keystroke.”64 The securitization of 
debt altered the scope and temporality of capital accumulation, creating the infrastructure 
and incentive for money to be loaned to borrowers previously excluded from credit 
markets, allowing lenders to realize anticipated profits immediately, and, in theory, 
dispersing risk by bundling loans together and selling them as debt “derivatives” to 
downstream investors. Indeed, as McClanahan makes clear, before the mortgage-backed 
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security market came crashing down in 2007-2008, “everyone from financial investors to 
the Federal Reserve believed that this kind of global securitization created a virtuous 
cycle, through which banks could lend to previously unqualified buyers and dilute the 
risk by reselling those loans as securities to speculative investors around the world.”65 
However, as she also makes clear, the growing global demand for debt securities (and 
MBS in particular) eventually lowered lending standards on the original loans, increasing 
the market in the riskiest debt (the so called “subprime market”) from 5 to 30% by the 
early 2000s, and encouraged creative new products like adjustable-rate mortgages 
(“ARMS”) – mortgages whose monthly payments would increase over time, eventually 
exceeding the borrower’s ability to pay.66 Moreover, the highly liquid market and use of 
complex structured financial products that unsophisticated investors could hardly 
understand created opportunities for Wall Street to not only create and sell an enormous 
menagerie of exotic derivatives, but, using derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS) to 
make their own hugely leveraged bets on or against the housing market.      
 The second major shift McClanahan discusses is the transformation from the 19th 
and early 20th century technique of subjective evaluation of credit based on a borrower’s 
personal character to the late 20th century development of the quantified credit score. 
Citing the New Historicist scholarship of Marc Shell, Mary Poovey, Deidre Lynch, 
Margot Finn, and Ian Baucom, she argues that beginning in the late 18th century and into 
the 19th  when the market economy became fully dependent on consumer credit, a 
standard practice for evaluating consumer credit in a way that would make possible “the 
leaps of faith necessary” for loans and investments drew from the model of the realist 
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novel and its way of describing fictional characters as well as “the formal habits of 
reading and interpretation the novel demanded.”67 In order to appear as a successful 
proxy for measuring a “borrower’s economic riskiness,” the genre of credit evaluation 
was, according to historian Kenneth Lipartito, “largely a narrative one.”68 The earliest 
credit reporting agencies would send evaluators to interview borrowers face-to-face 
where they could read “the applicant’s appearance and demeanor” and make subjective 
judgments as to their creditworthiness based on “a range of seemingly superficial 
observations, from fashion to physiognomy.”69 Evaluators then sought to shape these 
observations into a compelling credit narrative that would strike a balance between 
adequate description of a prospective borrower’s individual character and his/her social 
context (the “lived environment” associated with his/her social class), turning descriptive 
information into a “salable commodity,” which lenders could depend on to make sound 
judgments about a borrower’s creditworthiness.70   
 McClanahan describes how this model of credit evaluation underwent a radical 
transformation in the late 20th century, the period of emergent neoliberal governmentality. 
In conjunction with the behavioral revolution in economics, the emerging secondary 
markets for securitized debt, deregulation of caps on fees and interest rates, and wage 
stagnation, credit evaluation underwent what economic historians call its “quantitative 
revolution.”71  
                                                 
67 Ibid., 4; 59.  
68 Qtd. in McClanahan, Dead Pledges, 59. 
69 Ibid., 60. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 62. 
3 | Neoliberal Governmentality and Indebted Control 
134 
 
 The three primary information collecting credit bureaus (TransUnion, Equifax, 
Experian) shifted their techniques away from the old focus on providing narratives that 
would assess “character,” which had engaged in what Martha Poon calls “control by 
screening.” 72 Control by screening had separated borrowers into two classes: 
creditworthy and not creditworthy. With the neoliberal turn, the credit bureaus devised a 
method Poon calls “control by risk”: substituting “a highly segmented spectrum for this 
simple binary” and thus opening up “a new space of calculative possibility” in which 
creditors could turn to a finely-tuned system for pricing credit risk based “not on a 
qualitative assessment of moral character but on a quantifiable history of economic 
behavior.”73 
 As I briefly touched on in the description of debt securitization, the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA) was passed to prohibit the kind of categorical discriminatory 
lending practices associated with control by screening that creditors had employed 
throughout the 19th and well into the mid-20th centuries. In response to charges of overt 
racism and sexism, to remain within the letter of the new law, and to seize new 
opportunities for profiting from the newly imposed inclusivity in credit markets, credit 
bureaus and lenders sought evaluation techniques that would appear as objective and fair 
as possible. Quantitative methods provided an answer.  
 Lenders and professional credit evaluators turned to tracking and collecting data on 
consumer behavior, and using statistical and mathematical modeling techniques to aid in 
the determination of how to “price” the risk associated with the different segments of the 
borrowing population. Quantitative credit evaluation now involves transforming an 
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immense amount of behavioral data (“as many as 450 discrete data points”) collected and 
compiled by credit bureaus, including borrowing history, repayment habits, consumption 
patterns, health history, court judgments, etc., into a single numerical score using 
proprietary scoring algorithms developed by private companies like Fair Isaac 
Corporation (FICO) or VantageScore.74 FICO advertises its score as a “fast, objective 
measurement of credit risk,” that allows lenders to “focus only on the facts related to 
credit risk, rather than their personal feelings.”75 Lenders now rely on the “facts” about a 
borrower congealed into a proprietary 3-digit score, rather than “personal” and potentially 
prejudiced judgments about character, to determine creditworthiness. Moreover, the 
unprecedented levels of “quantitative granularity” lenders now have access to allows 
them to engage in what Poon calls “razor sharp segmentation games” in which a 
population of borrowers is no longer divided into creditworthy/unworthy, but segmented 
into a spectrum of calculable risk profiles corresponding to a wide range of chargeable 
interest rates, and even different mechanisms of debt repayment (for instance fixed versus 
adjustable rate mortgages).76 Beyond even the credit score, “control by risk” now 
involves lender-specific algorithms that use detailed and continuously updating consumer 
data to predict a borrower’s fluctuating delinquency risk, allowing lenders to extend or 
retract credit in real time.77  
 While McClanahan trains her focus on consumer credit, it is important to note that 
the quantitative revolution in credit evaluation extended to government debt as well, in 
particular the municipal bond market. Just as the passage of ECOA in 1974 signaled a 
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shift in consumer credit evaluation, the traumatic events of the New York City debt crisis 
the next year “spooked commercial providers of municipal credit everywhere” and 
catalyzed a move to debt securitization and quantitative credit evaluation. 78  According 
to Jason Hackworth, whereas local knowledge and mutual trust between cities and 
commercial lenders had previously served as the basis of the municipal credit market, 
after 1975, wealthy households and institutional investors seeking tax-free and low risk 
investments became the primary investors in municipal bonds.79 These so called 
“unsophisticated” investors (often retirement or pension funds) have been highly 
dependent on the credit ratings (bonds get “ratings,” individuals get “scores”) provided 
by the “big three” bond-rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch.80 Just as 
Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax, and FICO cornered the market for standardized and 
objective credit information on consumer borrowers, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch have 
filled a similar role in becoming the “primary gatekeepers” not only for municipal debt, 
but the entire transnational market for corporate and sovereign debt, as well as all manner 
of tradeable securities, including MBS (mortgage-backed securities) and CDOs 
(Collateralized Debt Obligations) – a fact that placed the rating agencies (CRAs) and 
their risk models at the center of the mortgage meltdown.81   
 For cities, the key judgment that rating agencies make is “whether a bond is rated 
as ‘speculative-grade’ (a ‘junk bond’) or ‘investment-grade.’”82 A city is required by law 
to hire one of the rating agencies (and pay for its services) as soon as it decides to issue 
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debt, and this agency gives the city’s debt a credit rating based on an examination of a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative factors including the city’s financial statements, its 
history of debt repayment, its economic and demographic outlook, legal factors affecting 
potential default, etc.83 These data points are analyzed and boiled down to a rating, 
ranging from investment quality (for S&P: AAA to BBB-, for Moody’s: Aaa to Baa3) to 
speculative grade and likely to default (for S&P: BB+ to – D, for Moody’s Ba1 to C).84 
In a way somewhat similar to an individual borrower, if any of the three major rating 
firms judge a city’s credit risk to be too high (based on a mix of factors that may include 
the city’s financial history, economic outlook, and current management conduct) and rate 
its bonds “speculative grade,” it can be, in Hackworth’s words, “summarily redlined from 
credit.”85  
While partially true, Hackworth’s invocation of the term “redlining” here is a bit 
of a misnomer in the brave new world of control by risk. As Ta-Nahesi Coates explains, 
the term “redlining” takes its name from the color-coded real estate maps used by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) that rated neighborhoods based on their 
perceived credit stability from green, demarcating stable and “in demand” areas without 
“a single foreigner or Negro,” to red, demarcating distressed areas “ineligible for FHA 
backing,” which happened to correspond exactly to the “[n]eighborhoods where black 
people lived.”86 Through common usage of these maps, an explicitly racist governmental 
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lending practice—“redlining”—spread to the entire mortgage industry, “excluding black 
people from most legitimate means of obtaining a mortgage.”87  
In the case of contemporary municipal credit rating, a city being rated speculative 
grade does not mean it will be excluded from credit markets; it means it will be charged 
punitively high interest rates that put enormous pressure on the city to cut costs, reduce 
services, and, in some cases, may lead to more drastic measures such as emergency 
takeover and bankruptcy. Moreover, because many investor portfolios (retirement and 
pension funds especially) can only be invested in low-risk, investment grade rated bonds, 
dropping below a certain threshold may have ripple effects that compound a city’s 
woes.88 To be clear, I am not arguing that exclusion or racism no longer play a role in 
credit scoring or credit rating, but rather that we need to understand how racism now 
functions through the “inclusive” techniques of control by risk. We return to this question 
in a moment. We must first understand the basis upon which CRAs make their rating 
judgments.  
While Moody’s acknowledges that qualitative factors do play a role in ratings 
judgments, it has insisted that, at the end of the day, its rating determinations are based on 
“the kinds of objective numbers the agency has always used to provide information to 
investors.”89 Moreover, the rating agencies, in the post-crisis market environment in 
which their ratings and expertise have come into question, are attempting to increase their 
“transparency” by quantifying the rating process even further. For instance, Moody’s has 
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created a “quantitative scorecard” to be shared with municipal borrowers in advance that 
shows how major factors (economy/tax base, finances, management, and debt/pensions) 
and subfactors (property values, median income, institutional framework, etc.) that 
determine a final rating are scored (they tout that each subfactor is now a “quantitative 
metric”).90 The CRAs claim that they are essential to making global markets more 
transparent and that they are updating their practices toward more objective and 
transparent methods of credit evaluation.91 However, ratings continue to be determined 
behind closed doors by a small committee of senior officials, which may consider factors 
not communicated to the borrower or the public (the quantitative scorecard is “not an 
exhaustive list of factors”), and retains the final authority to determine a rating, 
independent of any preset quantitative formula.92  
While the rating agencies, like the credit bureaus and FICO, purport to give expert 
and impartial judgments on borrowers’ creditworthiness, Timothy Sinclair stresses that 
because they continue to analyze quantitative and qualitative factors including 
“management structure, policy, and the wider context of the issuer . . . [this] make[s] the 
credit rating process inherently a nondeductive matter.”93 The simple fact that the three 
credit bureaus may produce significantly different credit scores in conjunction with a 
“critical mass of complaint over the past twenty years” betrays, according to legal scholar 
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Frank Pasquale, that “the assessment process is more than a little arbitrary.”94 While the 
three-digit number or alphanumeric rating appears to be “a marvel of concrete and 
compact clarity”—objective, reliable, incontestable—they are, in actuality “black boxes” 
concealing potentially arbitrary analytical processes that cannot be “fully understood, 
challenged, or audited.”95  Sinclair argues that this gate-keeping judgment process is 
“manifestly political” because it promotes modes of conduct, forms of knowledge, and 
governance systems configured to provide a “vetting and surveillance system for capital 
mobility, allowing capital to move ‘securely’ across geographic and cultural space.”96 
Moreover, the monopoly of information and authoritative judgment held by the credit 
bureaus and the CRAs gives them enormous power to determine the “global distribution 
of money, jobs, and economic opportunity” without any invitation for “public dialog, 
debate, or democratic deliberation.” 97 Accordingly, we see in the transformation and 
increasing politico-economic power of the credit evaluation industry, a clear 
manifestation of neoliberal governmentality’s technocratic face. In their role as expert 
information gatherers, interpreters, and authoritative sources of judgment, rating agencies 
and credit scorers are key enforcers in the struggle to construct and maintain a neoliberal 
governmentality that can indirectly control the conduct of indebted subjects at multiple 
scales.98  
Have Lazzarato and other theorists of debt who have drawn on Nietzsche and 
Marx to think through credit and debt’s ethical/moral effect on subjectivity and conduct 
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really missed these important shifts related to the quantitative turn in credit evaluation? 
Yes and no. Lazzarato is far more gestural in his approach to changes in the actual 
techniques of evaluation accompanying neoliberalism, which allows him to make 
sweeping transhistorical arguments such as this: “evaluation, whose importance within 
the debt economy both Nietzsche and Marx recognized, has become an extremely 
effective governmental technique in every sphere—economic, social, as well as education 
. . . for classifying, hierarchizing, and dividing the governed.”99 On the one hand, 
Lazzarato is right that evaluation is a vitally important and effective technique of 
neoliberal governmentality, and that Nietzsche and Marx, in their time, made a 
connection between evaluation, morality and debt. On the other hand, Lazzarato isn’t 
particularly clear on the specifics of how credit evaluation (scoring, rating, or otherwise) 
works to classify, hierarchize and divide the governed today.  
He suggests that while neoliberal “mnemotechnics” are not as “gory and cruel as 
those described by Nietzsche . . . their purpose remains the same: to construct memory, 
inscribe ‘guilt’ in the mind and body, fear and ‘bad conscience’ in the individual 
economic subject.”100 While credit evaluation’s form may have changed, Lazzarato 
thinks it still makes the individual subject its target and relies on producing 
individualized feelings of fear and guilt to incite responsible and disciplined economic 
conduct. It appears then, that, according to Lazzarato, we still live in a world that 
resembles Foucault’s “disciplinary society” of individuals rather than Deleuze’s emergent 
“society of control” working through “dividuals.”  
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By contrast, McClanahan seeks to offer an updated theoretical account of how 
quantitative credit scoring works on indebted subjects in the contemporary data-obsessed 
neoliberal society of control. She does so, in part, through a reading of Gary Shteyngart’s 
2011 novel Super Sad True Love Story, a “post-crisis” allegorical novel that is explicitly 
concerned with the new models of credit evaluation characteristic of the quantitative turn 
and control by risk. Super Sad is set in a near future where “all consumption is fueled by 
credit” and people wear a device like an iPhone called an “apparat” that projects “data 
about the wearer into the surrounding space.”101 When people in this world walk by 
public “Credit Poles,” their “credit rankings” are involuntarily displayed to everyone 
around them.102 Both in the novel’s characterization and in the technological world being 
presented, Shteyngart self-consciously uses a combination of caricature and stereotype in 
a way that, in McClanahan’s words, “elegantly registers contemporary credit scoring’s 
treatment of individuals as bundles of information.”103 Caricature describes an 
overabundance of detail and exaggeration, exemplified by Shteyngart’s overloaded 
physical descriptions of his characters as well as his presentation of expansive collections 
of arbitrary data about them (yearly income, alimony and child support obligations, sock 
and underwear preferences, LDL cholesterol levels and so on).104 These caricatured 
descriptions make the characters in Super Sad appear “too particular and too eccentric” to 
be credible characters in the tradition of the realist novel (the model for the 19th century 
regime of credit evaluation).105  
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McClanahan cites sociologist Michael Curry’s use of caricature to describe “the 
modern digital self in an age of credit-data accumulation” – the feeling of being treated 
“not like ‘me’ but as a caricature.”106 The alienating feeling caused by being presented 
with one’s credit data is not the “anxiety of reduction but the anxiety of excess, the 
experience of being defined not by a carefully limited array of personal details but by an 
indefinite accumulation of data.”107 It is here that McClanahan makes the connection 
back to Deleuze’s essay, suggesting that the exaggerated, overdetailed, overwhelming 
accumulation of information compiled on each of us, and, I would add, not only by the 
credit bureaus, but by all manner of corporate surveillance exemplified by companies like 
Amazon, Google, Facebook, etc., constitutes us as dividuals—“the divided data bodies of 
late capitalism”—as opposed to the stable, self-possessed, and responsible individuals 
assumed by Lazzarato, Nietzsche, and Marx.  
In some sense, the infrastructures of control operating through technologies of 
surveillance, recording, and instant communication act as a form of externalized memory 
on steroids; accumulating data stored in the memory of a networked machinic 
infrastructure that determines access to credit (and a whole host of other services and 
social goods) based on algorithmically-driven risk calculations and score/rating formulae.  
In this light, the importance of “breeding” individuals who know how to keep their 
promised debt obligations through the mechanisms of internalized cruelty (feelings of 
guilt) no longer appears to be paramount, as this function has largely been externalized 
into an assemblage of technical machines that perform the work of accounting for the 
entire populations’ credits and debits. The world of indebted control certainly appears to 
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be a far cry away from the intimate power relations between creditors and debtors 
envisaged by Nietzsche.108  
The specific techno-politics of this securitized and quantified world of control by 
risk forms only a partial basis for McClanahan’s critique of Lazzarato’s account of the 
neoliberal debt economy. She also takes issue with what she calls Lazzarato’s 
“Foucauldian narrative” emphasizing a shift from “direct physical coercion to more 
ideological forms of self-discipline.”109 To the contrary, McClanahan’s contends, 
“history has arced in the opposite direction,” citing empirical evidence showing that 
much of the American population has structurally and collectively come to depend on 
debt for “economic survival.”110 Her analysis shows that neoliberal governmentality 
substitutes expanded consumer credit for real wage increases, allowing businesses to cut 
costs while workers are forced to rely on credit to maintain a middle-class standard of 
living and, more frequently, to pay for basic necessities like healthcare, rent and 
groceries.  
In support of this line of argument, the transformations I described in markets for 
public debt have made it such that cities and states are also more dependent than ever on 
debt-financing and maintaining high credit ratings in order to fund basic services and 
obligations.111 Furthermore, McClanahan cites Adrienne Roberts’ work showing a post-
crisis rise in highly coercive methods of debt collection and the return of incarceration as 
a form of punishment for “undeserving” debtors – working class and poor borrowers who 
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just so happen to be disproportionately black and Latino.112 McClanahan uses this 
evidence to argue that Lazzarato and other debt theorists who have focused on the 
psychic and affective dimensions of debt have failed to account for how debt acts as a 
“brute material force” targeting the body and not just the conscience.113  
In her own reading of Marx’s “Essay on James Mill,” McClanahan argues, “the 
very fact that the debtor’s body serves as the ultimate collateral for the loan means that in 
the end there is no need for either accountability or for guilt, let alone ethics or 
subjectivity.”114 While the debtor may have bought into the “oft-described neoliberal 
logic of entrepreneurship,” believing that taking on debt is an investment in her future 
human capital, McClanahan thinks that “she is more likely to feel that she has no other 
option.”115 In her account of the effects of debt in neoliberal culture, debt’s affective 
production of personal shame, stigma and guilt is of only secondary importance 
compared to its brute material effect as a form of impersonal structural violence.116 
In my estimation, however, by claiming that Lazzarato has totally failed to 
account for the material force of debt due to his focus on its ethical dimension, 
McClanahan overplays her hand. For starters, Lazzarato’s deepest theoretical influences 
are Marxist and Deleuzian and so it would be quite strange for him to focus solely on the 
supposedly “ideological” effects of credit and debt while completely ignoring the 
material. Moreover, Lazzarato would likely reject McClanahan’s attempt to separate the 
material from the ideal and to associate Foucault with “ideology,” a term that Foucault 
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himself flatly rejected.117 A closer reading of The Making of the Indebted Man and his 
subsequent book Governing by Debt, shows that, despite his focus on subjectivity and 
ethics, Lazzarato does not ignore the material effects of credit and debt. In fact, he argues 
explicitly: 
Morality, the promise, and one’s word are mostly insufficient to guarantee 
debt repayment. To have a real ‘hold’ on subjectivity, there must also be 
legal and police ‘machines’ (Marx) as well as mnemotechnical ‘machines’ 
in effect which work on and manufacture the subject (Nietzsche).”118 
 
Lazzarato is fully aware of Nietzsche’s lesson that morality always involves force and 
violence to instantiate itself, and Marx’s insight that capital uses the power of the state, 
the law and the police (not just the “silent compulsion” of the market) to secure the 
conditions for class domination and capital accumulation. Lazzarato insists that 
“debt/money” must get a “hold” on its subjects by, on the one hand, what he calls “social 
subjection” at the molar level of the individual, conscience, memory (i.e. the focus of 
McClanahan’s criticism), and on the other, through what he calls “machinic subjugation” 
operating at the molecular, “infrapersonal,” and “pre-individual” level.119  
 Echoing Deleuze and Guattari’s call in Anti-Oedipus to consider desire not in 
terms of its representations, but in terms of the machines it forms, Lazzarato argues, 
“Machines are everywhere except in critical theory.”120 He thinks that machines and 
signs (the semiotic engines of these machines, i.e. “code”) “form enormous networks 
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which are at once apparatuses of valorization, of the production of subjectivity, and of 
police control.”121 Lazzarato argues that the transversality of the signs and machines of 
the debt economy, integrating human and non-human components, allows neoliberal 
capitalism to exercise both granular and global control.122 For instance, he argues that 
using a credit card is a “machinic function” that works without “a subject who acts” but 
instead a “dividual that functions in an ‘enslaved’ way to the sociotechnical apparatus of 
the banking network.”123 The dividual swiping the card in this case is only a human 
“operator” or “element” in the “sociotechnical” machinery or series of machines that 
communicate amongst themselves and with other human and non-human elements.124 
Late capitalism now relies on a vast array of machines through which we function in our 
daily lives, not least of which are the credit cards, banking websites, ATMS, databases, 
computers, internet, smart phones, apps, trading platforms, risk models and credit scoring 
formulas, which interface with the humans that use them to create the infrastructure that 
makes debt intelligible and such a powerful means of control.  
For Lazzarato, it is at the level of the machinic where Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality comes up a bit short in that it remains focused on the power/knowledge 
relations governing the conduct of individuated subjects rather than looking at the 
sociotechnical machines that dismantle the subject in order to press its many dividuals 
into serving the machines’ functional ends.125 For the most powerful companies operating 
in the business of profiting from collecting personal data, like Facebook or Google, 
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humans are treated less as individual subjects as they are “platform[s] for the exchange 
and transformation of information.”126 Similarly, for the financial firms creating and 
trading debt derivatives, individual borrowers become, on the one hand, bundles of data 
determining risk level/credit score, and on the other, streams of interest to be funneled 
and packaged into a range of products for similarly disembodied investors/creditors with 
no personal knowledge of or relation to the debtors at the other end of the chain.   
 This is all to say that Lazzarato does not miss the machinic/material side of the 
neoliberal debt economy, as McClanahan claims he does, but, to the contrary, thinks that 
the material and affective are both essential to understand and in fact always function 
together. He portrays the impersonal, machinic, and structural side of capitalism in such a 
way that it must be understood in conjunction with the work being done through the 
morality of the responsible individual who is constantly being “subjected” along the 
divide of human capital/indebted man. As he says, capitalism and its governmentality 
cannot be reduced to a “mere subjective power” or to an “impersonal and automatic 
power exercised by technical or cybernetic machines;” neoliberal governmentality, and 
creditor-debtor relations in particular, function successfully because they operate 
simultaneously on both registers.127  
It is somewhat strange that McClanahan wants to downplay credit/debt’s ability to 
shape conduct through affective suasion based in personal feelings of shame, guilt, fear, 
and anxiety, and insists that, at the end of the day, debt should mainly be considered an 
impersonal and structural force. Strange because she argues that while there has been a 
“radical shift in the formal logic and outward appearance of credit evaluation”—from a 
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“qualitative narrative model” based on “a finite set of typifying characteristics” to a 
model in which “a vast and indefinite number of data points are fed through a 
quantitative algorithm” to create a range of “highly individualized microassessments”—
credit scoring and credit evaluation in general “cannot leave subjective personhood 
behind, since the very category of ‘creditworthiness’ remains a quality of individuals 
rather than of data.”128 It is not just that qualitative and arbitrary factors are still in play – 
the very logic of creditworthiness/indebtedness is socially determined in such a way as to 
betray all attempts to fully clothe it in the objectivity of numbers. She argues that the 
“discourse of personal responsibility and moral rectitude is at least as resonant in the 
language of ‘behavior’ as it was in the discourse of moral character and personal 
characteristics.”129 Despite the newfound “granularity” of data, quantitative techniques of 
analysis, and continuous credit monitoring and surveillance, the credit score or credit 
rating remains, according to McClanahan, “intractably social insofar as it determines an 
individual’s position within the social logic of the marketplace.”130 Here she seems to 
concur with Lazzarato who insists that while “[c]apitalism would have us believe that it 
functions like an automaton, that there is no alternative precisely because the market, the 
stock market, and the debt economy are governed by automatic operations,” these 
operations and their machines are “always the result of a political victory over 
conducts.”131 
  
III. Blackboxed Racism and the Return of the Debtor’s Prison 
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McClanahan reinforces the view of the debt economy as intractably social and 
political in her analysis of an advertising campaign by FreeScore.com entitled “The 
Three Score Guys,” in which a consumer’s credit scores from all three major credit 
bureaus are personified by men wearing black body suits emblazoned with each score.132 
Two of the scores are good, depicted by handsome and athletic white men, while one is 
lower, depicted by a short, tubby, balding man wearing a hockey mask (seemingly 
invoking the serial killer Jason from the Friday the 13th horror films). McClanahan notes 
the visual contrast between fitness and fatness “registers the association between personal 
responsibility and fiscal credibility.”133 In this ad the quantified measures of 
creditworthiness/unworthiness are translated back into “biopolitical norms” associating 
physical fitness with health/credibility and obesity with irresponsibility/profligacy.134 
Most importantly, McClanahan also notes the ad’s racialization: the men portraying the 
scores are “neutrally white precisely to avoid implying any essentialized link between 
particular scores and particular ethnicities.”135 However the figures’ whiteness and 
maleness betray a “desperate attempt to disavow the link between credit and race.”136  
Here McClanahan raises the question of credit/debt’s racialized management of 
“both the individual body and the species body of the population” through the quantified 
techniques of credit scoring and control by risk.137 Despite Lazzarato’s focus on debt as 
the site of contemporary class struggle, his insistence on the joint functioning of ethics 
and economics to shape subjectivity, his concern over the alienating effects of the turn to 
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“human capital,” and his attention to the dynamics of “machinic enslavement” enacted 
through the credit infrastructure, nowhere does he concern himself with race, nor the 
racial politics of debt, nor does he think to consider creditor-debtor relations in terms of 
the long history of settler colonialism, racial slavery, indebted servitude and various 
forms of ongoing accumulation by dispossession that we explored, however briefly, in 
the previous chapter.  
Lazzarato speaks of the injustice of humans being turned into money or capital, 
and the danger of modern forms of enslavement without mentioning the actual history of 
racial capitalism and the slave economy in which, historian Walter Johnson remarks, 
“Enslaved people were the capital;” slaves performed the physical labor, the reproductive 
labor, and acted as the collateral securing the circulation of credit necessary to keep the 
cotton planters in business.138 Nor does Lazzarato mention slavery’s transformation, after 
Emancipation, to another regime of forced labor enacted and legitimated by debt. Despite 
his mention of social subjection being supplemented by legal and police compulsion, he 
does not explore contemporary connections between racialized indebtedness and mass 
incarceration. Perhaps, like Foucault, he suffers from a case of Eurocentric myopia, but 
this does not excuse the glaring hole in his account because these phenomena certainly 
extend to Europe and beyond. Lazzarato is not alone in this oversight; most of the critical 
literature on debt and finance remains silent on this question allowing the neoliberal 
rhetoric of post-racialism and colorblindness to go unchallenged. 
Perhaps then, couched in her criticism of Lazzarato and the burgeoning literature 
on debt, is McClanahan’s sense that the theoretical scholarship has failed to attend to 
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debt’s most brutal contemporary function as a vehicle for the continuing racial 
domination of minority populations and as a covert tool of white supremacy. Racial 
discrimination was not eliminated in the debt economy’s quantitative turn from the logic 
of screening/exclusion to the logic of risk/inclusion; its methods were transformed to suit 
the new political-economic reality of the post-Civil Rights era. As we will explore further 
in the next chapter, the turn to colorblindness, or as David Theo Goldberg calls it, 
“racelessness,” developed first as an expression of the new civil rights regime, but then as 
a “reaction to state commitment to affirmative action.”139 As we saw, in light of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act and other legislation aimed at reducing inequalities and 
exclusions in market practices, there was a move not so much to comply with the 
egalitarian spirit of the new legislation, but to transform the credit rating and scoring 
process so as to appear as objective as possible by basing it on data about individualized 
behavior and not on prejudiced subjective judgments. However, as Frank Pasquale 
suggests, the quantification of credit scoring does not eliminate bias, but may actually 
serve to systematize it in hidden ways by “laundering past practices of discrimination into 
a blackboxed score.”140 While neoliberal governmentality cleanses its discursive 
framework of all overt mention of race (not to mention class, gender and other markers of 
difference and inequality), race continues to function by and through the black boxes of 
the debt economy.141  
The evidence of this can be viewed in the disproportionate effects of the subprime 
housing crash and foreclosure crisis on communities of color. McClanahan cites a 
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startling figure about the 2008 financial collapse: “every cent of the wealth accumulated 
by African American households in the post-civil rights era was lost as a result of the 
collapse of home and investment values.”142 Housing policies and mortgage lending that 
had excluded African Americans from accumulating wealth through the “prime” segment 
of the real estate market—confining them to segregated neighborhoods through the 
practice of “redlining” in the first half of the 20th century—gave way to modes of 
predatory inclusion in the mortgage market through racially targeted “subprime” lending, 
dubbed “reverse-redlining.”143 To note one prominent example, Wells Fargo settled a 
Federal case in 2012 that accused it of practices that specifically targeted African 
Americans and Latinos for “subprime” home loans with inflated and adjustable interest 
rates in Baltimore, Memphis, Oakland, Chicago, Cleveland and elsewhere. Wells Fargo 
and other banks’ reverse redlining practices contributed to a wave of foreclosures after 
the 2008 financial crash that disproportionately affected people of color,144 wiping away, 
in the words of one journalist, “two decades of slow progress.”145  
The complaint revealed that Wells Fargo created a unit called the “Affinity 
Marketing Group,” based in Silver Spring, Maryland, that employed African American 
loan officers to specifically target African Americans in and around Baltimore for 
subprime loans, which the team referred to internally as “ghetto loans.”146 During the 
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course of the housing boom, many more African American and Latino/a homeowners 
were pushed into high-cost subprime mortgage credit than whites, even when they 
qualified for prime credit on better terms, and even when they weren’t seeking credit in 
the first place.147 Putting the lie to banking and credit institutions’ own claims that the 
quantified techniques of credit scoring do not discriminate based on race, gender, or 
class, McClanahan argues that the record shows that “the allocation and price of credit in 
the United States are in fact stratified along precisely those lines.”148 
How then does predatory inclusion in credit markets work to constitute and target 
racialized “subprime” populations in spite of supposedly sophisticated, technical and 
colorblind techniques? McClanahan suggests the key is that an individual borrower’s 
credit score is always calculated and understood in a statistical relation to “a larger 
collective body . . . a group, a neighborhood, an economic class or, most often, a race.”149 
The disproportionately destructive effects of subprime credit on black and brown 
borrowers suggest that despite the use of evaluation techniques calculating the terms of 
credit based on behavioral data, the interpretation of these data remains socially and 
historically mediated and continues to determine one’s creditworthiness based on 
stereotypical markers of race and class.150  
To return for a moment to McClanahan’s reading of characterization in Super 
Sad, she suggests that while Shteyngart presents “excessively particular data-persons” on 
the one hand, the “Credit Poles,” which read characters’ economic data from their 
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“apparat” devices, use this data to display racially and ethnically targeted ads.151 Hence 
the caricatures produced by an excess of data are reduced down to flattened stereotypes 
depicting, for instance, all Chinese as miserly or all Latinos as spendthrift.152 
Shteyngart’s novel shows how the internal logic of credit scoring depends on 
stereotyping and racialization as a consequence of the imperative to reduce “an excess of 
data into a three-digit score.”153  
The model of control by risk seeks to include borrowers previously excluded from 
the marketplace (i.e. African Americans historically redlined from credit), because there 
are profits to be made from the high interest rates legally charged to “risky” borrowers 
with lower credit scores, as well as from the fees generated by securitizing and selling 
their debt. Those targeted for “inclusion” in this way are constituted into the 
“stereotypical category of the ‘subprime population’” which just so happens to 
correspond to same racialized populations, particularly African Americans, who, since 
being emancipated from slavery, have been barred from owning property, indebted to 
usurious landlords, criminalized and sold as convict labor and throughout been castigated 
by whites as profligate, unreliable, and “undeserving” debtors.154  
In his essay “The Subprime and the Beautiful,” Fred Moten argues that blackness 
has been associated at different times throughout colonial history with the markers of 
“complete disorder” and “dereliction” such as rape, crime, and AIDS, and now, in the 
contemporary United States, “whoever says ‘subprime debtor’ says black as well.”155 As 
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we saw in the previous chapter, this is certainly nothing new. The subprime “crisis,” he 
argues, is simply the “disruption and resocialization of an already given crisis”: that of 
the ongoing domination and exploitation of black people by and through the white 
supremacist power relations of racial capitalism.156 Neoliberal governmentality describes 
an open set of techniques and strategies which maintain a highly unequal and racist social 
order under the legitimating cover of promoting, deregulating and expanding competitive 
private markets and marketizing social and governmental institutions – foremost among 
them the criminal justice system.157 Moten draws our attention to the wider history of 
struggle in which the quantified neoliberal condemnation of blackness and attempt at 
racial control by debt is situated.  
The dynamics of predatory inclusion in the formal credit markets that led to the 
creation and exploitation of “subprime” populations of black and Latino debtors 
correspond to what both McClanahan and Roberts identify as a post-crisis coercive and 
carceral turn in the treatment of those considered to be “undeserving” debtors.158 Roberts 
cites creditor-friendly changes to bankruptcy laws, the rise of a powerful and savvy debt 
buying and collections industry using coercive tactics and lawsuits to collect from 
unsophisticated working-class and poor debtors, and the explosion of what has been 
termed “criminal justice debt” as factors leading to the reemergence of debtor’s prisons in 
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the United States in recent years.159 While it remains illegal to incarcerate people for 
debts they are unable to pay, prison time may result from failure to appear in court and in 
some jurisdictions those facing fines or fees may voluntarily agree to jail time in lieu of 
monetary payment. Roberts’ research also shows that it is not only the debt buying 
industry looking to profit, but also municipalities seeking to download “costs onto 
individual ‘users,’ or clients’ of services,” adding to the “growing indebtedness of the 
primarily poor and disproportionately black and Latino population.”160  
After the police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014, 
an investigation by the Civil Rights division of the U.S. Department of Justice revealed a 
local criminal justice system strongly reminiscent of the profiteering convict-leasing 
system of the postbellum South.161 The report details a policing and court system focused 
almost exclusively on extracting revenue from black residents through unnecessary 
arrest, excessive ticketing and innumerable fees and fines.162 As the report states, these 
practices “impose a particular hardship upon Ferguson’s most vulnerable residents . . . 
Minor offenses can generate crippling debts, result in jail time because of an inability to 
pay, and result in the loss of a driver’s license, employment, or housing.”163   
Historian Donna Murch suggests that Ferguson is only the tip of the iceberg. She 
describes a complex extractive carceral apparatus involving “interlocking webs of public 
and private predation” that together constitute what she calls “the new debtors’ 
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prison.”164 This apparatus involves both private debt such as payday loans, student loans, 
medical debt, mortgages, etc., combined with “criminal justice debt . . . an unwieldy set 
of financial obligations consisting of fines, fees, and restitution payments” imposed at 
every stage of the criminal justice process, including “jail booking fees and per diems for 
pretrial detention, bail investigation fees, cost of drug and DNA testing, court costs and 
felony surcharges,” and, in forty-one states, the cost of imprisonment itself.165 Low 
income people and people of color, already facing the difficulties of private indebtedness 
and disproportionate policing and incarceration,166 are then hit with criminal justice debt, 
which not only poses a serious financial burden, but can further hinder access to 
employment and housing due to required credit checks that act as “de facto indicators of 
incarceration history,” effectively nullifying the victories of activists who struggled 
successfully to “ban the box” requiring job applicants to list prior felony convictions.167  
While for-profit privately run prisons have been singled out as particularly 
egregious actors in this scenario, private firms and contractors as well as state 
governments extract profits up and down the line of the state and Federal criminal justice 
system by charging for services like phone calls, healthcare, and electronic monitoring 
and then devolving the costs to the incarcerated themselves.168 Criminal justice debt adds 
a vicious new dimension to the carceral cycle of prison, probation, and parole because 
relatively minor unpaid debts can lead to a unpayable fees, arrest, incarceration, the loss 
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of work, loss of professional licenses,169 mounting debt and thus the inability to get 
oneself back to a position of solvency.   
The racial politics of debt help to explain why the persistent racial wealth gap in 
America widened after the Great Recession, with median white households holding 
thirteen times more wealth than median black households and ten times that of median 
Latino households as of 2013.170 A 2015 report by the Pew Charitable Trusts entitled 
“The Complex Story of American Debt” confirms this disparity, reporting that the typical 
white family making less than $40,000 a year has nearly 18 times the assets of the typical 
black family in the same income bracket.171 Black households making below $40,000 
actually display a negative median net worth, with debt outweighing assets by 2 to 1.172 
Imagine the crushing psychological effect of playing by the rules, working hard, 
achieving the dream of homeownership, and then suddenly being saddled with an 
underwater mortgage, unpayable debts and a negative economic net worth. Of course, 
this scenario applied to a great number of white families who suffered in the wave of 
foreclosures after the mortgage meltdown; however subprime credit and the foreclosure 
catastrophe affected black and Latino households in far greater proportion.173 As 
remarked by one African American homeowner in Memphis who faced bankruptcy and 
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foreclosure after agreeing to refinance his mortgage at an adjustable rate during the pre-





  McClanahan and others build a highly compelling case for the “brute material 
force” of debt in the 21st century as much of the American population has become 
structurally dependent upon debt for survival, predatory credit serves to mark out 
racialized populations slated for future dispossession, and an increasingly financialized 
state apparatus and justice system which demands that the incarcerated pay back their 
“debt to society” not only in time served, but in actual dollars as well. However, 
McClanahan’s attempt to sever debt’s structural and repressive effects from its intimate, 
affective, subjectivity shaping, “productive” side, seems unnecessary and unwarranted. 
She herself appears to marvel at the dual capacity of credit and debt to work at the most 
intimate and most macro of scales. She notices the persistence of personhood and 
racialized stereotypes within the neoliberal credit scoring techniques and apparatuses 
intended to give off the appearance of objective, automatic, scientific authority. Perhaps 
McClanahan appears intent on disavowing debt’s ability to make one feel anxious and 
responsible for one’s own fate not so much because this dimension is no longer 
important, but precisely because she recognizes that herein lies debt’s uncanny power to 
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mask its structural origin and make itself appear as the result of a free choice, a character 
flaw, or a cultural or racial deficiency.  
 In fact, this is precisely why it is important to understand debt in relation to the 
dominant norms of entrepreneurial subjectivity. Lazzarato and McClanahan would seem 
to agree that the creditor-debtor relation is indeed the linchpin of neoliberal 
governmentality, forming its very infrastructure and internal logic. That being the case, as 
Jean François Bissonnette argues, “the ability to manage one’s finances by striking the 
“delicate balance between the benefits of credit and the risks of debt” has become, under 
neoliberalism, the normative standard against which individuals, populations, businesses, 
organizations and states are judged capable or incapable of self-government.175 Lazzarato 
argues that this is precisely what being an “entrepreneur” has come to mean: managing 
one’s debts, the cuts to one’s wages, hours, and benefits, one’s loss of public services; in 
other words “hustling” harder176 to manage one’s downward mobility in a way that lets 
one avoid becoming irrevocably indebted. 
  As Miranda Joseph eloquently puts it in her recent work Debt to Society, “The 
ideal entrepreneurial subject of neoliberalism lives only one side of a contradiction: she 
borrows and invests to build a future for herself and her family. Meanwhile, she 
somehow avoids the dialectic that transforms credit received into a debt and binds the 
present to the past.”177 Part of neoliberal governmentality, as Lazzarato and Joseph point 
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out, is an ongoing disavowal that finance/credit leads to the accrual of debt and the 
production, exploitation, enslavement and gradual destruction of indebted subjects. 
Indeed, in relation to this point Joseph makes the connection to Lauren Berlant’s concept 
of “slow death,” which Berlant defines as “the physical wearing out of a population and 
the deterioration of people in that population that is very nearly a defining condition of 
their experience and historical existence.”178 While Berlant discusses obesity and 
capitalism in her essay, Joseph makes the parallel to debt, suggesting that recent financial 
crises brought scrutiny for a moment to something that had been there all along: the 
slowly dying and deteriorating population for whom the debt-reliant norms of 
entrepreneurial conduct act simultaneously as “life building” and life destroying.179 
Credit entices, promises, and offers a way of getting by, while debt slowly accrues, binds, 
and asphyxiates. This is why, as Joseph remarks, “the norm of entrepreneurial 
subjectivity is likely to be inhabited in the mode of failure.”180  
This fraught condition of the indebted neoliberal subject produces, according to 
the Institute for Precarious Consciousness (IPC), anxiety as its dominant affect.181 
Anxiety, they argue, has become dominant in a number of ways from the “omnipresent 
web of surveillance” to “voluntary self-exposure, through social media,” to precarious 
forms of employment, which treat people as disposable; however the divided neoliberal 
subject—potentially successful entrepreneur/potentially failed debtor—seems to be a 
crucial force multiplier for the spread of anxiety throughout society. IPC argues that 
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“control-by-anxiety” has become the “linchpin of subordination” to the extent that action 
is motivated by everyone’s internalized suspicion that the necessities of life are no longer 
guaranteed (as rights, benefits, entitlements), but are withheld conditionally based on a 
constant evaluation of one’s conduct, performance, and, indeed, perceived 
creditworthiness.182  
According to IPC, anxiety and stress are “public secrets”: they infuse the entire 
population and are the result of structural forces like the debt economy; however “[w]hen 
discussed at all, they are understood as individual psychological problems, often blamed 
on faulty thought patterns or poor adaptation.”183 To the extent that systematic causes of 
anxiety go unmentioned or examined, they can fuel “obsessive projects of social 
regulation” that attempt to enact some measure of control by projecting latent anxiety 
onto minorities through scapegoating and criminalizing discourses, which “treat precarity 
as a matter of personal deviance, irresponsibility, or pathological self-exclusion.”184    
 As we shall see, the slow death of the indebted population, colorblind racism 
operating through technical algorithms and market processes, misplaced feelings of 
failure and anxiety: these phenomena have the joint effect of severely endangering 
democratic institutions and the norms and practices of democracy through which 
indebted control might be contested. Indeed, as Lazzarato cannily observes, debt 
endangers democratic life and inhibits resistance because the style of life it demands to 
secure repayment uses up the very time and energy needed to engage in these forms of 
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struggle.185 I take up the question of the relation between debt and contemporary 
American democracy in the final chapter. 
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4 | Toward the Abolition of Indebted Democracy 
 
“‘People say I'm a dictator,’ Mr. Orr chuckles. ‘I don't appreciate that, but if I'm going 
to be one, I'm going to be benevolent.’” 
— Kevyn Orr, Detroit Emergency Manager1 
 
“What is, so to speak, the object of abolition? Not so much the abolition of prisons but 
the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have 
the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the 
founding of a new society.” 
— Stefano Harney and Fred Moten2 
 
Building off of my analysis in the previous chapter, which argued that the nexus 
of credit and debt is a crucial infrastructure of control supporting neoliberal 
governmentality and racial capitalism, in this chapter I explicate the ways in which 
indebted control erodes democratic values, institutions, modes of citizenship and forms of 
struggle, posing a severe threat to the unfinished project of democracy in America. To 
support this claim, the first part of the chapter offers a critique of Wendy Brown’s recent 
book Undoing the Demos in which she argues that neoliberalism poses a dire threat to 
democracy as we know it. I argue that, in failing to address the geo-temporal specificity 
of American neoliberalism and the living history of American democracy, Brown’s 
political vision misses both the centrality of debt to the antidemocratic neoliberal project, 
as well as the continuity between neoliberal and liberal democracies as racial projects 
founded on and operating via the supremacy of the white citizen. In order to provide a 
more nuanced and robust conception of democracy than that provided by Brown, I turn to 
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the work of William E. Connolly, as well as several theorists in the black radical tradition 
including W. E. B. Du Bois, James Baldwin, Christina Sharpe, and Joel Olson. 
In the second part of the chapter, I examine the intersection of democratic 
citizenship, whiteness, and credit. I argue that American democracy has been corrupted 
since its inception by the tyrannical power of the self-anointed “white” race; a power by 
which whites enjoy an a priori line of credit—what I term white credit—whiteness as a 
presupposed badge of moral rectitude, economic creditworthiness and full political 
citizenship, which is predicated on maintaining the degraded, indebted, and inferior status 
of people of color. I trace the ways in which white credit racially divides the democratic 
polity – from Nixon’s Southern strategy to Donald Trump’s rise to the Presidency. I 
contend that as white credit has been eroded by the neoliberal condition of generalized 
indebtedness outlined in the preceding chapter, there has been a corresponding 
resurgence of proto-fascist white nationalism embodied by the phenomena associated 
with “Trumpism.”3 
In part three, I show how neoliberal governmentality’s slow erosion of democracy 
periodically gives way to the emergency temporality of the debt crisis, in which the rule 
of the demos is abruptly suspended to make way for a unilateral executive power to 
reinstate conditions of market activity and capital accumulation. I do so through a 
sustained analysis of the rhetoric and practices of emergency financial management 
governing insolvent cities and school districts in the state of Michigan, with a specific 
focus on the Detroit bankruptcy. I hypothesize that taken together, the features of 
neoliberal governmentality and indebted control have helped to sustain American racial 
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capitalism and “white democracy” into the post-civil rights era. I conclude the chapter 
with a call for debt abolition coupled with reimagining debt altogether. Taken together, I 
contend that these theoretical and practical interventions might help to foment fugitive 
movements toward what Du Bois calls an “abolition-democracy,” firmly committed to 
dismantling the political economy of white supremacy in its contemporary guises. 
 
I. Neoliberalism in a White Democracy 
 
Wendy Brown’s 2015 work Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth 
Revolution, provides my point of departure to examine how the neoliberal 
governmentality of indebted control described in the previous chapter erodes democratic 
values, institutions, modes of citizenship and forms of struggle today. In Undoing, Brown 
discusses credit and debt only tangentially, setting her sites instead on what she argues 
are the democracy-eroding effects of “neoliberalism,” broadly construed as a “distinctive 
mode of reason, of the production of subjects, a ‘conduct of conduct,’ and a scheme of 
valuation,” which “configures all aspects of existence into economic terms.”4 Brown 
notes that after three decades of rich interdisciplinary scholarship on the subject of 
neoliberalism, it must be acknowledged that neoliberalism is at once a “global 
phenomenon, yet inconstant, morphing, differentiated, unsystematic, contradictory, and 
impure.”5 However, as a political theorist concerned with neoliberalism’s de-
democratizing effects, Brown brackets its “spatial and temporal variability” in favor of an 
account of neoliberalism as a “distinctive form of reason” or “governing rationality.”6  
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To focus on neoliberalism as a governing rationality, Brown follows Michel 
Foucault’s account in the Birth of Biopolitics lectures. That work, she suggests, identifies 
neoliberalism as “discernible norms and principles that consistently distinguish it from 
classical economic and political liberalism, as well as from Keynesianism, social 
democracy, or state-owned and state-controlled economies.” 7 Despite neoliberalism’s 
variable local instantiations, different techniques it employs, or policies it rolls out in 
different times and places, its logic persists. Drawing from Foucault’s lectures that 
examine how neoliberal governmentality transformed classical liberalism, Brown 
portrays neoliberalism as an abstract political rationality that “disseminates the model of 
the market to all domains and activities—even where money is not at issue—and 
configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and everywhere as 
homo oeconomicus.”8 While she makes note of the deleterious effects attributed to 
neoliberalism by a range of critics in recent years—its intensification of inequality9, 
unethical commercialization of heretofore public goods,10 creation of a state-corporate-
finance nexus,11 and contribution to bubbles, crashes, and increased market volatility12—
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it is neoliberalism’s quiet undoing of the basic elements of democracy that raises the 
greatest alarm for her.13  
Brown insists that the arch-threat posed to democracy comes from neoliberalism’s 
“economization” of previously noneconomic spheres and practices including the model 
of the subject and subjectivity itself. In a review of Undoing, Jodi Dean concisely 
summarizes this point: “Fully ‘transmogrified’ by its economization under neoliberal 
rationality, democracy has been unmoored, disemboweled, hollowed out from within, and 
utterly undone.”14 Brown singles out the concept of “human capital” as being at the root 
of this neoliberal hollowing out process.15 As persons are figured as “human capital” and 
states are “construed on the model of the contemporary firm,” Brown sees liberal 
democracy’s “already anemic homo politicus” being vanquished by homo oeconomicus 
with “enormous consequences for democratic institutions, cultures and imaginaries.”16  
She notes four consequences in particular. First, she suggests that “we are human 
capital not just for ourselves, but also for the firm, state, or postnational constellation of 
which we are members.”17 This means that as citizens are figured as human capital—
fully responsible for themselves and their investments of time and energy in “a 
competitive world of other human capitals”—the firm, the state, and other governmental 
bodies legitimately offload many of their former responsibilities and duties to protect the 
rights, health and welfare of the people.18 They are justified in doing so because workers 
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and citizens—figured as fungible “capital” to be invested in or disposed of based on 
calculations of risk and cost—no longer enjoy universal protections based on legal, 
moral, or political (i.e. non-economic) standing.19 Moreover, states no longer derive their 
legitimacy primarily from the sovereignty conferred by the people through democratic 
modes of representation and participation; they do so through successful management of 
the various forms of capital at their disposal (human and non-human) in order to achieve 
economic growth.  
Second, she argues that equality “ceases to be an a priori or fundament of 
neoliberalized democracy,” while inequality becomes normalized as the proper and 
normal relation between competing states and citizens. In other words, the logic of 
competitive markets normalizes the idea that there will always be big winners and losers 
in a polity.20 Third, she contends that as everything becomes subsumed under capital, 
“labor disappears as a category” and with it its collective form “class,” which heretofore 
had served as the analytical basis undergirding political claims seeking collective redress 
for exploitation and as the inspiration for political mobilization based on class 
solidarity.21 Without a concept of labor, she insists, resistance to capital through 
collective action and organization becomes increasingly unintelligible and futile.  
Finally, she argues that in a world governed by neoliberal reason, “citizenship 
itself loses its political valence and venue,” as the active cultivation of citizens’ concerns 
for public goods, common purposes, and public education is devalued and eliminated in 
favor of a model of citizenship as market conduct that contributes to economic growth, 
                                                 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid., 38. 
21 Ibid. 
4 | Toward the Abolition of Indebted Democracy 
171 
 
global competitiveness and creditworthiness.22 Moreover, the citizen reduced to homo 
oeconomicus (and homo oecnomicus now conceived as “human capital”) eliminates the 
idea of “a people” or “demos,” committed to self-rule and collective sovereignty as 
paramount expressions of freedom.23 Indeed, Brown contends that the conception of 
freedom that animates democratic rule—“[f]reedom conceived minimally as self-rule and 
more robustly as participation in rule by the demos—has given way to freedom 
conceived as “comportment with a market instrumental rationality that radically 
constrains both choices and ambitions.”24 In sum, Brown goes so far as to claim, 
“Neoliberalism is the rationality through which capitalism finally swallows humanity—
not only with its machinery of compulsory commodification and profit-driven expansion, 
but by its form of valuation.”25  
 I share Brown’s concern for the plight of “the demos,” the fate of democratic 
norms of government and citizenship, as well as public institutions and radical forms of 
protest and participatory democracy whose assault under neoliberal governmentality she 
unflinchingly catalogues in her book. However, to riff on a remark by Annie McClanahan 
in an essay response to Undoing: if Brown wants to insistently ask “the Lenin question: 
What Is to Be Done?,” then she may have to think more critically about “The Marvin 
Gaye question”: “What’s Goin’ On?” in order to develop an effective response.26 In other 
words, attempting a prognosis without a careful diagnosis, can lead one into a nest of 
self-inflicted difficulties, and may end up leaving the patient worse off than before. In my 
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view, there are some intertwined flaws in Brown’s diagnosis of the neoliberal threat to 
democracy.  
The first has to do with the questions that frame her study and the ways in which 
she chooses to portray neoliberalism. She asks, for instance, “What happens when the 
precepts and principles of democracy are remade by this order of reason and 
governance?” and “What is the connection between neoliberalism’s hollowing out of 
contemporary liberal democracy and its imperiling of more radical democratic 
imaginaries?”27 These, “What” questions act as foregone conclusions that assume 
neoliberalism to be a totalizing force against which democracy stands little chance, which 
leaves Brown little room to theorize chinks in its armor, points of resistance to its logic or 
implementation, or to imagine what a counter-politics or counter-program might look 
like. Strangely, Brown enlists Foucault in this effort by focusing solely on the 
knowledge/discourse side of governmentality, which she calls “political rationality.” She 
focuses almost exclusively on his discussions of neoliberalism in the Birth of Biopolitics 
lectures, which, as I noted in the previous chapter, uncharacteristically (for Foucault) 
focus on the theoretical formulations of neoliberal intellectuals rather than considering 
their inter-involvement and mutually constitutive functioning with the practical 
techniques and tactics of power shaping postwar Europe and the United States. As 
Foucault himself says in the lectures of the previous year, “it seems to me that the 
dimension of what is to be done [my emphasis] can only appear within a field of real 
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forces, that is to say within a field of forces that cannot be created by a speaking subject 
alone.”28  
Thus, if neoliberalism is indeed a multiplicity or heterogeneous assemblage of 
power/knowledge—Brown suggests that it has become “a scholarly commonplace” to 
recognize neoliberalism as a “loose and shifting signifier” with “temporal and geographic 
variety in its discursive formulations, policy entailments, and material practices”—and if 
Brown is interested in how this neoliberal assemblage undoes the institutions of existing 
democracies and the citizenry’s very ability to imagine democratic futures, then it seems 
counterintuitive to confess to this reality only to set it aside.29 But this is precisely what 
she does. She focuses on a highly abstracted and discursive notion of neoliberalism, 
portraying it as an economizing “rationality” that has already been largely successful in 
neutralizing our ability to think and act politically. To my mind, it makes far more sense 
to take heed of the wisdom evinced by the rich multi-disciplinary literature on 
neoliberalism and, in the words of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, move the theory 
“rather closer to the ground”30 by grappling with the messy geographically and 
temporally specific “field of real forces,”—a hybrid network conjugating racialized and 
gendered bodies, technical machines involving human and non-human components, the 
built environment, culturally specific ways of knowing, representing and thinking, and so 
on—which actualizes neoliberalism as a process of becoming which significantly affects 
contemporary prospects for democracy.  
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I attempted to follow this method in the previous chapter by focusing in on the 
specific politico-economic work debt performs as a component of neoliberal 
governmentality in the United States. While remaining within the realm of political 
theory, I followed the interplay of forces involved in a specific political technology in a 
limited spatio-temporal region—credit evaluation and creditor-debtor relation in the 
United States over the last few decades—in an attempt to better understand one of the 
strategically important ways in which neoliberalism works. I did so with the intention of 
showing how this phenomenon has been able to take hold of and reshape American 
political and economic life to the degree that it has. As a political theorist enmeshed in 
the field of forces comprising neoliberal governmentality, I follow Foucault’s proviso 
that the best my work can do is offer “tactical pointers: key points, lines of force, 
constrictions and blockages that might prove useful to those engaged in specific 
struggles.”31 Taking this approach means that one cannot deal with all the dynamics and 
effects of neoliberalism in one article, book, or book series; it does not admit to the 
reductionist abstractions of grand theory or lend itself easily to an all-encompassing 
answer to the question “What is to be done?”  
However, Brown does not even attempt to give provisional answers to this 
question. After cataloguing neoliberalism’s cancerous effect on democracy, she appears 
to throw up her hands in defeat. Her primary focus on the “grammar and terms of 
[neoliberal] rationality and on the mechanisms of its dissemination and interpelletive 
power," terms and mechanisms which, she well knows, are designed to leave one with the 
                                                 
31 Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population, 3.  
4 | Toward the Abolition of Indebted Democracy 
175 
 
perception that “There is No Alternative,”32 end up leaving Brown and her reader—
surprise?—with no viable alternative.33 As she says, her critique of “neoliberalization 
does not resolve into a call to rehabilitate liberal democracy, nor, on the other hand, does 
it specify what kind of democracy might be crafted from neoliberal regimes to resist 
them.”34  
While she admits that neoliberal rationality is “buttressed by concrete policies,” it 
does not appear to be worth examining these policies or even reversing them because, in 
her estimation, the “deleterious effects of neoliberal reason on democracy” would 
continue apace unless it were totally replaced with another “order of political and social 
reason.”35 Focusing on changing local practices or policies in order to gradually change 
hearts and minds appears to be out of the question. Brown admits that she and much of 
the “Euro-Atlantic Left” appear to be tied up in “paralyzing conundrums” leaving them 
unable to “articulate a road out or a viable global alternative.”36  
A second major flaw in Undoing, and more to the point of this chapter, is how 
Brown theorizes democracy itself. She prefaces her remarks by saying that “democracy” 
is one of “the most contested and promiscuous terms in our modern political 
vocabulary.”37 In the popular imaginary, what it is that democracy stands for runs the 
gamut from free elections to free markets, from the right to protest to the rule of law, 
from “the voice of the assembled multitude to the protection of individuality.”38 She 
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points to the ambiguous Greek etymology of the term “democracy” which translates as 
“people rule” or “rule by the people,” which has inspired numerous debates as to who 
“the people” are and what exactly is meant by “rule.”39 With this in mind, it is 
unfortunate that Brown chooses to punt on the question of how to robustly specify the 
version of democracy she would like to support and defend against the onslaught by the 
economizing forces of neoliberalism. Instead she refers to a stripped down conception of 
“bare” democracy: the “political form in which the whole of the people rule the polity 
and hence themselves.”40 She intimates that she does this by design because she wishes 
to “release democracy from containment by any particular form while insisting on its 
value in connoting political self-rule by the people, whoever the people are.”41 For 
Brown then, the “bare promise of bare democracy,” is that it “affords without 
guaranteeing the possibility that power will be wielded on behalf of the many, rather than 
the few, that all might be regarded as ends, rather than means, and that all may have a 
political voice.” 42 
Brown clearly seeks to rally support against neoliberalism from all the warring 
factions in democratic theory by showing that even the barest conception of democracy is 
under assault. This is a canny rhetorical technique; however Brown is very quick to drop 
this more ecumenical definition of bare democracy in favor of “contemporary liberal 
democracy.”43 Despite all the flavors of democracy to choose from, Brown seems most 
concerned with defending its liberal instantiation despite its “formalism, privatism, 
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individualism, and relative complacency about capitalism.”44 Indeed, Brown is at pains to 
admit liberal democracy’s flaws:  
Liberal democracy's imbrication with privileges, inequalities, and 
exclusions is masked through explicit formulations such as equality before 
the law and freedom based in rights and through a trove of tacit precepts 
such as moral autonomy and abstract personhood. Together, these precepts 
secure unequal and unfree social, cultural, and economic life as they 
disavow their intersection with entrenched divisions of labor and class 
stratifications and their mobilization of norms of personhood heavily 
inflected by race, gender, and culture.45 
 
Liberalism’s sins are many indeed, but Brown thinks it may be absolved because, unlike 
neoliberalism, it still manages to hold out the democratic ideals of freedom, equality, and 
popular sovereignty as yet-to-be realized principles. As Brown argues, despite liberal 
democracy’s disavowals of the actual practices maintaining class stratifications, gender 
inequality and color lines, these disavowals produce “dissonances”—for instance 
“between paeans to freedom and equality, on the one hand, and lived realities of 
exploitation and poverty, on the other—that have inspired political imaginaries that 
exceed “liberal democratic precepts” and seek to “realize a democracy precluded by its 
liberal form.”46 She draws from the early Marx here suggesting that bourgeois calls for 
political emancipation based on abstract rights of liberty and equality contained the germ 
that would or could eventually catalyze the overcoming of entrenched economic and 
social inequalities and forms of domination.47 The divide in liberal democracy between 
its lofty principles and the cruel exigencies of its actual existence, provides, per Brown, 
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“the scene of paradox . . . that social movements of every kind have exploited for more 
than three centuries.”48  
While it is true that liberal democracy’s rhetoric of universal equality and freedom 
for all has been adopted as a weapon by abolitionist movements, revolting slaves, the 
women’s suffrage and liberation movements, the black freedom movement, gay rights 
activists and many others, it is also true that these principles have been able to coexist 
with the ongoing genocide of indigenous peoples, racial slavery, indebted servitude, 
gender inequality, sexual violence, Jim Crow segregation, and mass incarceration, to 
name only a few of the most glaring instances. Liberal democracy may be too capacious. 
Thus it is strange for Brown to claim that while democracy “does not require absolute 
social and economic equality . . . it cannot withstand large and fixed extremes of wealth 
and poverty, because these undermine the work of legislating in common.” 49 Liberal 
democracy has withstood fixed extremes of wealth and poverty, especially poverty 
concentrated among those classified as not belonging to the white race, since long before 
the last three or four decades of neoliberalism. Indeed, despite the gains in public higher 
education and subsidized housing for some in what Brown calls the “golden age” of the 
North American twentieth century, these gains were segregated by the color line.50  
  Hence, despite my agreement that neoliberal governmentality is a significant 
threat to democratic imaginaries and the remaining strains of democratic rule in the 
United States, I contest Brown’s insistence that the liberal democratic imaginary is the 
only game in town and must be saved at all costs. She asks, “if . . . neoliberal reason is 
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evacuating these ideals and desires from actually existing liberal democracies, from what 
platform would more ambitious democratic projects be launched? How would the desire 
for more or better democracy be kindled from the ash heap of its bourgeois form?”51 My 
response to these queries is that seeking to preserve democracy by fighting neoliberalism 
with liberalism is apt to fail. Brown’s account fails to fully grasp that in America, the 
question of who counts as the “people” in the democratic formula of “rule by the people” 
matters a great deal, even in the economized and depoliticized neoliberal era. Thus, it is 
my contention that, in failing to address the geo-temporal specificity and embodied 
governmentality of American neoliberalism and its accompanying strain of democracy, 
Brown’s political vision misses the centrality of debt to the antidemocratic neoliberal 
project, as well as the continuity between neoliberal and liberal democracies as racial 
projects operating on, albeit in different forms, the supremacy of the white citizen. 
While she is careful to acknowledge the cultural, gender, and racial oppression 
inherent in liberal democracy, she appears to make these issue secondary to the more 
pressing issues of class inequality and the economization of the political imaginary. This 
deflates important realities in the United States. As I’ve tried to show in the previous two 
chapters, racism, the stigmatization of blackness, and white supremacy have all been 
central to the political economy of capitalism in America, and as I will argue here, they 
must remain central to any analysis of the fate of democracy under the influence of 
neoliberalism and its modes of indebted control. This is not just important to understand 
for diagnosing the ills wrought by neoliberal governmentality; it is essential for 
theorizing and organizing an alternative democratic project. This is evidenced in Brown’s 
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account: by the end of Undoing, she seems demoralized, desperately clinging to an 
admittedly fraught conception of liberal democracy. There is no alternative democratic 
imaginary in sight, nor any concrete or even inchoate ideas for actions or modes of 
resistance to neoliberalism’s anti-democratic infrastructure of control and hegemonic 
model of subject formation.   
In order to avoid this trap and effectively diagnose the current plight of neoliberal 
American democracy, I seek to account for the twinned forces of debt and race, and, in so 
doing, offer a political vision of democracy surpassing the boundaries of the liberal 
imaginary. To do so, I am informed by two strains of radical democratic theory. First, I 
draw on William Connolly’s theorization of democracy in The Ethos of Pluralization, in 
which he engages the work of C. B. Macpherson and the debate between representational 
and participatory visions of democracy.52 Like Macpherson, Connolly is critical of liberal 
pluralist democratic theories, such as those of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl, that 
attempt to submerge and downplay the role of democratic participation as inefficient and 
potentially dangerous in favor of “settled modes of democratic representation,” which 
depend on the predictable apathy of the masses and which produce and legitimate he calls 
an “equilibrium in inequality.”53 As Connolly argues, under this “equilibrium model,” 
democracy “becomes a vehicle for rationalizing and legitimating the limited capacity of 
the state to represent citizens within the existing class structure.”54 Neoliberals profess a 
more extreme version of this view, advocating a strong state as the primary agent of the 
market, while keeping the power of the democratic majority relatively impotent, lest it 
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attempt to advocate policies that run counter to market outcomes.55 As Hayek remarked 
in an address to the Mont Pélerin Society in 1966, “Liberalism and democracy, although 
compatible, are not the same . . . [A state] demanding unlimited power of the majority, 
has essentially become anti-liberal.”56 More recently, mainstream commentators such as 
Fareed Zakaria continue to popularize the view that an “excess of democracy” is the main 
threat to individual liberty and freedom. 57 This line suggests that, in the neoliberal view, 
it is the demos and not capital that needs restraining. 
Connolly joins Macpherson in contesting the equilibrium model of democracy (in 
both its liberal and neoliberal forms) with a vision of a democratic society that valorizes 
participation as a means of reducing social and economic inequality. However, Connolly 
goes beyond Macpherson by insisting that equality must be pursued in a way that “does 
not undermine either existing cultural pluralism or future possibilities of democratic 
pluralization.”58 Put differently, this means that a “pluralizing democracy,” advocated by 
Connolly, “is the site of tension or ambi-valence between politics as general action to 
sustain the economic and cultural conditions of existing plurality and the dissonant 
politics of pluralization.”59 I take Connolly to mean that we must theorize democracy not 
just in terms of an institutionalized forms of rule and governance by the people in its 
existing configuration, but as a politics that is capacious enough to affirm and facilitate 
processes of pluralization within the “demos,” and to nourish social movements that seek 
to disrupt inherited power relations and cultural norms. As Connolly puts it, in a 
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pluralizing and egalitarian democracy, the “politics of governance” must share the 
honorable position with “social movements that disrupt the sense of completeness, 
closure, and moral innocence in dominant formations.”60  
This “ambi-valent” conception of democracy also contains what Connolly calls a 
“constitutive ambiguity” in the way it conceives of the democratic citizen.61 While 
representative democracy constitutes the citizen as a member whose role/right is to vote 
periodically in the election of his or her representatives, for Connolly, citizenship 
connotes much more than periodically giving one’s consent to those who rule in one’s 
stead. Democratic citizens are also active “political agents who can question, interrogate, 
doubt, dissent, protest, organize, resist, disturb, prod, and disrupt fixed priorities, as well 
as mandate and obey general laws.”62 The contending dimensions of democratic 
politics—at once a mode of political rule and a mode of its disturbance and 
transformation—are embodied within the same political subject: the “citizen/dissident” 
who may act as a “participant in representational politics of the state and as activist in 
social movements that interrogate previous patterns of settlement in the state and other 
social institutions.”63 Maintaining this vital tension between contending valences of 
citizenship, for Connolly, “constitutes the perfection of democratic politics.”64 
Connolly’s theorization of democracy as requiring both government through 
representative institutions and active citizens participating in pluralizing social 
movements that challenge and unsettle previous power relations, identities and norms 
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provides us with a framework from which to evaluate the effects of the neoliberal debt 
regime on contemporary American democracy. I will take up this work in the next two 
sections as we examine how debt affects democracy and citizenship at different scales 
and speeds. However, Connolly, despite his focus on the intersections between identity, 
political economy, democratic citizenship and pluralization, does not give us all the 
conceptual tools we need to grasp debt as a force working within the neoliberal variant of 
racial capitalism in the United States.   
While Connolly does address the politics of racial resentment and white 
supremacy in Ethos of Pluralization and in his later work,65 he does not go so far as to 
describe the United States a “Herrenvolk democracy”—a political order that is 
“democratic for the master race but tyrannical for subordinate groups”66—whose ideals 
of equality, freedom, and citizenship have been segregated and reserved in large part to 
benefit those considered to be white. I believe that an abolitionist perspective that takes 
race, racism, and white supremacy as the central objects of its political analysis and 
critique is indispensable for identifying the intersections of debt and race and democratic 
theory. For this reason, I bring Connolly into conversation with democratic theorists 
working in the black radical tradition. In particular, I draw on the late Joel Olson’s 
theorization of America as a “white democracy” and his call to undo white privilege by 
taking up the political project that W. E. B. Du Bois called the “abolition-democracy.” 
The black radical tradition, encompassing work by Du Bois, C. L. R. James, James 
Baldwin, Angela Davis, Cedric Robinson, and many others, attunes us from the outset to 
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the shortcomings of the colorblind frame of liberal democratic theory by insisting on the 
primacy of race as an organizing principle of the democratic polity and capitalist political 
economy. As James Baldwin argues, “Color is not a human or a personal reality; it is a 
political reality.”67 In the words of Cedric Robinson, whose concept of “racial 
capitalism” we encountered in chapter two, the black radical tradition emerged from “a 
revolutionary consciousness that proceeded from the whole historical experience of Black 
people and not merely from the social formations of capitalist slavery or the relations of 
production of colonialism.”68 In the words of Fred Moten: “the history of blackness is 
testament to the fact that objects can and do resist.”69 This is resistance from within what 
Christina Sharpe names “the wake”: a conception (and effort to awaken consciousness) of 
black being as occupying and being occupied by “the continuous and changing present of 
slavery’s as yet unresolved unfolding.”70 To the experience of being “in the wake” of 
racial capitalism and colonialism, we must add the historical experience of people of 
color living in the position of “anticitizens” in the white democracies of Europe and the 
United States. 
 Starting from the presumption that race is a political category, Olson argues that 
while racial oppression makes full democracy impossible, “it has also made American 
democracy possible.”71 Olson and black radical scholars challenge the notion that 
democracy is an unsullied ideal and unassailable solution to the problems of social 
inequality and racial oppression. Instead, they consider democracy itself to be a living 
                                                 
67 Baldwin, James. “The Fire Next Time,” Collected Essays. New York: Library of America, 1998. 345-6. 
68 Robinson, Cedric J. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel Hill, N.C: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000, 169. 
69 Quoted in Sharpe, Christina Elizabeth, In the Wake: On Blackness and Being. Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2016, 76. 
70 Ibid., 13-4. 
71 Olson, The Abolition of White Democracy, xii, xv.  
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political problem, the “rough-and-tumble product” of ongoing power struggles, the 
results of which have historically premised equality among whites upon the degraded and 
unequal status of non-whites, freedom upon evolving forms of racialized forced labor and 
enslavement, and the protections of citizenship upon the political disenfranchisement and 
abjection of racialized anticitizens rendered illegal, criminal, or indebted.72 This is 
American democracy as theorized by thinkers like Du Bois, Baldwin, and Sharpe, from 
the position as “no-citizen . . . [as] Black peoples in the wake with no state or nation to 
protect [them], with no citizenship bound to be respected . . . Black life lived in, as, 
under, despite Black death.” 73  
With this in mind, Olson argues that democratic theory must exceed “the limits 
set by the white imagination,” which presumes that “the system of rights and 
representations established in the Herrenvolk and post-civil rights eras are the highest 
political form attainable.”74 We see an example of this in Brown’s colorblind critique of 
neoliberalism and resigned defense of liberal democracy. Olson would point out that 
Brown is not alone in this view; contemporary democratic theory is “pervaded by a 
chastened conception of democracy that appears resigned to liberalism.”75 By contrast, 
the black radical tradition offers a critical perspective and transformative vision of 
democracy that exceeds the white imagination and, according to Michael Dawson, 
                                                 
72 Ibid., xvi-xvii. For examples of the transformations in forced labor practices see Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. For citizenship premised on disenfranchisement, see Dilts, Andrew. Punishment and 
Inclusion: Race, Membership, and the Limits of American Liberalism. First edition. Just Ideas. New York: 
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73 Sharpe, In the Wake, 22. 
74 Olson, The Abolition of White Democracy, 128. 
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“cannot be confined within the boundaries of liberalism.”76 Whence does this alternative 
political vision emerge? James Baldwin remarks:  
The American Negro has the great advantage of having never believed that 
collection of myths to which white Americans cling: that their ancestors 
were all freedom-loving heroes, that they were born in the greatest country 
the world has ever seen, . . . that Americans have always dealt honorably 
with Mexicans and Indians and all other neighbors and inferiors . . . Negroes 
know far more about white Americans than that.77 
 
Indeed, Baldwin relates that despite what they know and despite the abuse they have 
endured, African Americans tend to “dismiss white people as the slightly mad victims of 
their own –brainwashing.”78  
For his part, Robinson identifies the black radical tradition as emerging from 
uncompromising revolutionary figures such as Toussaint L’Ouverture (Haiti), Samuel 
Sharpe (Jamaica), and Nat Turner (United States) who drew from their own African 
heritage that had been sustained covertly in the New World as the religions of the 
oppressed—“obeah, voodoo, myalism, pocomania”—to inspire forms of escape, 
maronnage, and eventually violent insurrection79 as means of total rejection of the 
conditions of slavery, colonization, and efforts by their masters to normalize black 
identification with slave status, docility, subordination, and dependency.80 Robinson 
argues that radical forms of black collective action drawing from non-Western cultural 
roots and solidarities pursued freedom in the only way possible under conditions of 
slavery and white supremacy: “They lived on their terms, they died on their terms, they 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 131. 
77 Baldwin, “The Fire Next Time,” 344. 
78 Ibid. 
79 In this regard, Robinson is keen to assert that the history of black radicalism is marked by the peculiar 
absence of violence; indeed far less violence than contemporary white observers understood their situation 
to require. Robinson, Black Marxism, 168.  
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obtained their freedom on their terms.”81 Drawing on the wisdom gained by those who 
engaged in collective struggle (quite often leading to their own demise) against the self-
deluded beneficiaries of white supremacy, democracy may therefore be reinterpreted as 
“something that white citizens have contributed to yet compromised and that anticitizens 
have advanced.”82  
Drawing on the critical lens afforded by this democratic tradition, Olson makes 
the claim that America has been and continues to be a “white democracy,” that is “a 
polity ruled in the interests of a white citizenry and characterized by simultaneous 
relations of equality and privilege: equality among whites, who are privileged in relation 
to those who are not white.”83 Whiteness here is not conceived as a genetic inheritance 
based on skin color or European ancestry, but a form of self-arrogated political privilege 
and standing premised on the denial of black humanity, and used to justify black 
subjugation.84 Referencing the work of Lerone Bennett and Alain Locke, Olson specifies 
that “a white person is a person called white by other whites. The antithesis of ‘white’ is 
‘not-white,’ a category of subordination that has been occupied by various peoples and 
social identities throughout American history.”85 Crucially then, citizenship and 
whiteness are intertwined in American democracy. Keeping this in mind, the political 
challenge and imperative becomes the subversion of white privilege and “no less than the 
abolition of white citizenship itself.”86  
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What exactly would this entail? Du Bois lays out his vision of the “abolition-
democracy” by contrasting it to what we would understand today as the “American 
Dream,” which he calls the “American Assumption”: the assumption “that wealth is 
mainly the result of its owner’s effort and that any average worker can by thrift become a 
capitalist.”87 According to Lawrie Balfour, “the American Assumption distanced 
successive generations from the wrong of slavery and denied that those who profited 
from that wrong bore any ongoing responsibility for it.”88 Hence, the American 
Assumption serves as the foundational myth of white democracy: it safeguards whites’ 
collective delusion of innocence by disavowing the political power of race. This myth 
presupposes a level social and economic playing field, a belief that is made possible by 
whites’ stubborn disregard for “the exceptional position of a freed slave,” a position, as 
we saw in chapter two, in which freedom for black Americans was synonymous with 
indebted servitude, criminalization, disenfranchisement and gratuitous white violence.89  
 In the 19th century, abolitionists questioned the universality of the American 
Assumption because they “saw the danger of slavery to both capital and labor,” believed 
that “freedom in order to be free required a minimum of capital in addition to political 
rights,” and therefore advocated training “Negroes in intelligence, experience and labor, 
                                                 
context,” and misconstruing “racial domination as a problem of exclusion (for which the solution is 
inclusion) rather than a problem of privilege (for which the solution is abolition)” (xxiii-iv). Connolly’s 
pluralistic approach rightly valorizes the inclusion of the previously excluded in the demos, but it does not 
explicitly promote the abolition of the privileges of whiteness, without which, I wager, the prospects for the 
radical democratic change Connolly advocates remain severely limited. In drawing Connolly and Olson 
together, I hold that both perspectives have something valuable to offer in terms of diagnosing neoliberal 
forms of domination and promoting radically anti-racist and abolitionist democratic politics, despite the 
evident tensions between the two theoretical frameworks.   
87 Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk 
Played In the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy In America, 1860-1880. New York: Russell & Russell, 
1962, 183.  
88 Balfour, Katharine Lawrence, Democracy's Reconstruction: Thinking Politically with W.E.B. Du 
Bois. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 30. 
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the ownership of land and capital, and the exercise of civil rights and the use of political 
power.”90 As Du Bois, Olson, Sharpe, and others argue, since Emancipation Black people 
have been continuously confronted with innumerable obstacles (and chief among those 
we will consider being the force of indebtedness) preventing them from “escaping the 
limbo between slavery and citizenship.”91 As Balfour argues, Du Bois’ conception of 
democracy is one in which there is an “absence of gross inequality or the dependency that 
accompanies it. Democratic citizenship, for Du Bois, entails at least a basic education and 
the economic wherewithal to live a relatively comfortable life free from unearned debt.”92 
To be free from “unearned debt”—debt which we now understand to be the poisoned 
fruit of the “gift of freedom” explored in chapter two—is indeed an important 
precondition to realizing an abolition-democracy. Du Bois understood that economic self-
sufficiency, education, and suffrage were all essential to a democracy in which all 
citizens—regardless of race—could participate in governing their own affairs, and that all 
these conditions were severely handicapped by the grinding conditions of black indebted 
servitude instituted through sharecropping and convict-leasing in the postbellum South.93  
However, Olson alerts us to the other side of this equation: an abolition-
democracy must also be free of unearned credit. American democracy is corrupted by the 
tyrannical power of the self-anointed “white” race; a power by which whites enjoy, as it 
were, an a priori line of credit—what I will call here white credit—e.g. whiteness as a 
presupposed badge of moral rectitude, economic creditworthiness and full political 
citizenship, which is predicated on maintaining the degraded, indebted, and inferior status 
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of blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, and other non-whites. This “present-past”94 divide 
between white creditor/citizens and non-white debtor/anticitizens gives the lie to the 
American Assumption, and suggests important contemporary linkages and resonances 
between the moral, economic, and political valences of debt and the abolition of white 
democracy, which we will explore in what follows. 
 In the next two sections we examine in more depth the problem of white credit 
and citizenship in the colorblind neoliberal polity and the ways in which this (disavowed) 
racialized model of neoliberal citizenship couples with infrastructures of indebted control 
to induce both the slow and rapid death of democratic visions, institutions and practices 
for citizens on both sides of the color-line. In doing so, we must attend to the effects of 
racialized creditor-debtor relations on both of the essential aspects of democracy 
highlighted by Connolly: the side of citizen participation in formal democratic processes 
and institutions as well as the dissident movements of a fugitive demos comprised of 
those marked as citizens and non-citizens, who seek to pluralize and transform settled 
distributions of power and disenfranchising norms. 
  
 
II. White Credit and the Slow Death of an Indebted Democracy 
 
 To understand how race and debt are simultaneously maintaining the 
contemporary United States as a species of white democracy, while undermining the 
pluri-potentiality of democracy as a living political problem—the assemblage of norms, 
                                                 
94 The notion of “present-past” is taken from Du Bois. I suggest that this divide is “present-past” because 
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practices, and imaginaries that have and may continue to inspire movements toward the 
actualization of more radical and less compromised forms of democracy—it is helpful to 
begin by examining the intersection of citizenship, whiteness, and credit. We begin with 
Du Bois’ analysis of how race, and in particular whiteness and white citizenship, has 
been deployed as a “racial bribe”95 since America’s inception to undermine class 
solidarity among whites and non-whites. Speaking about the Reconstruction-era South, 
Du Bois remarks:  
It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received 
a low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological 
wage [my emphasis]. They were given public deference and titles of 
courtesy because they were white. . . . Their vote selected public officials, 
and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great 
effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them. . . . On 
the other hand, in the same way, the Negro was subject to public insult; was 
afraid of mobs; was liable to the jibes of children and the unreasoning fear 
of white women; and was compelled almost continuously to submit to 
various badges of inferiority.”96  
 
While Du Bois discusses the 19th and early 20th centuries, the invention of whiteness and 
its strategic deployment to divide the labor force in the Americas go at least as far back in 
history as the 17th century Virginia colony and the events of Bacon’s rebellion.97  
Whiteness is spoken about by Du Bois and others as a type of “wage” or “bribe” 
that is paid to all people considered to be white regardless of social status, in order to 
diffuse class tensions by maintaining the feeling of superiority of the white racial group 
                                                 
95 Citing the work of historian Edmund Morgan, Michelle Alexander uses the term “racial bribe” to 
describe how, in the wake of an interracial rebellion of debt bondsman led by Nathanial Bacon, the planter 
class deliberately and strategically “extended special privileges to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge 
between them and black slaves.” See Alexander, Michelle, and Cornel West. The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. Revised edition. New York: New Press, 2012, and Morgan, 
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97 See Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 24-5. For more on Bacon’s Rebellion, see Edmund Morgan’s 
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over all non-whites.98 However, we might consider whiteness more appropriately, 
especially today, as a generous line of credit extended by way of an ex ante granting of 
deference, titles of courtesy, full and unquestioned citizenship status, property rights and 
leniency in all legal matters to those identified as white.99 The phenomenon which David 
Roediger calls the “wages of whiteness”100 and Joel Olson refers to as “white 
citizenship”—a public, psychological and material marker of privilege granting a white 
person “the enjoyment of all the rights accorded citizens including suffrage, the right to 
join political parties, access to desired jobs, the ability to compete in an unrestricted 
market, the capacity to sit on juries, the right to enjoy public accommodations, and the 
right to consider oneself the equal of any other”101—I would like to consider in terms of 
credit and debt.  
If we reflect for a moment on how Du Bois describes the ways in which whiteness 
and blackness divide members of the same social strata who, according to Marx, should 
be class allies in solidarity against capitalist exploitation, we can see that race functions 
more as a form of credit or debt than it does as a wage. A wage is normally understood as 
an agreed-upon amount paid in compensation for work performed, usually for some 
period of labor-time, and usually agreed upon between employer and employee in a legal 
contract.102 However, what Du Bois describes—a “public and psychological wage” 
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granting deference, courtesy and political rights on the one hand, and denoting someone 
with inferior status and “no rights which the white man was bound to respect”103 on the 
other hand—appears closer to a moral evaluation of creditworthiness than it does the 
payment of a wage. Recall Marx’s discussion of credit from the previous chapter in 
which he argued that credit appeared to unsettle the terms of classical political economy 
because it functioned based on an economic judgment of “the morality of man” and, 
indeed, his “entire existence,” rather than as a payment in exchange for the labor he 
performed.104 Moreover, to be judged as one without credit, Marx says, was not just to be 
deemed poor, but to be viewed pejoratively as “without trust,” “a social pariah, a bad 
man.”105 Thus, we can see how this Marxian view of credit (not to mention our analysis 
in the first chapter of Nietzsche and Weber’s discussion of how moral estimations of 
creditworthiness served as the basis for evaluating the fitness of a “spiritual aristocracy” 
of Protestant Christians) maps onto Du Bois’ discussion of the wages of whiteness and 
anti-wages of blackness, with whiteness acting as a badge of good credit, while blackness 
marks its bearer as one as without credit, without trust, without standing (in the eyes of 
the white creditors) – a mark of indebtedness, pariah-status and social death. 
White credit here is equated with enjoying full citizenship rights and equal status 
with all other whites, while it affords superior status over those without credit, i.e., non-
whites whose lack of whiteness leaves them both racially inferior and irredeemably 
indebted. Indeed, white citizenship and white democracy are premised on the 
irredeemability of blackness; and this in spite of the vast evidence of the unimpeachable 
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and creditworthy economic, moral, and political conduct of actual black people. On this 
point, Du Bois quotes South Carolinian W. P. Calhoun: “Character, wealth, learning, 
good behavior, and all that makes up or constitutes good citizenship in the black man is 
positively to no avail whatever. Merit cannot win in this case.”106 Thus, white supremacy 
requires that blacks remain existentially in the position of the debtor, because white credit 
does not guarantee that all whites will be successful, but it does ensure “that no white 
citizen will ever be thrown down to the absolute bottom of the social hierarchy.”107 The 
absolute bottom is reserved for blacks, Latinos, Native peoples, and other people of color.  
In an important dynamic which Olson calls the “cross-class alliance,” whiteness 
acts as a “consolation prize,” a redemptive line of credit, in exchange for which, 
“working-class whites acquiesce to the domination of the political and economic system 
by powerful elites.”108 He argues that maintaining this special status, rather than 
challenging class hierarchies, has been the primary focus of white citizen’s political 
energies at least since Reconstruction, and that the enticements of white credit continue to 
stunt the white democratic imaginary, leading to passive and conservative conceptions of 
citizenship, freedom and equality that favor the status quo.109 Du Bois argues that this 
cross-class alliance among whites has had ruinous effects for the prospects of democracy 
not just in the United States, but the world over.110 
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The question then becomes: how do white credit and white citizenship continue to 
function in the wake of events representing great progress for racial equality in the U.S. 
such as the civil rights movement and the presidency of Barack Obama? In 2013 the 
Black Lives Matter movement (BLM) incited public outcry on social media and 
organized demonstrations in response to the vigilante murder of a black teenager, 
Trayvon Martin, and the succession of highly publicized police murders of black men, 
women and children that followed in 2014 and 2015. 2016 saw the election of Donald 
Trump to the presidency after an unprecedented campaign notable for overtly racist and 
misogynistic remarks and the dog-whistle white supremacist slogan “Make America 
Great Again.” Before these events of the last five years, and especially during the 8-year 
term of President Obama, many thought America had finally moved beyond race into a 
truly post-racial era.111 Indeed, it appeared to critical observers like Wendy Brown and 
others that unprecedented income inequality and the encroaching economization 
associated with neoliberalism were the true threats to contemporary democracy.  
Recall that for Brown, it is the shift, stemming from the work of Chicago School 
economist Gary Becker, to viewing the state as an enterprise and citizens as “human 
capital” that is the clear and present danger for democracy. Once governments and 
institutions view themselves as businesses and citizens are viewed as fungible human 
capital (entrepreneurial investors in themselves and their own capacities), citizens are 
expected to fend for themselves and governments are able to justify offloading or 
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devolving their duties to protect citizens’ rights, to provide for healthcare, education and 
welfare, and to maintain public spaces and infrastructures (duties, it should be noted, that 
were impressed on the state as a result of hard fought political struggles won by the 
working class). In this scenario, the values of egalitarianism, mutual aid, and militant 
political engagement in defining one’s own troubles and possibilities—what Connolly 
calls a “democratic ethos”—give way to the new normal of competition, inequality, and 
precarity. Labor as a category disappears into capital, and class along with it.  
While these developments are indeed troubling, it is important to note that state 
support for health, wealth, safety, education, and equal protection under the law, could 
never be assumed by black American citizens; neither before the neoliberal turn, nor 
after. The same could be said for Native American, Latino, and Asian American citizens 
as well as other non-whites. The golden era of post-WWII welfare liberalism hearkened 
back to by Brown and other critics of contemporary neoliberal politics was also the era of 
Jim Crow segregation in the South and redlining in the North. Furthermore, being treated 
as a form of more or less valuable but dehumanized “capital,” as I noted in the previous 
chapter, is something that has figured the African American experience since slavery. 
And being excluded from the white dominated labor movement and from class 
solidarities has long been par for the course for non-whites.  
Consequently, the changes associated with neoliberal citizenship identified by 
Brown in many ways amount to a downgrading of white democracy. In other words, 
poor, working and middle-class white Americans are moving closer to the way in which 
black and other non-white citizens have been treated since the end of slavery, while the 
wealthiest tier of whites continue to enjoy full citizenship rights and protections. My 
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contention here is that what conspires to destabilize the privileges and powers of the 
white citizen and to do continued and compounded harm to the non-white citizen in the 
neoliberal era is their collective positioning as debtors, leading to their disciplining and 
political disempowerment via the techniques of surveillance and control we encountered 
in the previous chapter.  
The great irony here is that a large segment of white citizens have conspired and 
consented to fundamentally denature and undermine their own citizenship rights, popular 
sovereignty, public goods and to take on unprecedented levels of personal and public 
debt—to the lucrative benefit of the corporate and financial elite—in order to safeguard 
their white credit and keep non-whites in a subordinate social status. This is evidenced by 
the continued effectiveness of the racial bribe in what has come to be known as the 
“Southern Strategy.” The Southern Strategy, beginning with Nixon’s call for “law and 
order” in response to student and civil rights protests in the late 1960s, and perfected by 
Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, was a campaign strategy in which conservative Republican 
candidates appealed to “oftentimes coded but sometimes overtly, racist messages directed 
at disaffected whites.”112 As Joshua Inwood argues, “Far from seeing the Southern 
Strategy as new, we should instead see it as a contemporary manifestation of a ‘racial fix’ 
that restores historic class and race alliances between poor and working-class whites with 
economic elites who had become destabilized through the US Great Depression and the 
growth of the Keynesian state.”113 In other words, the Southern Strategy restored the 
cross-class alliance identified by Du Bois and Olson as central to the “American racial 
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order” in that it “ensured the social stability of American democracy by reconciling 
political equality with economic exploitation through a system of racial privilege and 
subordination.”114  
What was different than before was that, as a result of the Black freedom struggle 
of the 1960s and the U.S.’s desire to legitimate its claim to global leadership in the Cold 
War era, the Federal government had become a guarantor of minority rights, and at least 
in its official discourse, made a “normative commitment to racial equality.”115 The 
Southern Strategy restored the white cross-class alliance in favor a neoliberal 
governmentality that would dismantle the welfare state and public institutions now 
contributing to black social equality in favor of “color-blind,” market-based and 
privatized governmental solutions that rewarded individual merit and entrepreneurial 
initiative.116 As Lee Atwater, one of the architects of Reagan’s Southern Strategy 
candidly put it: 
 [Y]ou start out in 1954 by saying ‘nigger, nigger, nigger,’ [but] by 1968 you can’t 
say nigger, that hurts you, backfires, so you say stuff like ‘forced bussing,’ ‘states 
rights,’ and all that stuff. At this point, you’re getting so abstract now, you’re 
talking about cutting taxes, by this time you’re talking about all these economic 
things, and the by-product of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.117 
 
Reagan and his political strategists had discovered a “color-blind discourse” centered on 
“states’ rights,” cutting taxes, individual responsibility, law and order, and market 
freedom, which was essentially a “‘new way to speak about race that none-the-less had 
the same effect as previous overt racist discourses.”118  
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Neoliberals like Reagan were able to mobilize the white working class because 
they redefined race as something “pre-political”—a natural attribute of one’s identity 
with “no bearing on one’s political or economic life”— while playing up the American 
Assumption of the economy as a level playing ground where everyone should be able to 
get ahead based on entrepreneurial spirit and individual effort.119 At the same time, they 
directed white racial resentment toward the now desegregated state, castigating it as the 
realm of overpaid and corrupt bureaucrats funneling tax dollars into failing welfare 
programs designed to give handouts to the lazy and undeserving racialized poor – for 
instance Reagan’s infamous “welfare queen” with “80 names, 30 addresses [and] 12 
Social Security cards” enjoying a lavish lifestyle on the taxpayer’s dime.120   
What this neoliberal rhetoric elides is that despite the fact that whiteness as 
formalized unequal standing may have disappeared after the passage of civil and voting 
rights legislation in 1964 and 1965, whiteness still provided unearned racial credit in the 
private sphere and in the economy.121 In the transition from Herrenvolk to “color-blind” 
democracy, whiteness shifts from status to norm – from an individualized to an 
aggregative form of power in which standing is replaced by statistical advantages.122 
While the public and juridical power of the state now provided for formal equality 
between white and non-white citizens, the economic and social advantages accrued 
through generations of white credit were never abolished or redistributed through 
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reparations or some other mechanism.123 Thus, non-whites as a population continue to 
find themselves competing in a highly asymmetrical and disadvantaged position vis-à-vis 
whites:  
Poverty, violence, inferior schooling, poor health, high incarceration and 
unemployment rates, lack of assets, and substandard housing continue to 
disproportionately affect those who are not-white, while whites continue to 
disproportionately escape them. But because they are probabilities, not 
guarantees, the aggregate advantages of normalized whiteness hardly seem 
like privileges.124 
 
 While whites still enjoy a massive wealth advantage and major statistical advantages 
over non-whites in education, life expectancy, and political representation, the loss of 
guaranteed standing has bred a sense of injustice and resentment that has fueled white 
citizens’ self-destructive support for punitive neoliberal policy shifts and sowed the seeds 
of reactionary movements to “reestablish Herrenvolk forms of white privilege,” sprouting 
up most recently as support for Donald Trump and his nationalistic promise to “Make 
America Great Again.”125 
 I say “self-destructive” because the massive tax cuts, disciplining of unions, and 
cuts to public funding for education, social insurance and poverty reduction deployed by 
the neoliberal beneficiaries of the renewed cross-class alliance were made possible 
through the deregulation, expansion, and transformations of the debt economy explained 
in the previous chapter. As Maurizio Lazzarato succinctly puts it: “It is simple: if taxes 
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are being reduced while services are maintained, there is a need for the state to get 
indebted. There is no other way. . . .With neoliberalism, and this is even more clear since 
the 2007-2008 crisis, the Keynesian theory has been totally reversed as the state now 
represents a fundamental device allowing wealth to be transferred to creditors.”126 
Ballooning deficits at the federal and state levels were paralleled by the “democratization 
of credit” at the consumer level, whereby previously excluded poor and non-white 
constituencies were extended greater access to credit necessary to purchase homes, cars, 
and other goods that not only promised to improve their standard of living, but to 
encourage entrepreneurship and to bring about the post-racial dream of full social and 
economic citizenship.127 This did not just play out in the American domestic context but 
at a global scale, for instance through loans by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund to formerly colonized countries, which, in the words of former IMF chief 
Horst Köhler, were intended to “to make globalization work for all.”128 Moreover, the 
extension of “microcredit” in the Global South was extolled by institutions like the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh as a “human right” and humanitarian form of investment 
that would empower small-scale entrepreneurs, often women, to pull themselves out of 
poverty.129  
In all of these transformations wherein the extension of credit was supposed to aid 
in bringing democracy and economic prosperity to racialized and colonized peoples who 
had been excluded (both internally and externally) from the rights of citizenship, we 
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should recognize the imprimatur of the “gift of freedom.” As Mimi Thi Nguyen argues, 
what is “given” as the gift of freedom, here in the form of the extension of credit, is time: 
“time for the subject of freedom to resemble or ‘catch up to’ the modern observer, to 
accomplish what can be anticipated in a preordained future, whether technological 
progress, productive capacity, or rational government.”130 With the histories of whiteness 
as a badge of creditworthiness and full citizenship and blackness as a marker of 
irredeemable indebtedness and anti-citizenship in mind, we can see how the neoliberal 
profession of faith in entrepreneurship and ownership coupled with the material extension 
of credit, appeared as a turn toward finally allowing African Americans and other non-
white and formerly colonized groups to “catch up” to white modernity in terms of 
achieving the same economic and political standing as white citizens.  
However, just as manumission did not really grant self-possession, but instead 
inaugurated a new form of domination and subjection, so too did the time given by credit 
run out too soon. 131 The promised freedom proved to be a new form of predation, leaving 
in its wake the shackles of debt binding one, as it were, in the hold of the slave ship 
named Subprime.  If the gift of credit, and by extension freedom, gives time, it is also a 
demand of time, an enduring debt that “troubles the recipient far into the foreseeable 
future.”132 As Nguyen remarks, “what is given is time to diminish—but never to close—
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the distance between the anachronism and the modern, and time to linger under the 
lengthening shadow of debt.”133  
Operating via what I termed in the previous chapter a form of “blackboxed” 
racism, the inclusiveness of mortgage lending became a new tool of racialized 
dispossession harming both whites and non-whites, but on the disproportionate terms 
figured by the legacy of white credit. David Graeber points out that after a decade, 
microcredit projects in the Global South began to resemble the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis, complete with unscrupulous lenders, fraudulent appraisals, high interest rates, 
borrowers attempting to refuse payment, goons sent to seize assets, and an epidemic of 
suicides by poor farmers caught in debt traps that they could not possibly escape.134 Fred 
Moten captures the continuity here with previous eras of racial capitalism:  
What we want is always already unaffordable and, moreover, the 
financialization of everyday life was a plantation imposition. . . . [the 
subprime crisis] is also the disruption and resocialization of an already given 
crisis. . . .This disownership renewed an old experiment that moves at the 
intersection of squatting and ‘the imposition of severalty’ (the name 
Theodore Roosevelt gave to his plan to eradicate the Indian who was not 
vanishing quite fast enough by liberal conferral of the gift of private 
property). That imposition, updated and disseminated by George W. Bush 
in the name of the ‘ownership society’, was sanctioned by the hegemonic 
public–private partnership so that it could continue in its brutal, violent 
habit of enclosing our common capacity, insofar as we are one another’s 
means, to live beyond our means.135  
 
Democratic citizenship bought on (subprime) credit proves to be “alarmingly 
provisional,” as it is contingent upon “good governance” and disappears as a soon as the 
debt cannot be repaid.136  
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 In their groundbreaking study of neoliberal poverty governance, Joe Soss, Sanford 
Schram, and Richard Fording take note of this shift toward what they call a “paternalist 
conception of citizenship.”137 They argue that up until the neoliberal turn in the 1970s, 
the dominant vision of citizenship in the United States was in line with T.H. Marshall’s 
classic theory, where “civic duties such as voting and working attach to individuals 
because they possess membership rights.”138 This ideal of social citizenship prevailed in 
the circumscribed domain of Herrenvolk democracy in which whites were willing protect 
membership rights for all because citizenship, in practice if not in name, was the 
exclusive domain of whites. With the abolition of Herrenvolk democracy in the 1960s 
due to pressure from the Black freedom movement, the incipient neoliberal democracy 
that followed turned Marshallian citizenship on its head by coupling its vision of the 
political subject as homo oeconomicus with a “paternalist conception of citizenship” 
wherein “the fulfillment of obligations”— such as “self-reliance as a worker and self-
discipline as a community member”—become the preconditions for civic membership, 
rather than citizens’ “mutual engagement in a democratic mode of governance.”139 In 
other words, citizenship no longer conferred a set of rights to all members of the polity, 
but became a measurement of individuals’ and populations’ conformity to the norms of a 
fully marketized society – precisely the norms conducive to consumer debt repayment in 
the private sphere, and the maintenance of credit ratings for institutions and governments 
in the public sphere. 
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What traditional liberals like John Stuart Mill described as a lack of civilization 
among enslaved and colonized peoples, depicted as children or “barbarians” incapable of 
exercising free choice, becomes, for neoliberal paternalists, mismanagement, 
irresponsibility and a lack of “civic virtue,” evidenced by indebtedness and insolvency.140  
Poor and perpetually indebted individuals, populations, municipalities, or even sovereign 
states are not viewed as the “deserving” victims of structural forces beyond their control, 
but as free subjects responsible for their bad choices and lack of self-control. These 
supposed flaws in character or culture justify their subjection to a range of illiberal and 
anti-democratic disciplinary measures including heightened surveillance, continuous 
auditing, limited autonomy, seizure of assets, incarceration, forced labor (through 
“workfare” or prison labor) and in the case of cities and states, emergency takeover or 
military invasion.141  
As P. J. Brendese argues, part of the enduring legacy of racialized and colonial 
temporality is that “people of color are relegated to the status of being ‘out of time’ in 
multiple senses that include being perceived as anachronistic—or ‘outside’ of time—as 
well as subjected to the impositions upon their time that shorten and expropriate their 
lives to the point of literally having no time left.”142 This projection of anachronism lends 
itself to white paternalism and what Brendese calls “temporizing universalism”: strategies 
of power through which persons, populations or nations deemed to be in need of external 
care or uplift are kept in a subordinated position of dependency while being promised 
democratic equality, citizenship rights, or self-determination to be granted at a future date 
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that is indefinitely postponed.143 We are reminded here of the words of Isaac Brinkerhoff 
to the freedmen: “I believe that if you and your people will follow wise counsels, and try 
to do right and improve the advantages which you now have, you will become worthy 
and respected citizens of this great nation.”144 In this light, I suggest that indebtedness not 
only serves to disempower and produce dependency in its own right, but comes to serve 
as a deracialized index of blackness/anachronism used to justify paternalist forms of 
neoliberal control that impose a segregated “wait time” on democracy for indebted 
constituencies while exploitation, dispossession, mass incarceration, “slow death” by 
attrition and fast death at the hands of police continue apace.145  
That being said, it is important to remember that while neoliberal 
governmentality, indebted control, and paternalist citizenship are most destructive to 
people of color, white people and white democracy do not escape unscathed, either 
economically or politically. Far from it. The goal of “perpetual economic growth in 
pursuit of private affluence,” the infrastructure of debt-underwritten consumption and the 
paternalist market citizenship championed by neoliberals and supported at times by large 
segments of the white working and middle-classes have also left the majority of whites 
economically worse off and political disempowered.146 By subordinating the state and 
citizenship to the “verdict of the marketplace”147 as a means of perpetuating the cross-
class alliance to sustain white credit, white Americans denatured their own democratic 
institutions and citizenship rights, leaving formerly middle-class whites exposed to forms 
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of precarity and market brutality already quite familiar to poor whites and people of color 
– the colonized and commodified denizens of liberal empire and racial capitalism.  
The neoliberal program calls for maximum efficiency and productivity from 
workers coupled with deficit spending and the expansion of consumer credit to insulate 
corporations from having to cut into profits to raise wages. Many Americans must now 
rely on debt in order to afford higher education, to pay for medical bills, to afford daycare 
for their children, or even just to pay for rent and groceries. Many benefits that had been 
the social rights of citizenship are now contingent upon one’s ability to repay the debt 
taken out to afford them. Moreover, as Connolly rightly notes, the goal of “perpetual 
economic growth in pursuit of private affluence” under the new normal of heightened 
inequality, indebtedness and insecurity is “deadly for the prospects of a pluralizing 
democracy,” because promoting growth under “difficult conditions of realization” 
requires new techniques of discipline, regulation and surveillance to “control or 
neutralize those populations excluded from its benefits.”148 In the 21st century, the 
deployment of debt as a colonial technique of indirect control granting an illusory 
freedom while fostering a long-term power relation of political docility and economic 
dependency has come to encompass the majority of the American populace. 
 Neoliberal governmentality by indebted control cannot tolerate a democratic 
politics that goes beyond governance to include the risky and disruptive processes of 
pluralization deemed essential by Connolly. Debt is a means of isolating and shaming 
distinct classes of citizens so as to neutralize their potential for collective action and 
social movements, especially abolitionist movements like Black Lives Matter, Strike 
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Debt, which target the disciplinary, carceral, and violent intimidation measures used to 
maintain political quiescence and to shore up the cross-class alliance. Neoliberal 
governmentality redefines citizenship in terms of capital investment/debt repayment so as 
to make the “dissident” side of the citizen/dissident theorized by Connolly—an active 
form of citizen dissidence that would interrogate and challenge the institutionalization of 
the norms and power relations that I attempt to lay out here—unthinkable. In this respect, 
one may understand debt’s threat to contemporary democracy both in terms of its “slow 
violence”—“a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed 
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically 
not viewed as violence at all”—and its attempt to neutralize the pluralizing potential of 
democratic futurity.149  
Neoliberal governmentality, according to Lazzarato, in its equation of citizenship 
with the successful management of debt repayment, effectively seeks to protect the 
equilibrium in inequality of the status quo by neutralizing democratic time: “time as 
decision-making, choice, and possibility.”150 Credit is an effective tool of anti-democratic 
control because it creates, through legal mechanisms such as credit scoring, punitive 
bankruptcy proceedings, and contractually binding austerity provisions, an infrastructure 
for anticipating and warding off “every potential ‘deviation’ in the behavior of the debtor 
the future might hold.”151 In this light, it appears that the financial innovation and 
“democratization of credit” from the 1970s to the 2000s actually served to neutralize the 
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risk posed by a desegregated state and an empowered citizenry. The securitized debt 
economy served to reduce “the future and its possibilities to current power relations,” 
appropriating “not only the present labor time of wage-earners and of the population in 
general” but “each person’s future as well as the future of society as a whole . . . the raw 
material of all political, social, or esthetic change.”152 An indebted citizenry and indebted 
governments, as long as they honor their debt obligations, have little say in how they act 
in the future and little ability to set their own priorities, which are instead set by the 
assessments of creditors and their agents. In the following section, I examine in further 
detail one struggle to neutralize democratic time through the manufacture of a debt crisis 
that led to the emergency takeover and bankruptcy of Detroit, Michigan. 
 
III. Debt Crisis, Emergency Management, and Neoliberal 
Authoritarianism 
 
 For a variety of reasons, cities have been on the front line of neoliberal 
adjustments and experiments since the 1970s. The city arguably constitutes what Jamie 
Peck and Adam Tickell refer to as “the bleeding edge of processes of punitive-institution 
building, social surveillance, and authoritarian governance” associated with what they 
call “neoliberalization.”153 This is not totally surprising as cities have historically been 
the sites of what, in the frame of neoliberal governmentality, would be viewed as 
democracy’s excesses: organized labor, large public-sector workforces, student militancy 
and protests, and large, hyper-segregated black and brown communities unable to move 
to the suburbs due to racist housing covenants and redlining practices. As I touched on 
briefly in my discussion of municipal credit and credit rating agencies in the previous 
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chapter, the importance and power of debt as both a life-line and restrictive tether for 
American cities has grown tremendously since the 1960s as deindustrialization and white 
flight to the suburbs eroded cities’ tax bases.154 The neoliberal dismantling and 
transformation of the welfare state, beginning in earnest in the 1980s under the Reagan 
administration, used the rhetorical guise of stimulating the economy by cutting taxes and 
returning power and responsibility to states and localities to slash federal funding to 
cities, forcing them to compete with each other in the private municipal debt market to 
fund projects and services. 155  Moreover, cities continue to be burdened with the costs 
associated with unfunded federal social control mandates to build and maintain prisons 
and increase police forces, further compelling them to incur debt.156 In this way, cities 
were put in a highly precarious and dependent position, while at the same time they were 
positioned to appear free and responsible for choosing their own fates. Either they could 
continue to provide jobs and services and make up the funding shortfall using debt 
financing––under the supervision and on the terms of the credit rating agencies––or they 
would be starved of funding and end up in a fiscal crisis like that of New York City in 
1975.  
 The New York City debt crisis of 1975 offers one of the first examples of a 
neoliberal-style structural adjustment on American soil. It followed the model of the 
U.S.-backed coup in Chile in 1973, which was used as a test run by University of 
Chicago trained economists to implement neoliberal “shock therapy”: tax cuts, privatized 
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services, cuts to social spending and trade deregulation.157 The threat of crisis, 
exemplified by the fate of New York City, coupled with the discipline imposed by credit 
rating agencies—the gatekeepers of municipal credit markets—induced cities to accept 
austerity politics, reduce budgets, and abandon the rights and social provisions associated 
with Keynesian liberalism and Marshallian citizenship.158 This strategy mirrored that 
used by the IMF in the Caribbean, Latin American and Africa where manufactured debt 
crises served to “soften up” countries disinclined to accept the Fund’s demands for 
privatization, deep cuts to social spending, and deregulation because these policies were 
extremely unpopular with citizens.159 As Naomi Klein relates, “Coming unraveled by 
hyperinflation and too indebted to say no to demands that came bundled with foreign 
loans, governments accepted 'shock treatment' on the promise that it would save them 
from deeper disaster.”160  
 We see here another way in which debt acts as a colonial technique of temporal 
control; it serves as a vehicle of “shock” or “crisis,” creating what Giorgio Agamben calls 
a “state of exception.”161 A state of exception involves “the suspension of the juridical 
order itself,” historically declared during a state of siege, insurrection, or civil war in 
which the constitution is suspended and expansive powers are transferred to an executive 
authority who may issue decrees with the force of law.162 While states of exception are 
normally assumed to be temporary, according to Agamben, the “voluntary creation of a 
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permanent state of emergency” which may establish (as in the case of the Nazi state) a 
“legal civil war” allowing for the “physical elimination not only of political adversaries 
but of entire categories of citizens . . . has become one of the essential practices of 
contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones.”163 As Walter Benjamin 
remarked during the rise of fascism in Germany: “The tradition of the oppressed teaches 
us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”164  
 Not only during slavery or in the Jim Crow-era, but in today’s colorblind white 
democracy, people of color occupy a permanent state of the exception, as they have been 
branded the constitutive anti-citizen or “internal enemy,” whose constitutional rights and 
protections may be suspended at a moment’s notice.165 This plays out in the interactions 
of individual African Americans with police forces, especially when they are singled out, 
outnumbered, or (seemingly) out of public view. At the larger scale of the population and 
the city, where overt racism and state violence have the potential to cause greater public 
outcry, and punitive adjustment policies may affect both whites and non-whites, 
neoliberals have perfected the art of seizing on debt crises as one of their core tactical 
nostrums in order to “act swiftly, to impose rapid and irreversible change before the 
crisis-racked society slip[s] back into the ‘tyranny of the status quo.’”166 Truly radical 
free-market transformations have proved to be too difficult to impose democratically, and 
thus, creating an “atmosphere of large-scale crisis” as the necessary pretext to overrule 
the expressed desires of voters and their representatives becomes essential.167  
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 Credit and debt are doubly propitious in this regard because, on the one hand, 
easy credit creates a boom time in which cities can finance capital investments and 
services while interest accrues to lenders and investors, while on the other hand, debt 
default creates a crisis which, through the emergency powers of a singular executive or 
team of experts put in charge, the city may become a “clean slate on which to build a 
reengineered model society.”168 In other words, debt’s crisis temporality creates a rift in 
everyday democratic time where normal expectations and processes slow down or stop 
while authoritarian transformations may speed up and be rapidly implemented. 
 With this in mind, let us examine how the declaration of a debt crisis in Detroit, 
Michigan in 2013 led to the suspension and sidelining of the city’s democratically elected 
officials, its takeover by an emergency manger, and the city’s structural adjustment via 
bankruptcy proceeding. Since the 1970s, Detroit, inasmuch as it is identified with its 
majority-Black population and is considered a “Black city,” has been subject to increased 
perceptions of credit risk and a lower estimations of creditworthiness. Lester Spence 
argues that to the extent that the “American city as we know it is not only a hub for the 
well-fitted entrepreneurial class but also for the poor and nonwhite,” cities like Detroit 
have been represented as “dangerous, crime ridden, and inefficient” and their governing 
institutions have been depicted as corrupt.169 Detroit, a city with a history of radical black 
labor organizing, a solid black middle class, black home-ownership, and as a seat of 
autonomous black political power and citizenship, arguably has the potential to exemplify 
the abolition-democracy envisioned by Du Bois, in which African Americans have been 
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able to achieve education, the ownership of land and capital, exercise their civil rights 
and govern themselves.170 Therefore, it is not surprising, if we consider neoliberal 
governmentality to be a racial project that seeks to reinvent white democracy, that Detroit 
has been portrayed—by the credit rating agencies, the Michigan governor, and the 
mainstream media—as a hopelessly indebted subject, undeserving of credit, respect, or 
autonomy. This in spite of Detroit’s four decades under austere African American 
mayors—from Coleman Young to Kwame Kilpatrick—who took pages right out of the 
neoliberal playbook.171  
For instance, Jason Hackworth argues that under Mayor Coleman Young from 
1973-1993, Detroit embraced the “virtues of fiscal conservatism” with less reluctance 
than Philadelphia or New York, adapting the conduct of the city in search of an 
investment grade credit rating and in order to attract business investment.172 However, 
despite his aggressive efforts to make city government more austere, for years these 
actions did not result in a favorable credit rating, and in the nineties The Economist called 
Young “the creature of a discredited school of Democratic politics, over keen on 
entitlements and given to playing on class and racial antagonisms,” a criticism that was 
trotted out again in 2013 to blame Young for the city’s bankruptcy crisis.173 Not only 
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does The Economist use the word “creature” to refer to Young, tapping into a long history 
of whites representing black identity as a marker of the subordinated status of the non-
human animal vis-à-vis white civilized humanity;174 here Detroit’s commitment to 
abolition-democracy stands in as a colorblind indicator of its blackness and “discredited” 
status, and is used by neoliberal paternalists to portray the city as irresponsible and 
“behind the times” of neoliberal modernity, generating what Spence would call an 
“affective shift away from progressive government and its solutions and toward more 
punitive ones.”175  
Both Hackworth and Timothy Sinclair note how Detroit, despite its exemplary 
neoliberal conduct, has largely been unable to garner the same credit rating as 
comparable cities displaying similar conduct, but without black city leaders or a majority-
black population.176 The supposedly race neutral evaluation of Detroit’s “population” has 
also come to serve as a crucial factor justifying the city’s lack of credit. In an interview, 
Brenton W. Harries, the president of Standard & Poor’s from 1972 to 1981, denied that 
race was a factor in rating judgments, but he did mention, in reference to Detroit, that 
“this particular mix of population requires more welfare payments, more housing. 
They’re more of a drain as opposed to being more a contributor.”177 While rating 
agencies insist that they focus on the neutral quantitative dynamics of a city’s population, 
Sinclair stresses that there is data showing a “relationship between the higher rungs of the 
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rating scales and home ownership, and the lower rungs and predominance of black 
Americans in the local population.”178 
  In March of 2013, the State of Michigan’s Republican governor Rick Snyder 
ordered the City of Detroit to be placed under emergency management. This event 
signaled a watershed moment in which cities in Michigan comprising approximately 10% 
of Michigan’s total population but over 50% of Michigan’s African American population, 
had been placed under an exceptional form of non-democratic control for perceived 
financial mismanagement. The governor’s power to declare an economic state of 
exception was authorized by a recently updated Michigan state law called the “Local 
Financial Stability and Choice Act” or PA 436.179 Four months later on July 18th, under 
the unilateral control of its newly appointed emergency manager—an African American 
bankruptcy lawyer with Michigan roots named Kevyn Orr—the City of Detroit filed for 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. In his letter authorizing Orr’s decision to file for bankruptcy, 
Governor Snyder proclaimed that the bankruptcy filing was the end result of “60 years of 
decline for the city,” a period in which “reality was often ignored.”180 In his remarks, 
Snyder disavows the numerous structural and contingent factors leading up to Detroit’s 
bankruptcy—chief among them a precipitous drop in state revenue sharing with the city 
coupled with the effects of the 2008 mortgage crisis and property foreclosures that put the 
city’s already strapped tax base underwater—and, in a rhetorical move that tars Detroit as 
beholden to its supposedly profligate past, makes the city singularly responsible for its 
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own decline, which Snyder extends back to the era when whites started abandoning the 
city.  
Snyder is not the only one with this type of explanation for the city’s bankruptcy. 
In October 2013, Detroit’s then mayor Kwame Kilpatrick was sentenced to 28 years in 
prison––an exceptionally harsh punishment––for his conviction on counts of racketeering 
and extortion. In a New York Times article describing the sentencing, Kilpatrick’s 
punishment is presented as “the closest [Detroiters] will get to holding past leaders 
accountable for decades of disappointment and poor fiscal decisions.”181 Kilpatrick is 
described as accelerating Detroit’s move toward bankruptcy and as a “poster child of 
what went wrong with the city and why it went bankrupt.”182  
For his part, Kevyn Orr, emergency manager of Detroit from July 2013 until 
December 2014, has remarked that Detroit’s black politicians were happy to be 
complacent and “for a long time the city was dumb, lazy, happy and rich.”183 Moreover, 
Orr told the Wall Street Journal that, in his role as unelected emergency manager, he 
would be a “benevolent” dictator, and insisted that he had “support from the silent 
majority,” a dog-whistle line appealing to white racial resentment lifted directly from 
Richard Nixon.184 Even U.S. Bankruptcy judge Steven Rhodes who oversaw Detroit’s 
bankruptcy proceedings, in an interview marking his retirement at the conclusion of the 
trial, commented, “Part of the decline of the city itself can be attributed to our unique 
racial circumstances . . . The city was desperate, and desperate people and desperate 
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entities do desperate things.”185 In their hardly veiled attempts to blame Detroit’s 
dysfunction on the presumed cultural dysfunction of its black citizens, Snyder, the New 
York Times, Orr and Rhodes obfuscate the way in which, after years of conduct that 
conformed so impeccably to the market-driven norms and expectations of the rating 
agencies, banks, developers and state officials, it was actually a short-term debt crisis 
legally engineered to trigger an authoritarian takeover that drove the city into 
insolvency.186 
The emergency manager law, PA 436, authorizes “remedial measures” to be taken 
when cities and school districts display signs of “financial stress,” and it also authorizes a 
state of exception when these signs add up to a “financial emergency” at which point an 
“emergency manager,” appointed by the governor, is placed in almost total sovereign 
control of the city or school district with a mandate and powers to act in his or her sole 
discretion to solve its problems.187 The law contends that for the credit of the city and the 
state to be preserved—and by extension, for private creditors to be paid, credit rating 
agencies satisfied, and for the free market in debt to continue operating smoothly—
“prudent fiscal management” must be restored, “restructuring of contractual obligations” 
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must be permitted, and the sovereignty of the local people and their democratically 
elected representatives must be suspended and transferred to an expert administrator.188  
The law couches this justification for extreme intervention in the case of fiscal 
mismanagement in the language of security and risk, asserting that “the fiscal stability of 
local governments is necessary to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this 
state and that it is a valid public purpose” for the state to provide for a range of 
disciplinary measures if financial instability is suspected.189 One can speculate that it is 
primarily the health, safety, and welfare of the white citizen that is at stake here, but the 
law remains fully within the colorblind rhetorical space of neoliberal exception 
whereby a city’s debt default is presented as a “nonpolitical and nonideological” problem 
in need of a technical solution provided by an expert manager brought in from the 
outside.190 
PA 436 enables the governor to appoint an agent with the power to restructure and 
monetize what had been off limits even under previous neoliberal regimes: entrenched 
pension and healthcare benefits, collective bargaining agreements, and valuable public 
assets held by the city, like the Detroit Institute of Arts, the Department of Water and 
Sewerage, and Detroit’s public lighting grid.191 PA 436 provides the emergency manager 
(EM) with broad powers beyond those of the mayor and city council including the power 
to violate city charters and even the Michigan State constitution by authorizing the EM to 
unilaterally “reject, modify, or terminate” collective bargaining agreements, take over 
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and potentially alter a city’s pension funds, merge or eliminate city departments, hire and 
fire city employees, bring in private contractors, auditors or technical personnel to take 
over city functions, lease, sell, or transfer city-owned assets, merge the city with another 
municipality, and even disincorporate and dissolve the city itself.192 Importantly, the EM 
may “recommend to the governor that the municipality file for chapter 9 bankruptcy, and 
. . . proceed to represent the city in bankruptcy negotiations with creditors.”193 This state 
of non-democratic exception for the people of Detroit authorized by PA 436 is 
supposedly necessary because, according to Governor Snyder, “the current system has 
not been working” and so the time has come “to bring all our resources to bear to say: 
‘let’s just solve the problem.’”194  
The use of debt crises to install emergency management regimes in Detroit, other 
Michigan cites, and, more recently, on an even greater scale in Puerto Rico, offers 
compelling evidence that anti-black racism and white supremacy are not a coincidental or 
epiphenomenal aspects of the neoliberal threat to democracy, but central to it. When 
Detroit was placed under the power of an emergency manager, several majority-black 
cities and school districts in Michigan like Benton Harbor, Flint, Pontiac and the Detroit 
Public Schools were already under emergency management. Up until December 2014 
when Detroit exited emergency management, over 50% of Michigan’s black population 
had lost their right to democratic representation and self-government due to emergency 
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takeover.195 EMs in Detroit, Flint, Benton Harbor and elsewhere have gutted city service 
provision, disciplined labor, cut health and pension benefits, privatized public assets, and 
even shut off residents’ water as a means of collecting past due bills.196 Just as cities were 
subjected to the racial redlining of real estate, which formally and informally enforced the 
segregation of their populations and reduced mobility and economic opportunity for 
people of color, predatory lending, “reverse-redlining,” property-tax foreclosures,197 
“criminal justice debt”198 and emergency management hyper-concentrate the effects of 
both slow and rapid violence on black cities and populations, and jeopardize the 
prospects of democracy for all.199  
The austerity measures enacted through Michigan’s emergency management 
regime have caused severe harm to the residents of the affected cities, especially people 
of color. The strategy that Snyder and Orr pursued during Orr’s tenure as EM was to 
clear the ground of undesirable legacy costs, inefficient labor contracts, and to privatize 
the infrastructure serving Detroit and other cities. In Detroit, the governor and emergency 
manager pursued measures that have proven effective in making the city attractive for 
business development and a settler population of “creative” gentrifiers, drawn to the 
city’s gritty charm and its potential to serve as a blank canvass for social innovation. The 
city’s existing population—weighed down by the slow violence of white flight, 
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segregation, deindustrialization, indebted control and imposed austerity—are treated as 
bankrupts who no longer deserve the right to self-government, and must either be 
disciplined or allowed to die.200 As Orr confidently explained to The Wall Street Journal: 
“The untold story of Detroit is young people . . . I met with two dozen entrepreneurs . . . 
these are kids in their 20s who can go anywhere and are making it work.”201 In his own 
small-scale rendition of trickle-down economics, Orr hopes that his plan will eventually 
push development from the downtown business district and emergent hipster colonies 
like Corktown—which he describes as “the frontier of civilization”—out to the blighted 
neighborhoods.202   
However, from the perspective of those most affected by the results of this 
experiment in neoliberal authoritarianism, the outlook for Detroit does not appear as rosy 
as Orr promises. In the words of Michigan State Senator Virgil Smith, Jr. spoken in 
protest on the floor of the Michigan Senate upon the passage of PA 436, “You guys act 
like this is some kind of panacea; that it’s going to actually get things in order. . . . All 
this is rearranging the chairs on the deck so somebody else can take this money and put it 
in their pocket. . . . Folks could care less about coming into the ghetto to get things right, 
at the end of the day.”203 State Senator Coleman Young II of Detroit was even less 
circumspect with his comments about emergency management:  
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If you are looking for an example of the success of EMs, look no further 
than DPS [Detroit Public Schools]. We have an emergency dictator over 
there, and they still have books that don’t show up, they still have Internet 
that doesn’t work, and they have fifty kids to a class. The 1999 takeover had 
folks who were supposed to be fixing school districts, but instead they 
started to rape, rob, pillage, raid, and blame the school district. We must 
reject these municipal marauders as they come into our districts and take 
away our freedom and emancipation. . . .  the definition of insanity is doing 
the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.204 
 
In Flint, which was placed under emergency management by Snyder in 2011, the 
result of their cost-cutting strategy led to the decision, by the emergency manager Ed 
Kurtz, to use the polluted Flint River, starting in April of 2014, as an interim source of 
the city’s drinking water.205 It wasn’t revealed until July of 2015 that Flint’s residents, 
including at least 6,000 children, had been drinking and bathing in hazardous water as a 
result of this decision, leading to record levels of lead poisoning.206  
The people living in the cities most affected by the discipline of the rating 
agencies and the authoritarian control of emergency managers or bankruptcy judges 
recognize that these governmental techniques and the neoliberal transformations they 
enact have done the opposite of improving their general economic conditions or quality 
of life. While Detroit’s emergency manager has packed his bags and glossy magazine 
spreads proclaim a “new day” for Detroit, an unelected “Financial Review Commission” 
will retain control over the city budget for the next thirteen years.207 The “Plan of 
Adjustment” for the city, agreed to in bankruptcy court, lays out “cost-saving initiatives” 
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in addition to the cuts to retiree pensions and city employee healthcare, which will keep 
the city in a permanent state of austerity for years to come.208  
In response to those who have criticized the emergency manager law as anti-
democratic and racist, Governor Snyder has sounded an upbeat tone, suggesting that 
people shouldn’t waste time making it a political issue by assigning blame or “discussing 
how we got there.”209 Instead, he told the public: “The long term answer to this solution 
is not to dwell on the negative . . . we need to use a phrase I live by: Relentless Positive 
Action. We need no blame, no credit. We need to simply solve this problem and head 
toward a bright exciting Detroit."210 In his response to Detroiters’ criticisms that their city 
had been taken away from them and put into bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes had this advice: 
“I urge you now to forget your anger. Your enduring and collective memory of what 
happened here, and your memory of your anger about it, will be exactly what will prevent 
this from ever happening again. It must never happen again.”211 He followed this 
statement by encouraging angry voters to engage in the democratic process, telling them 
“It is your City,” apparently missing or disregarding the bitter irony.212 
These statements by Snyder, Orr, and Rhodes encouraging political amnesia and 
complacency after Detroiters’ democratic rights were trampled, are reminiscent of the 
way freedmen were encouraged to forget the crimes of slavery. In Saidiya Hartman’s 
words:  
The repression of slavery's unspeakable features and the shockingly 
amnesiac portrait of the peculiar institution produced national innocence yet 
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enhanced the degredation of the past for those still hindered by its vestiges 
because they became the locus of blame and the site of aberrance. While the 
enduring legacy of slavery was discernable in the disfigurements of 
freedom, its vestiges and degredations were addressed almost exclusively 
as problems of conduct and character.213 
 
The emergency takeover and structural adjustment of Detroit and other cities are 
presented as if they were totally apolitical and rational solutions to crises caused by the 
cities’ own mismanagement and moral failings. Those responsible for orchestrating and 
taking advantage of these crises attempt to project their own benevolence and innocence, 
while encouraging the victims of this racialized violence to forget what happened and 
move on. 
  
IV. Conclusion: Toward an Abolition-Democracy 
 
 This chapter has attempted to provide an answer to the question “What’s Goin’ 
On?” at the intersection of debt and democracy under the contemporary neoliberal regime 
of racial capitalism. Here, and in previous chapters, I provided evidence that American 
democracy, in its past and present forms, has been corrupted by “white credit,” that is, 
whiteness considered as a presupposed badge of moral rectitude, economic 
creditworthiness and full political citizenship. White credit has historically been 
predicated on reinforcing the degraded, indebted, and inferior status of Native Americans, 
African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans and other groups deemed “not-white” and 
placing them on the debit side of the human racial equation.214 To the extent that the 
promise of American democracy has been predicated on the mythology of the American 
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Dream, which disavows the violent history of racial capitalism to project the image of 
America as an even playing field, I contend that avowing the staying power of white 
credit in contemporary politics allows us to disrupt ongoing forms of racialized violence 
obscured by America’s presumed democratic status.  
In concluding this chapter, I want to make abundantly clear the political stakes of 
the dissertation as a whole. Identifying the nexus of debt and racism and its anti-
democratic effects in different political temporalities and geographies is, in my view, 
absolutely crucial to challenging ongoing practices of racial domination and economic 
exploitation. Without a critical theory of creditor-debtor relations and the type of neo-
colonial government and political economy they enable, such as the one I offer here, 
academics, journalists, experts, and politicians may continue to persuasively portray 
indebtedness leading to economic inequality and authoritarian forms of government as 
the politically and racially neutral results of individual choices made freely and for which 
the indebted subject alone is responsible.  
We see in the case study from the state of Michigan this very dynamic: the 
strategic deployment of credit/debt as a means of “shock therapy” leading to authoritarian 
control of local government serving to clear the way for domestic settler colonialism. 
Indebted control functions via the power asymmetries produced by racialized creditor-
debtor relations wherein white credit has historically afforded those considered white the 
enjoyment of moral superiority and full citizenship, while the indebtedness foisted onto 
people of color has justified their ongoing exploitation and disenfranchisement. Recently, 
with the securitization and expansion of credit during the neoliberal period, the ranks of 
the indebted have come to include a much larger slice of the population, placing those in 
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the white working and middle classes closer to the subject position and status of indebted 
people of color – a phenomenon that has fomented dissident acts of resistance as well as a 
reactionary embrace, by some, of the white supremacist politics of “Trumpism” – a turn 
that William Connolly calls “aspirational fascism.”215     
  This analysis therefore leads us back to the pressing question: “What is to be 
done?” What is to be done about the slow death of democracy through the mechanisms of 
credit and debt? What is to be done to confront and move beyond the brutal legacy of an 
America which, for most of its history, could best be described as a Herrenvolk 
democracy serving a racialized system of capitalism wherein debt was both a mark of 
degraded non-white/non-citizen status and a tool of moral condemnation, criminalization 
and servitude? What is to be done to account for the unacknowledged debts the country 
owes to its indigenous peoples and former slaves? What is to be done about the tragic 
situation in which the seductions of credit and the financial burdens and anxieties 
produced by mounting debts have led a large section of working and middle-class white 
Americans to embrace a politics of revenge against immigrants and minorities rather than 
a politics of solidarity with their brown and black neighbors to combat the machinations 
of the ultra-wealthy elite that profits handsomely from their combined suffering? Indeed, 
how do we forge pluralistic alliances and solidarities among the indebted majority 
population that is divided along racial lines by a governmentality of indebted control 
while it is collectively dispossessed of wealth, time, and energy?  
Within the scope of this dissertation, my general response to the “Lenin question” 
is to forcefully raise these critical questions about debt, race, capitalism and democracy 
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as part of a call to action. However, to provide at least a slightly more satisfying answer 
to this question, and with the politics of indebtedness, neoliberalism, and white 
supremacy firmly in our sights, let us very briefly return to the question of “abolition” 
raised at the beginning of this chapter. In their book Undercommons: Fugitive Planning 
and Black Study, Stefano Harney and Fred Moten ask:  
What is, so to speak, the object of abolition? Not so much the abolition of 
prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have 
slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the 
elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society.216 
 
Abolition as the founding of a new society. How could we make this society an abolition-
democracy? In other words, what must be abolished in order to make Du Bois’ dream of 
abolition-democracy live? Debt. What type of abolition might truly lead to a radically 
pluralistic democratic society? Debt abolition. But not the abolition of all forms of debt. 
We must abolish the debt racked up as a result of the gift of freedom. Colonial debt. The 
unearned debt of slavery. Debt incurred at the behest and in the service of white credit. 
Perhaps even, at the level of our moral psychology, the debt that makes us feel guilty; the 
debt that recommends punishment, self-abuse, and incites in us the desire for revenge, the 
desire to get payback.  
 From what we’ve learned by taking a hard look in this study at the history and 
politics of credit and debt—from the birth pangs of capitalism to the present—the species 
of debt that must be abolished is the debt that is produced as the hallmark and artifact of 
all forms of colonization. Credit and debt that together form a political weapon for the 
(dis)possession of one’s freedom, which works by and through one’s very desire for 
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freedom. We must seek the abolition of the type of debt that follows on the heels of the 
offer of credit; the type of debt that must beg to be forgiven. Seeking the forgiveness of 
monetary and financial debts while leaving the racialized framework of existential credit 
and debt in place is only a matter of buying time. It is this colonial form of debt-thinking, 
which animates the governmentality of indebted servitude and control that must be 
abolished. Indeed, as Moten and Harney put it, “Governance is the wit of the colonial 
official, the CIA woman, the NGO man;” it is the offer of credit and the prospect of 
recognition that invites and seduces the colonized to participate in their own 
domination.217 It is this promise of credit, premised on the supremacy and desirability of 
whiteness that must, in the final analysis, be abolished.  
If it is this society that operates on the colonial relation between the racially 
superior creditor and the racially inferior debtor that must be abolished, then what would 
debt look like in an abolition-democracy? Perhaps we cannot and would not want to 
recreate the gift-giving societies studied and portrayed by Marcel Mauss, but we can be 
inspired by these visions of societies in which debt circulates in a spirit of generosity, 
abundance and competitive displays of excess wealth rather than out of a desire to punish 
and/or make a profit. Mauss offers examples from non-Western societies and Nietzsche 
offers examples from antiquity in which debts ran in all directions, creating bonds of 
mutual respect and friendship rather than one way streams of interest.  
However, we must remember that these practices and this alternate way of 
approaching debt are not completely outmoded; they coexist and cohabitate with the 
dominant mode of credit and debt characteristic of contemporary racial capitalism, which 
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I have attempted to theorize in these pages. Moten and Harney express this differing 
valence of debt in words more eloquent than my own:  
They say we have too much debt. We need better credit, more credit, less 
spending. They offer us credit repair, credit counseling, micro-credit, 
personal financial planning. . . . But our debts stay bad. We keep buying 
another song, another round. It is not credit we seek nor even debt but bad 
debt which is to say real debt, the debt that cannot be repaid, the debt at a 
distance, the debt without creditor, the black debt, the queer debt, the 
criminal debt. Excessive debt, incalculable debt, debt for no reason, debt 
broken from credit, debt as its own principle.218 
 
They affirm debt that cannot be repaid, debt without credit or creditor, debt that stays “bad” 
in a good way. To the extent that debt is, for better or worse, intertwined with the meaning, 
identity, and everyday practices of black life (and in varying ways in the identities and 
ways of living of all groups denied the benefits of white credit) it would be 
counterproductive, impossible and indeed harmful to attempt to extricate the two. Better to 
affirm “bad debt,” emptying the word debt of its derogatory meaning (in a way similar to 
the affirmative signification of the word “queer”) in order to affirm the ones it describes – 
to affirm the black debtor, the queer debtor, the Native debtor, the criminal debtor, the 
student debtor, the single-mother debtor, the artist debtor, the teacher debtor, the nurse 
debtor, the immigrant debtor, the indebted demos struggling desperately to avoid being 
undone. 
 To found a truly abolitionist democratic polity governed by and accountable to the 
demos in all of its rhizomatic glory, I advocate that the asymmetrical and hierarchical 
relation between creditor and debtor be broken in favor of a multitude of incalculable little 
debts. If, as Moten and Harney argue, “Credit is a means of privatization and debt a means 
of socialization,” then perhaps affirming, multiplying, and accelerating debt is one means 
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of affirming social democracy by over-drafting the accounts of liberal democracy, and in 
so doing, breaking up the white, unitary, “civilized” sovereign model of the creditor into a 
thousand tiny debtors, a thousand little acts of socialization, a thousand micropolitical debts 
escaping in all directions.219 If credit is a means of privatizing the public and enclosing the 
commons, then its abolition coupled with an agenda for the encouragement of bad debts 
and the recognition that we are all, in fact, hopelessly indebted to and reliant upon each 
other, is perhaps one means of reclaiming and recreating a common space – a space of 
refuge for bad debtors among other bad debtors from which democracy may draw strength 
and sustenance.220 This, in my estimation, is at least one promising angle from which we 
might respond to the dangers posed to democracy by the forces of credit and debt today. 
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